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TAKEN FROM HERE TO WHERE IT CAME FROM AND TAKEN TO A 
PLACE AND USED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IT CAN ONLY 
REMAIN AS A REPRESENTATION OF WHAT IT WAS WHERE IT 
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Abstract 
There has been excellent academic research, not only on diaspora, but also on post-
conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina in regards to transitional justice and peace-
building. However, the factors that play a role vis-à-vis diaspora mobilization and 
transitional justice have been explored less. Theorizing has been ad hoc. Thus, the 
guiding question of this thesis is: How do diaspora utilize the political environments 
in their hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of transitional justice, in what 
ways and why? I develop a typological theory of diaspora mobilization, focusing 
on transitional justice claims, to systematize understanding and to develop mid-
range level explanations. Four types of diaspora mobilization (engaged, involved, 
reactive, and inactive) are theorized based on three independent variables: 
citizenship regimes, collective claims, and the presence or absence of 
‘translocalism’ within diaspora communities. In particular, the more open 
citizenship regimes are, the higher the potential for diaspora mobilization will be. 
The thesis builds on the idea of translocal communities being an important factor 
in helping to determine the level of diaspora mobilization, along with the presence 
of collective claims in relation to transitional justice processes in the post-conflict 
homeland environment. The study is based on a qualitative research design using a 
unique two-level comparative lens, focusing on three countries in Europe (Sweden, 
France, and Germany) as well as four different cities within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Srebrenica). The research 
methods include semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and process 
tracing with multi-sited fieldwork. Thus, transnational, translocal, host country, and 
homeland influences are incorporated into analysis. The study provides 
comparative rigor to research on diaspora mobilization that is particular and rare. It 
establishes diaspora as an important actor to consider in transitional justice based 
efforts and provides a new perspective on the idea of translocalism.
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A Note on Diacritical Marks  
Throughout the thesis, I have used letters with diacritics, as in the original languages 
from which these names and words come from. This was done purposefully as 
sources were used in original languages, interviews were conducted mostly in local 
languages, and generally reflects on the author’s fluency in these same languages. 
French was used sparingly during fieldwork as well as writing, and is thus not 
included.   
 
The letters with diacritical marks in Bosnian/Croatian/(Montenegrin)/Serbian, 
locally referred to as BC(M)S, are as follows:  
- ć is pronounced as a soft 'ch' as in the word 'church' 
- č is pronounced as a hard 'ch' as in the word 'chimney' 
- đ is pronounced as a soft 'dj' as in the word 'jackal' 
- dž is pronounced as a hard 'dʒ’ as in the word ‘jeans,’ or by pronouncing the 
author’s first name correctly.  
- š is pronounced as 'sch' as in the word 'shimmer' 
- ž is pronounced as 'zh' as the 's' in the word 'pleasure' 
 
The letters with diacritical marks in German, better known as Umlauts, are as 
follows: 
- Ä is pronounced as the ‘a’ in the word ‘day’ or the ‘e’ in ‘get’ 
- Ö is pronounced as the ‘u’ in the word ‘burn’ 
- Ü is pronounced similar to the sound ‘ew’ in ‘stew’  
 
The letters with diacritical marks in Swedish are as follows:  
- Å is pronounced as the ‘au’ in the name ‘Paul’ 
- Ä is pronounced as the ‘a’ in the word ‘care’ 
- Ö is pronounced as the ‘u’ in ‘purr’
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH or Bosnia from here on out) today is a country often 
recognized and remembered for the war that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia 
and its subsequent bloodshed (1992 – 1995). It remains outside of the European 
Union (EU), marred by economic problems such as high unemployment, endemic 
corruption, as well as a host of domestic challenges since the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Accords in 1995. A myriad of published work analyzes the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the resulting challenges of the Bosnian state. Particular attention is 
paid to issues of ethnic politics, genocide, democratization, peacebuilding, and 
transitional justice.1 These remain at the center of its contested sovereignty2 within 
the Western Balkans, a direct result of the constitutional structure set up by the 
Dayton Peace Accords.  
Often considered the diaspora, a large number of Bosnian citizens were 
displaced and ultimately resettled in numerous countries in Europe and the world 
as a result of the 1992-1995 conflict. Their mobilization has not been examined in 
a systematic, comparative way, particularly around issues of transitional justice.3 
This dissertation addresses this gap both empirically and theoretically. It deepens 
discussions and bridges different strands of academic scholarship on diaspora, 
                                                
1 For example, see: Bose, Sumantra. 2002. Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and 
International Intervention. London: C. Hurst.; Toal, Gerard, and Carl T Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia 
Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. New York: Oxford University Press.; Woodward, 
Susan L., and Brookings Institution. 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold 
War. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. 
2 Krasner, Stephen D., ed. 2001. Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political 
Possibilities. New York: Columbia University Press.; Different aspects of diasporas and contested 
sovereignty lie at the core of the ERC-funded project this thesis was part of.  
3 This scenario serves as the starting point for this thesis project within the framework of the larger 
ERC Project entitled “Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty.” 
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transnationalism, transitional justice, and the Balkans with multi-sited fieldwork in 
BiH and three host countries in Europe.  
While there has been previous academic research on diaspora and much 
literature on post-conflict BiH in regards to transitional justice, peace-building and 
international governance, how diaspora mobilize around these issues has not been 
addressed in detail, especially vis-à-vis diaspora mobilization. As a result, 
theorizing has been ad hoc. However, considering the continued stalemate when it 
comes to issues of transitional justice and ultimately, reconciliation in BiH, as well 
as the size of the country’s diaspora, it is important to understand the process of 
diaspora mobilization on these efforts. 
This thesis adopts a working definition of diaspora based on Adamson and 
Demetriou’s work which encompasses the agency diaspora have when mobilizing 
politically in order to generate support for their causes. “A diaspora can be defined 
as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over 
time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense 
of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) 
display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social 
collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and 
transnational links.”4 This definition highlights that to be diaspora, there is a certain 
level of activity required with a sense of urgency to mobilize towards issues, usually 
sustained through the development of links amongst diaspora members. 
                                                
4Adamson, Fiona, and Madeleine Demetriou. 2007. “Remapping the Boundaries of `State’ and 
`National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing.” European Journal of 
International Relations 13 (4): 497. 
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Bosnians who live abroad have been studied with a particular focus on their 
ethnic belonging, and whether this influences their reconciliatory attitudes for 
example.5 Less often, research has examined other cleavages such as urban vs. rural 
backgrounds. 6  The predominance towards focusing on individuals’ ethnic 
belonging remains relevant in research undertaken by Bosnian authors as well, who 
most often focus on discussing the Bosniak diaspora and focusing on religious ties.7 
Alternatively, they stress individuals whose ethnic backgrounds are Croat or Serb 
as being more aligned with Croatian and Serbian diaspora associations.8 The idea 
of a unified Bosnian diaspora, as with any diaspora, is usually contested due to its, 
in part, ‘imagined’ nature. 9  Diaspora research has previously focused on the 
autonomy of voices within diaspora groups and the lack of perceived homogeneity 
among diaspora populations, regardless of their origins.10 Hence, the definition 
utilized throughout this thesis focuses on a diaspora’s ability to channel particular 
claims and represent collective interests, in this case those focused on BiH as the 
homeland. Even though there are three main ethnic groups in BiH (Bosnian 
Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs), this thesis focuses on diaspora 
                                                
5 Kostic, Roland, and Johnathan Hall. 2009. “Does Integration Encourage Reconciliatory Attitudes 
among Diasporas?” In Working Paper No. 7, Global Migration and Transnational Politics. 
6 Halilovich, Hariz. 2013. Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory, and Trans-
Local Identities in Bosnian War-Torn Communities. Space and Place, v. 10. New York: Berghahn 
Books. 
7 Dervišević, Alaga. 2006. Bošnjaci U Dijaspori: Historijat, Problemi, Analize I Perspektive / 
Knjiga Prva. Sarajevo, BiH: Bosanska riječ. 
8 Iseni, Bashkim, Didier Ruedin, Dina Bader, and Denise Efionayi-Mader. 2014. “The Population 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Switzerland.” Federal Office for Migration (FOM), Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation (SDC). 
9 Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 
10 Feron, Elise. 2013. “From ‘Long Distance Nationalism’ to Autonomization.” In Migration and 
Organized Civil Society: Rethinking National Policy, edited by Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, 63–
78. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science 80. New York: Routledge.; Koinova, 
Maria. 2012. “Autonomy and Positionality in Diaspora Politics.” International Political Sociology 
6 (1): 99–103.  
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mobilization which considers the homeland to be BiH, regardless of its members 
ethnic belonging, and which mobilizes predominantly as ‘Bosnian’ diaspora.  
Bosnian diaspora associations place an emphasis on their multi-ethnic 
character and their ties to the Bosnian state as some of the main characteristics of 
their establishment, and in turn, their ties to each other and the homeland.11 The 
diaspora individuals interviewed for this thesis identified themselves as Bosnians 
firstly, and in turn joined and organized diaspora associations as Bosnians, 
regardless of their ethnic background. When interviewees explicitly identified 
themselves as Bosniaks, they did not deny they were also Bosnians, unless they had 
a different citizenship, such as those from the Sandžak region in Serbia for 
example.12 Others noted they were Bosnian, but not Bosniak, even when they 
sometimes had a Muslim background.13 Still others noted they came from a Bosnian 
Serb or Bosnian Croat background, but were Bosnians firstly, and that BiH is their 
homeland, rather than Croatia or Serbia.  
Throughout the thesis, ‘Bosnian’ is used to describe diaspora members who 
identify as such, regardless of their ethnic background. ‘Bosniak’ is used for 
Bosnian Muslims who explicitly identify as such and mobilize through religiously 
based diaspora organizations. The comparative element of examining the Bosnian 
diaspora in different host land contexts highlights the similarities and differences in 
their mobilization. While this includes a primary focus on conflict-generated 
Bosnian diaspora members, each of the chapters also highlights the Bosnian 
                                                
11 Kent, Gregory. 2006. “Organised Diaspora Networks and Homeland Peacebuilding: The 
Bosnian World Diaspora Network as a Potential Development Actor.” Conflict, Security & 
Development 6 (3): 449–69.  
12 This is further discussed in Chapter 7 on France, where Bosniak diaspora members were often 
from the Sandžak region in Serbia, rather than from BiH proper. 
13 Respondents in all three countries noted this throughout their interviews when asked about their 
ethnic background. 
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diaspora population in the hostland as a whole in order to provide a complete picture 
of the diaspora mobilization processes.  
Bosnian diaspora individuals, organizations and associations across Europe 
are increasingly invested in engaging with their homeland, both on a political as 
well as a social basis. They collaborate with nongovernmental organization, find 
creative solutions, and want to make their voices heard not only in the homeland 
and different host lands, and also through online resources and social media. The 
mechanisms that lead otherwise passive members to become mobilized are thus 
increasingly important. However, this is not to say that these mechanisms will 
always be the same, but rather that they will help to trigger mobilization in different 
ways. This is important when considering the investment of diaspora in their 
homelands, especially beyond financial incentives. In countries recovering from 
conflict, diaspora can utilize transitional justice mechanisms and potentially have 
an effect on transitional justice and peacebuilding, on the local or national level. 
Thus, examining diaspora mobilization towards the homeland becomes 
increasingly important as diaspora emerges as a potentially powerful new political 
actor.  
Discussions of diaspora have gained momentum in international relations 
over the last fifteen years. There is an increased discussion of diaspora in regards 
to issues of conflict, security and the potentials of mobilization, resulting from 
initial debate about the relationship between transnationalism and diaspora. Thus, 
the relationship between diaspora and International Relations as a discipline is 
found somewhere between strictly statist, liberal, and constructivist 
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interpretations.14 Further, Lyons and Mandaville make a cogent argument for the 
importance of considering transnational perspectives when looking at comparative 
politics, in particular diaspora actors who engage in homeland politics from 
abroad.15 They state that one of the distinctions of diaspora “is that they challenge 
contemporary notions of how political life should be organized.”16  
Nonetheless, the diaspora literature is at times sporadic and requires more 
theoretical grounding and further rigorous comparative empirical research. In 
particular, diaspora populations cannot be examined outside of the contexts in 
which they find themselves, most obviously the host countries in which they are 
settled. These affect their political views which, combined with their previous 
political experiences, result in different diaspora political engagement. In other 
words, diaspora’s political perceptions in one country develop in parallel with 
diaspora’s political understandings in another country, and with homeland 
populations. While this does not guarantee there will not be overlap and similarities, 
it highlights these develop through slightly different processes. This pertains not 
only to the geopolitical understanding of BiH as a whole country rather than one 
separated into two entities or in any other way, but also perceptions of identity of 
the diaspora, played out in the host countries as well as in BiH with local 
populations. Hence, the comparative analysis of this thesis is particularly relevant. 
To place this into perspective, while less than 3% of BiH’s citizens lived in 
a strictly monoethnic settlement prior to the war. Since the war, there has been a 
                                                
14 Shain, Yossi and Aaron Barth. 2003. “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 57 (3): 2003: 449-479. Shain, Yossi. Kinship & Diasporas in 
International Affairs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. 
15 Lyons, Terrence, and Peter Mandaville. “Think Locally, Act Globally: Toward a Transnational 
Comparative Politics.” International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (June 7, 2010): 124–141. 
16 Ibid., 126.  
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‘reorganization of power relations through ethnic expulsion,’ 17 which in turn also 
contributes to relations between the diaspora and BiH. Considering that the country 
is divided into two entities, the Federation, mostly Bosniak-Croat controlled, and 
the Republika Srpska, controlled by Bosnian Serbs, the relationship between the 
diaspora and each entity brings the diversity of political aims and views to the 
forefront. It thus also brings a new dimension to bottom-up approaches to 
transitional justice as well as peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Hall 
recognizes it is particularly relevant to examine the political attitudes, activities, and 
motivations of diaspora populations, who are distanced from daily ethnonationalist 
politics and instead often live in liberal states with functioning democracies and 
minority rights. 18 This thesis examines in which ways diaspora mobilize amidst 
ethnonationalist politics in the homeland around issues of transitional justice 
including memorialization from different host countries.  
Diaspora, while sometimes disagreeing with certain factions within its 
homeland, nonetheless has the potential to challenge narratives and encourage 
dialogue that not only addresses the past but also looks to the future of the country 
in a more productive way. In this sense, diaspora can aid political actors in the 
homeland as well as undermine their efforts through its own mobilization in host 
countries. For homelands such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states facing 
contested sovereignty, understanding a diaspora’s engagement thus becomes even 
more important.19  In the Bosnian case, such issues include Bosnia’s accession 
                                                
17 Toal, Gerard, and Carl T Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. 
New York: Oxford University Press. p. 116. 
18 Hall, Jonathan. 2010. “The Transnational Dimensions of Societal Reconciliation.” in Working 
Paper No. 14, Global Migration and Transnational Politics. 
19 This is one of the driving ideas behind the case selection for the greater ERC ‘Diasporas and 
Contested Sovereingty’ project which primarily includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, 
and Palestine.  
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process to the EU or its shared international and domestic governance structures 
through the Office of the High Representative (OHR from here on out). Bosnian 
diaspora members in different host countries can advocate for policies within those 
countries that motivate the accession process of BiH towards the EU. They can act 
as partners to help their homelands. In fact, Bosnian born politicians in Europe have 
already done so.20 A Bosnian American lobby group, the Advisory Council for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, has set up a Congressional Caucus on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which has resulted in legislative activities in the United States on 
account of BiH.21 Diaspora members act as ambassadors of their homeland to the 
rest of the world when it comes to lobbying and other activism, while on the other 
hand serving as potential partners for EU accession processes and similar political 
engagements.   
Nonetheless, how diaspora connect to EU accession processes of potential 
member states is a topic, while worthwhile to study, one that should be considered 
once a country begins the accession process in earnest, unlike BiH at the time of 
writing. Instead, the ways in which diaspora members organize around political 
processes in their homeland, wielding their influence in their homeland as well as 
the hostland, is particularly interesting. Traditionally, this has been analyzed 
through remittances, 22  but this thesis addresses further processes such as 
remembrance and transitional justice. 
                                                
20 A recent example is Aida Hadžialić, Sweden’s Minister for Upper Secondary School, Adult 
Education and Training, who traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina and spoke about the importance 
of education reform on the EU path, offering resources from Sweden to help Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on this path as well.  
21 The members of the Congressional Council on BiH can be found here: 
http://acbih.org/?page_id=26. 
22 This is a vibrant literature. See for example: Newland, Kathleen, and Erin Patrick. 2004. 
“Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin.” 
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.; Riddle, Liesl, Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, and Tjai M. 
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So far, the diaspora’s engagement in the politics of its homeland, in 
particular through transnational means, as well as the group’s potential for helping 
to shape local communities in their homeland, has not been considered to its full 
extent. From a scholarly perspective, the diasporic community of BiH has been 
examined through cross-country analysis and engagement with their political 
mobilization, usually by focusing on the dynamics such as levels of integration 
within the host country.23 Incidentally, the Bosnian diaspora is continuously touted 
as the most integrated within Swedish society, with low unemployment rates and 
high education rates, especially among its youth. 24  However, this places such 
research more in line with migration scholarship with the focus on a particular 
hostland, rather than on diaspora, the actors, themselves. More comprehensive 
research endeavors, while welcome in the discipline, have engaged with Bosnian 
diaspora on a largely exploratory scale.25 
Diaspora is understood to consist of different groups within it, with 
dominant actors as well as competing narratives and claim-making which can help 
to unify or further differentiate factions within the group. The different practices of 
diaspora members that act on behalf of their respective transnational community is 
understood to encompass diaspora in scholarly literature.26 At the same time, there 
is increasingly an understanding of how these practices differ based on the hostlands 
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23 Eastmond, Marita. “Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes of 
Refugee Integration in Sweden.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 2 (February 
2011): 277–295. 
24 Povrzanović Frykman, Maja 2012. “Struggle for Recognition: Bosnian Refugees’ Employment 
Experiences in Sweden.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31 (1): 74. 
25 Valenta, Marko, and Sabrina P Ramet, eds. 2011. The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in 
Transnational Communities. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
26 Brubaker, Rogers. 2005. “The ‘diaspora’ Diaspora.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28 (1): 12. 
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in which diaspora groups settle. I build on Koinova’s idea of politically relevant 
environments (PRE) in hostlands. This helps to explain how diaspora mobilize 
based on their embeddedness in various hostlands, including global and 
supranational levels.27 In particular, I am interested in how diaspora mobilize, how 
they make claims, around issues of transitional justice and reconciliation from the 
hostland. The post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the 
homeland offers a particularly relevant diaspora community to examine. 
This research is timely not only in addressing the gaps in the academic 
literature, but also when considering the Bosnian diaspora case study. Over the last 
few years, diaspora has started to strengthen its relationships with political 
structures in BiH and is increasingly lobbying for a stronger political voice and 
influence. In turn, this has been recognized within the Bosnian government. While 
there is no Ministry of Diaspora, there is a division within the Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees that focuses on diaspora and fostering relationships between 
the diaspora and the state. Additionally, there are several non-profits in BiH that 
aim to foster better relationships between the diaspora and the homeland.  
The Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees has organized academic 
conferences in order to raise awareness about the Bosnian diaspora, including both 
conflict-generated individuals and those who have migrated in prior waves during 
Yugoslavia. A roundtable policy discussion, attended ten different localities within 
Bosnia, several Ministries at the federal level, and members of the diaspora from a 
variety of countries presented another particularly interesting attempt at reaching 
                                                
27 Koinova, Maria. 2014a. “Transnationalism of Diasporas of Former Yugoslavia in the Dutch 
Political Context.” In Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural and Political Perspectives, edited by Dino 
Abazović and Mitja Velikonja. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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out to diaspora actors by the sending state.28 This demonstrates that there is an 
understanding from the homeland for a need for better understanding of diaspora 
engagement even though there is limited institutional capacity to support this. Thus, 
this thesis brings useful insights about diaspora mobilization that has potential to 
influence policy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also beyond.  
I am interested in how diaspora utilizes the political environment in their 
host countries and homelands in order to further their claims, in particular in relation 
to transitional justice efforts. In other words, the central questions this thesis seeks 
to answer are: How do diaspora utilize the political environments in their 
hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of transitional justice and peace? 
In what ways and why?  
Thus, the thesis will contribute to theory building in regards to diaspora 
mobilization, provide valuable comparative research, and illuminate policy 
discussions regarding diaspora. Sub-questions include: Do diaspora entrepreneurs 
use the same arguments to mobilize diaspora transnationally or are they specific to 
the host countries? How do host countries help or hinder diaspora mobilization?   
This thesis will thus focus on the conditions inherent in the host countries 
that lead to diaspora mobilization towards its homeland, but also transnationally. I 
am interested in the pathways that lead to diaspora mobilization and how these 
differ in certain host countries. Each of the three countries with diaspora 
populations will be examined in relation to the levels of diaspora mobilization in 
order to bring about a more complete picture of the relationship of host countries to 
diaspora mobilization. While the comparative method gives leverage to understand 
                                                
28 Respondent BH3 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH.; Respondent BH16 (2013) Interview 
in July, Sarajevo, BiH. 
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the factors which have crucial importance for diaspora mobilization, process tracing 
is applicable as a method to account for the pathways which lead from these 
combinations of factors to the specific outcomes of diaspora mobilization. Process 
tracing also allows for the examination of alternative explanations.29 Multi-sited 
fieldwork in the three hostlands and BiH is combined with interviews and 
participatory observation. Using triangulation with secondary sources further helps 
to develop the typology and in turn, amend it. The following section explores in 
detail how the remainder of the thesis is organized.  
The following chapter will focus on the situation in BiH at present, giving a 
brief political overview, in particular the institutional framework of the country 
today, a result of “peace-building without politics.” 30  To grasp the impact of 
diaspora mobilization on BiH, it is important to understand the dynamics within the 
country in the post-conflict period. This chapter provides some background on the 
1995 Dayton Peace Accord (henceforth Dayton) which ended the 1992 – 1995 war 
in BiH. It also highlights some of the remaining challenges due to the complicated 
constitutional framework that resulted. The chapter draws on the politicization and 
instrumentalization of ethnonationalist rivalries that continue in BiH to this day and 
help to mobilize as well as frustrate diaspora members. Here in particular it is 
important to consider local dynamics within communities in BiH as well as national 
dynamics as the political structures in the country differ and create an impact on 
how diaspora mobilizes. The second chapter will also review some of the previous 
research on Bosnian diaspora communities internationally, including diasporas 
                                                
29 Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. 2015. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to 
Analytic Tool. Strategies for Social Inquiry. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
30 Kostić, Roland. 2012. “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Whose 
Memories, Whose Justice?” Sociologija 54 (4): 649–66.  
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from former Yugoslavia. This research helps put into perspective the contribution 
of this thesis to this highly relevant case study of conflict-generated diaspora.  
The third chapter grounds the puzzle among research on diasporas, 
transitional justice, and peace and conflict debates, while also noting the inherent 
interconnectedness between these literatures, particularly in the post-Yugoslav 
region. Diaspora research draws from a variety of topics including peace and 
conflict literature, migration, transnationalism. The chapter will provide an 
overview of transitional justice as an increasingly established scholarly field, before 
juxtaposing some of the existing literature on peacebuilding with it. Ultimately, this 
chapter traces the development of this scholarship from initial debates to the more 
bottom-up, localized perspectives that are increasingly being integrated into them. 
It then positions the thesis’ puzzle within the chapter by bringing in the diaspora 
dimension, thus establishing its contribution.  
The fourth chapter focuses on research design and methodology in more 
detail, outlining the research process including the comparative case study and 
process tracing. The diaspora in these three countries (Sweden, Germany, and 
France) has developed within varied political environments and incorporation 
regimes, providing a comparative range for this thesis to explore. One of the main 
components of the political environments is that the three countries represent three 
different points on a continuum of citizenship regimes.31 This chapter will thus 
establish the dependent variable, diaspora mobilization, as well as the three 
independent variables: citizenship regimes, translocal community, and collective 
claims. Based on this framework, the chapter will introduce a typology of diaspora 
                                                
31 Howard, Marc Morjé. 2009. The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. Cambridge ; New York: 
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mobilization and discuss the hypotheses generated as a result. The chapter also 
addresses the importance of considering researcher positionality as well as explores 
in more detail the fieldwork process including semi-structured interviews before 
delving into the empirical chapters.   
The following three chapters form the empirical core of the thesis. Each 
focuses on a particular host land comparatively, examining the types of 
mobilization theorized as well as empirically examined within them. Chapter 5 
focuses on Bosnians in Sweden, chapter 6 on Bosnians in Germany, and chapter 7 
on Bosnians in France. These chapters provide background on the way that 
countries have incorporated their migrant populations as well as the relationships 
those countries have built with the homelands. Semi-structured interviews tease out 
how the interplay of different independent variables in each of the three countries 
influences diaspora mobilization. By examining each of the three countries in 
particular, Germany, Sweden, and France, the empirical chapters shed light on how 
the three different independent variables influence diaspora mobilization in the 
three different hostlands. Each of the chapters addresses the hypothesized types of 
diaspora mobilization introduced in Chapter 4 and juxtaposes this with the 
fieldwork in each of the three countries, respectively. 
In particular, these chapters will provide new data on unique diaspora 
initiatives as well as the diaspora’s integration and participation in hostland politics 
around issues of transitional justice. Considering the alternative integration 
schemes of the three countries in question, this will work towards building a more 
cohesive theory of diaspora mobilization, in particular, causal mechanisms. It will 
also showcase differences among the three countries’ citizenship regimes. These 
chapters will explain how the factors of each host country lead to different 
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mobilization initiatives. The types of diaspora mobilization will be highlighted 
through different diaspora initiatives. Some of these are focused on local 
communities in BiH, while others on the homeland as a whole. Still others examine 
the diaspora community in the hostland or engaging it transnationally.  
Analyzing the translocal levels of diaspora mobilization will provide new 
insights about the mechanisms that lead to diaspora mobilization. “Research on 
translocality primarily refers to how social relationships across locales shape 
transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic space.”32 It is 
in these spaces that translocal connections can happen and thus also aid diaspora 
mobilization in multiple locations in different ways. This thesis contributes to an 
understanding of how translocal communities influence diaspora mobilization and 
is explored in more detail in the second chapter.  
The final chapter will summarize the findings of the thesis project as well 
as suggest further research agendas. It will also include lessons learned from BiH 
diaspora mobilization that can serve as foundations for future work as well as some 
policy recommendations. It will exhibit the ways in which hostland contexts can 
influence transnational diaspora mobilization and to what extent this makes a 
difference for strengthening the sovereignty of weak states but at the same time, 
validating the importance of diaspora as a player within that process.  Ultimately, 
the last chapter will also highlight the validity of the typology developed in the 
thesis and provide some guidelines for future research on these and similar topics. 
                                                
32 Brickell, Katherine, and Ayona Datta. 2011. Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, 
Connections. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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Chapter 2 Contributions of Previous Research on Bosnia and Bosnian 
Diaspora 
This chapter will provide an overview of the historical and political situation in BiH 
to show the environment that has resulted in both a conflict-generated diaspora as 
well as diaspora mobilization. It will address a few of the most salient issues within 
the country today, which will, in turn, contextualize the diaspora initiatives 
examined at the heart of this thesis. In large part, this chapter examines the 
continued struggle to constitute Bosnian identity as well as solidify citizen 
representation and rights within a multiethnic setting.  
The chapter will first provide a quick historical outline of BiH followed by 
a section about the salient features of the Dayton Peace Accords, which continue to 
dictate how the country operates. A section about the geopolitics of the diaspora in 
BiH will follow before concluding remarks about BiH today. This chapter provides 
the background to the ongoing transitional justice process and the politics of 
memory that continue to be relevant in BiH politics today. It will examine how 
more recent developments including civil society initiatives, protests since 2013, 
and the floods of May 2014 have factored into discussions about diaspora influence 
and mobilization in BiH. 
2.1 Demise of Yugoslavia 
Much research has discussed the demise of Yugoslavia and the reasons for its 
breakup, its history, as well as the consequences thereof.33 This short overview 
serves to situate the reader in the broader context for how this situation influenced 
                                                
33 Laura Silber and Allan Little’s Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation provides a useful entry point. 
More recently, Catherine Baker has written a short introductory text titled The Yugoslav Wars of 
the 1990s.  
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the demographic changes in the country, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It 
speaks briefly to the history of Yugoslavia and the political identities with which 
some individuals in the diaspora identify with, harking back to the memory and 
nostalgia of a country that encouraged multi-ethnic belonging amidst other flaws.34  
 Yugoslav national identity was represented by the Partisan political 
movement and reaffirmed through ‘brotherhood and unity.’ 35  It resulted in a 
federation of different constituent republics with Belgrade as the capital following 
WWII. “In BiH, the Partisan movement was particularly popular, and citizens of all 
nationalities and religions joined it.” 36  BiH was established as one of the six 
constituent republics (the others were Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia). It encompassed a mini-Yugoslavia by being multinational and 
multiethnic. Subsequent changes in the Yugoslav Constitution allowed for nascent 
Muslim nationalist factions to allow for Bosnian Muslims to declare themselves as 
‘Muslim, in the sense of a nation,’ reflecting the tendency for Orthodox and 
Catholic Bosnians to call themselves Serbs and Croats. Malcolm explains, “once 
they had made that move, it became impossible for the Muslims to take the logical 
course, which would have been to describe their religion as Muslim and their ethnic 
substratum as Bosnian. That would have had the effect of setting up “Bosnian” as 
a third term in the contradistinction to “Serb” and “Croat” – which would be like 
the use of “Muslim” as a third term, only even more divisive, since at least the three 
                                                
34 Korac, Maja. 2009. Remaking Home: Reconstructing Life, Place and Identity in Rome and 
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groups can now still be referred to as Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats.”37 
Tito’s death in 1980 left the country in shock and led to a downward political 
spiral which resulted in the demise of the country throughout the 1990s. National 
groups were increasingly played off each other, with Serb nationalism being revived 
throughout the country. By 1989, Yugoslavia was in economic turmoil, in large part 
due to its financial debt to the West. By the early 1990s, Yugoslavia faced numerous 
crises: an increasingly weak political system that could not balance powerful 
political figures, an economic and geopolitical crisis over the territory of BiH which 
fueled a rise of ethnic nationalism.38 Rivalries between Yugoslavia’s constituent 
republics increased as each competed for more autonomy from the federal 
government in Belgrade. New political parties emerged to compete with the 
Communist Party, emphasizing ethnic belonging over political platforms. An 
increasingly republic-oriented media pursued nationalist goals which exacerbated 
the unstable political situation. In BiH, ‘Yugoslavs’ and by extension those who 
considered themselves ‘Bosnians,’ became ‘stateless persons’ as the very Yugoslav 
state started to disintegrate.39  
Bosnia became embroiled in war, which resulted in close to 100,000 deaths 
between 1992 and 1995.40  “Suddenly one had to be Slovene, Croat or Serb – or 
almost by default, Muslim. Of all people I talked with between 1995 and 1998, the 
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Muslims in Bosnia seemed most grounded – even now – in a cosmopolitan 
“Yugoslav” identity.”41 “The idea of ‘Bosnian’ in an outside world that perceived 
only ethnic conflict and unidimensional concepts of national self-determination 
was too complex.”42 This continues today with Bosnia’s citizens often declaring 
themselves by their ethnonational identity as Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), Croat, or 
Serb. Outside of the country, between 1 and 2.2 million are estimated to belong to 
a Bosnian diaspora. 43  These individuals escaped the fates of many of their 
compatriots including ethnic cleansing, genocide, rape, being under siege, hunger 
– in short, conflict and war, that left the newly independent country devastated.44 
Their recognition of themselves as Bosnians firstly rather than the ethnonational 
identity is in turn a particular political statement, a response to the political 
environment of their homeland and region which continues to promote limited 
concepts of belonging or not belonging to it. 
2.2 BiH since 1995  
A journalist once described Bosnia and Herzegovina as “Absurdistan.” 45  The 
General Framework Agreement, better known as the Dayton Peace Accords, was 
signed in Dayton, OH in November 1995 and ratified in Paris in December 1995, 
marking the official end of the war. In an effort to appease ethnonationalism as well 
as find a peaceful solution to end the conflict, the country became a consociational 
                                                
41 Ibid., 47. 
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democracy. 46  The Dayton Peace Accords were signed with support and the 
engagement of multiple international actors invested in the area including the 
United States and the EU. In fact, previous research has argued that Bosnia’s 
governmental power is in effect in the hands of international institutions, a 
‘neotrusteeship.’47 However, over the last two decades, this international influence 
has waned and the country’s political elites have effectively been left to co-opt the 
state without much incentive to move towards liberal democracy. Over time, this 
has led to external actors that are unable “to prevent local insurgents from wresting 
control of regions and the countryside.”48  This section will briefly outline the 
political environment of BiH today.  
On the subnational level, there are two so-called entities, the Federation and 
Republika Srpska. The Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina (FBiH), which 
compromises 51% of the country’s  territory, is dominated by Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats, while Republika Srpska (RS), 49% of BiH’s territory, is mostly 
dominated by Bosnian Serbs. These territorial demographics are a direct result of 
the mass exodus of individuals during the war and the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s, 
which created the conflict-generated diaspora at the center of this thesis.49 The 
Federation is further divided into ten ‘cantons,’ in an effort to ensure that Bosnian 
Croats’ political voices are dominant in certain parts of the Federation where they 
are demographically dominant. Cantons are further divided into municipalities, 
opštine, that are assigned to deliver basic government functions at the local level, 
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further decentralizing governmental functions. The RS is managed as one canton 
from Banja Luka, its capital, centrally. 
The Dayton Peace Accords envisioned a governance system that would 
enable ethnic divisions to be overcome, over time, through multilevel mechanisms 
that give voice and agency to different groups within the country. While authors 
such as Bache and Flinders argue for the importance of considering multi-level 
governance as a system of overlapping networks, 50  it is also important to 
acknowledge that the concept has not been applied effectively or researched in 
depth when looking at the Balkan region. “In other words, the double silence is 
complete: the multi-level governance literature is silent on the specifics of South 
East Europe, and even the best literature on governance in South East Europe is 
silent on the concept of multi-level governance.”51 Instead, it has resulted in an 
effective political structure that benefits and maintains the current political elites in 
power. The fragmentation of the country has further weakened the state rather than 
instilling more democracy.52  
Neither of the entities has historical basis and both are the product of “last-
minute creative cartography.”53 “Dayton has been a poor foundation for peace-
building because it institutionalized unresolved conflict, ethnic division, and 
fragmentation at the heart of the Bosnian state. Given the war crimes involved in 
its creation, the Republika Srpska is a difficult reality for most Bosniaks to 
countenance.”54 Ultimately, ‘Dayton’ BiH, in an effort to maintain peace which has 
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been its greatest success since 1995. However, it has resulted in continued political 
stalemates due to the complicated governmental structures overviewed in this 
section. The political elites, belonging to ethnonationalist parties that led the 
country to war, have maintained their grips on power and have not helped to 
forward democratization and peacebuilding processes.55 Ethnoterritorial political 
forces have, over the last two decades, learned how to obstruct the state’s functions 
for their own benefit.56 This is ironic as BiH was the least homogenous republic 
within Yugoslavia prior to the war, where integrated notions of identity were 
embraced.57  
In the case of BiH, consociationalism by means of the Dayton Peace 
Accords have led to a dysfunctional state without much accountability for 
governmental institutions. To cite an example, it took thirteen different steps to start 
a business in BiH, as opposed to 6 for the countries in the region with an average 
of 40 days rather than the average 16 in the region in 2012.58 The same data in 2016 
reflects that it takes twelve different steps, and approximately 50 more days to start 
a business in BiH than the rest of the European region.59 Of particular interest for 
this thesis, this governance structure has maintained a perpetual state of post-
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conflict transition for the last two decades, with little reconciliation or justice 
(further elaborated on in the following chapters). More importantly, integration 
with EU policies as well as the potential accession of BiH to the EU is continuously 
hindered by issues of internally contested sovereignty.60 Without a unified and 
central state organization, most of the functions of the cantonal institutions become 
ineffective, if not redundant, and implementation of any policies is thus increasingly 
difficult. To cite just one example, the region experienced the largest flooding of 
the last 120 years in the spring of 2014. A state of emergency was not declared on 
the national level due to infighting and disagreement on the entity level. The 
implementation of emergency and subsequent humanitarian aid after the floods 
were uncoordinated. Citizens continue to note their low confidence levels for their 
government across ethnic lines.  
The country has, in effect, five heads of state. There is a rotating presidency 
on the country level made up of a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb. Those serving 
currently are Bakir Izetbegović, Mladen Ivanić and Dragan Čović. Both entities also 
have their own president, currently Milorad Dodik (RS) and Marinko Čavara 
(Federation). There is a High Representative who serves as the head of the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), a peace implementation organization set up by 
Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement in order to help stabilize the country. The 
mission of the OHR consists of helping the country implement the peace settlement 
and to ensure that all of its institutions function in accordance to Dayton. Since Carl 
Bildt’s original tenure which started in 1995, there have been seven High 
Representatives. The current High Representative, Valentin Inzko, has been in 
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office since 2009. Depending on the mandate of the OHR as well as on the 
personality of individual High Representatives, their day-to-day involvement in the 
country’s political affairs has differed. Inzko is considered as one of the more 
disengaged High Representatives. The OHR’s mandate has been difficult to 
implement as monitoring the variety of provisions and rules Dayton set up in BiH 
is a task too broad for the size and reach of the organization. Regardless of the 
efforts and initiatives taken by the High Representatives, this becomes even more 
so the case in situations in which the OHR comes up against barriers at each of the 
different levels of government within BiH.61  
To further complicate the bureaucracy of the country, there are more than 
100 officially registered political parties within the country and 136 ministries at 
different levels of government. To cite an example, including both federal, entity 
and cantonal levels, there are usually more than ten of the same ministries, which 
rarely coordinate or cooperate with one another in terms of policies and financing 
of different services provided. Few political parties have been able to reach across 
ethnic lines and recruit candidates of different backgrounds, though there are a few 
exceptions such as the SDP (Social Democratic Party) or more recently, Naša 
Stranka, although its stronghold is Sarajevo.62  
Previous research has noted the challenges moderate political parties face in 
elections as they are competing with dominant nationalist parties in post-conflict 
environments. 63  Ethnic tensions within the country continue to be played out in 
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the political sphere, only further benefiting the political elites. 64  Rather than 
developing political platforms meant to foster more progressive policies and 
implementation of initiatives that help local populations, these ethnically based 
parties often simply compete with one another in order to gain votes as the 
“outbidding for ethnic support is a constant possibility.”65 This stalls transitional 
justice processes due to a lack of political will.  
The vigilant perseverance of three different ‘constituent’ nations – Bosniaks 
(Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs, has hampered the 
development of national unity among BiH citizens, simplifying them to their 
national belonging. Individuals who identify as ‘Bosnian’ find they have little 
political space to exercise their political identity amidst the ethnonational political 
environment. Rather, one must fit themselves within one of the ‘constituent nations’ 
categories in order to be able to receive state benefits of any kind. The political 
climate in BiH reflects a divided society in which nationalist parties dominate the 
political conversation and the people themselves have to an extent lost the option 
of being simply “Bosnian” within a political system in which ethnic belonging 
remains the dominant priority.66 For those in the diaspora, it is a challenge to 
navigate the political structures within the country. The bureaucracy of the current 
system, not to mention the lack of representation many in the diaspora feel within 
Bosnian parliamentary and governmental structures, ensures they remain frustrated 
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when they need to resolve any legal issues in their homeland. Further, it limits their 
political engagement in formal institutions.67  
While the local population has largely been dormant, protests in the country 
between February and June of 2014 indicated the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the 
governmental institutions and politicians in place. Protesters’ demands focused on 
the economic recession, extreme social stratification, in particular in regards to 
abolishing the ‘white bread’ privilege,68 high levels of unemployment, and low 
standards of living. The protests presented the most severe domestic crisis of 
governance and openly questioned the legitimacy of dominant political actors on 
both the national and subnational levels. Citizens were finally, almost two decades 
after war, standing up against the exploitative political elite and the divided political 
society in which they live. However, the protests ultimately fell short of instilling 
lasting change in Bosnian politics and bridging the ethnically divided society. The 
country remains stranded in a contingent socio-economic situation. Nonetheless, 
the protests demonstrated that while large-scale citizen mobilization across the 
country was not yet possible, BiH’s citizens have shown that they can unite and 
engage in civic activism.69 
This short overview provides some context about the political environment 
in the homeland functions and in turn how diaspora members experience it. It is 
noteworthy that change in the homeland, particularly civic engagement which 
creates opportunities for local actors to cooperate with diaspora, can potentially 
                                                
67 Respondent BH16 (2013) Interview in August, Sarajevo, BiH. Respondent UK2 (2014) 
Interview in May, Birmingham, UK. Participant Observation at World Diaspora Congress, 
Sarajevo, May 2014.  
68 Protesters were particularly upset in regards to a law that allows officials in all levels of 
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trigger diaspora engagement as it opens up the political environment for actors 
besides political parties to be influential. For example, the floods during 2014 
elicited a diaspora response to fundraise in order to help homeland communities, 
demonstrating diaspora’s continued interest and engagement in its homeland. The 
following section will provide an overview of the Bosnian diaspora and their role 
in BiH today.    
2.3 The Status of Diaspora and Returnees in BiH 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreements have provisions for the return of refugees to 
their former regions after the end of the conflict. Annex 7 explicitly grants the right 
to return home safely, regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation among 
other things.70 However, many individuals, having begun new lives abroad and 
having experienced their villages and homes destroyed as a result of the war have 
been reluctant to return. This has in turn benefited those in power after the war, 
solidifying the demographic shifts which happened during the war as a result of 
ethnic cleansing.71 Between 1995 and 1998, more than 300,000 individuals returned 
to their homes.72 Others rebuilt their homes, and continue to spend at least a few 
weeks in the homeland each year, usually during the summer period. Returnee 
communities have been firmly established in certain portions of the country such as 
the Bratunac/Srebrenica area as well as the Kozarac area near Banja Luka and 
Prijedor.  
For those who remain outside of the country, the structural set-up and 
political representation in their former localities is new and unfamiliar and diaspora 
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members feel disenfranchised and frustrated with the political realities of their post-
conflict homeland. These individuals are the main focus of this thesis –conflict-
generated members of the Bosnian diaspora – although particular attention will also 
be paid to guest workers and children of conflict-generated individuals who also 
mobilize as Bosnian diaspora.  
An estimated 2 million Bosnians live outside of its territory, across Europe, 
Australia, the United States and Canada, creating an incredible amount of potential 
for influence if mobilized. According to the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and 
Refugees, the number of those in the diaspora registered to vote dropped to 38,000 
for the 2012 elections from 458,000 in 1996, a drastic change, despite many 
retaining their citizenship and returning to BiH on a regular basis. In these 
communities, there have been notable initiatives such as Prvi Mart73 that have 
campaigned in order to maximize voter registration among returnees as well as 
citizens abroad. Nonetheless, they maintain cultural ties and identities with BiH. 
Over the last 20 years, they have evolved from refugees to citizens of the countries 
in host countries, have built successful lives abroad, but have nevertheless 
continued to maintain networks amongst each other encouraging cultural 
production, political engagement, and generating foreign investments. They are 
often vocal when it comes to issues they feel strongly about, and increasingly 
understand how to influence media sources to cover this. 
When asked about political participation in BiH, whether it is through 
voting or by other means, such as political party membership or adherence to party 
politics, diaspora interviewees almost exclusively answered they felt unrepresented 
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by the existing political parties in BiH. They consider the voting process 
complicated as most feel unsupported by the embassies in their countries of 
settlement. “I have to re-register for every election, even though I’ve voted before. 
It’s like they don’t want us to vote from abroad.74 The low rate of voter turnout 
signals the discontent many feel with the current political party structures. For local 
elections, moderate political choices are unavailable as many of the places from 
which diaspora members come from are now part of the RS where Bosnian Serb 
parties dominate the political scene, both in local as well as federal elections.  
When asked to pick a politician they identity with, interviewees often cited 
moderate politicians who endorse a multi-ethnic BiH as candidate. This is striking 
considering that candidates who do not participate in ethnic outbidding in BiH are 
negatively viewed by their respective ‘constituent people.’ The prime example of 
this is the former Bosnian Croat head of the presidency, Željko Komšić who 
attempted to moderate political rhetoric within the country. Komšić’s election as 
the Bosnian Croat President, who was elected in 2005 largely by non-Croats in BiH, 
could be considered a step towards reconciliation and as a subversion of the Dayton 
Peace Accords.75 Governance focused on practical solutions for the country that 
allocates services rather than focusing on ethnic tensions remain rare.  
How does diaspora mobilization make an impact, if any, in the 
peacebuilding and transitional justice processes? How do they mobilize amongst 
each other? On one hand, recent protests, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
combined with citizen solidarity in light of recent floods in May 2014 indicate that 
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BiH’s population is relying more and more on each other, sensing the divide 
between the political elite and ordinary citizens rather than embracing 
ethnonationalism. On the other hand, finding avenues where action is possible, 
whether by embracing national institutions at risk, or mobilizing in domains where 
the state is unable to do so or where diaspora influence can create change. Examples 
include mobilizing in order to reopen the National Museum of Bosnia or lobbying 
for policies on a national basis, regardless of citizens’ background, to renaming 
streets, to seemingly banal shows of solidarity such as inclusive national festivals, 
cross-national support for the football team.76 Often, creating social capital among 
different civil society organizations has more positive effect for rebuilding 
communities in post-conflict society than political parties.77 Diaspora mobilization 
aims for a similar impact. 
While the Bosnian state remains in political gridlock, there are nonetheless 
efforts to include the diaspora within larger frameworks within the country.  In May 
2014, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
cooperation with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the 
United Nations Development Program organized a roundtable discussion entitled 
“Migration and Development.” Diaspora from several countries, representatives 
from Bosnian and Herzegovinian institutions at different levels of government, 
local nongovernmental organizations and international agencies met to discuss how 
best to implement policies in order to encourage more socio-economic 
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development.78 A policy on diasporas has been spearheaded in the BiH government 
by several local politicians who are interested in implementing a diaspora strategy 
that will foster better relationships between BiH and its diaspora.79 
Events like this bring together both diaspora and local actors in order to 
discuss the potential of working together.80 However, often times there is a limited 
engagement with peacebuilding and transitional justice, with the focus on economic 
development. For example, 2014 also marked the second Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian Diaspora Business Forum, bringing together members from the 
diaspora willing to invest with local actors, in an effort to ensure that investment 
happens in a transparent and efficient way, in order to benefit both the diaspora 
investor as well as the homeland by bringing revenues, employment to some 
citizens, and profit for the region.81  
Other events gain little engagement with local political actors. For example, 
the Bosnian World Congress was held at the Bosnian Parliament building in June 
of 2014, and attended by diaspora representatives living in sixteen different 
countries. They echoed their commitment to the country and their desire to remain 
involved. On the first day, Bosnian politicians who are committed to the diaspora 
in BiH attended, in part to mobilize them to vote for their own parties, and in part 
to reconfirm their commitment to diaspora engagement in the homeland. However, 
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two of the country’s presidents who were scheduled to speak, cancelled at the last 
moment.82  
These examples illustrate that Bosnians living outside of Bosnia remain 
attached to their homeland and continue to contribute to the country, in 
transnational ways regardless of the fact that there is not an adequate Ministry of 
the Diaspora or a similar governmental organ that organizes and channels this 
engagement. The remittance contributions make up 11% of the country’s GDP as 
of 2012, a figure that has been maintained over the last decade. 83 Yet, up to now, 
both academic as well as governmental engagement has been limited in regards to 
the diaspora in more productive ways. Instead, the Bosnian diaspora is mentioned 
in regards to its financial contributions or in regards to its cultural associations and 
successful integration abroad.84 In fact, the Bosnian government has only recently 
taken to cataloguing prominent diaspora members across the globe in a kind of 
‘Who’s Who’ index, published and updated on a haphazardous basis.85  
Bosnian diaspora activists cite their potential political power if engaged 
effectively through mechanisms such as voting and economic development. They 
are also keen to help build the country’s capacity as they see both financial benefit 
for themselves, feel the desire to give back, and see the potential for their homeland 
to prosper. 86  The relationship between the diaspora as both an economic and 
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political power in BiH, amidst international organizations, ethnonationally focused 
politicians, and other state actors represents a delicate balance between competing 
interests in a transitional state after conflict, something under-explored in within the 
academic literature. 
As such a vibrant group with a variety of elements and mechanisms for 
engagement, they remain an underutilized resource of their homeland. This thesis 
pools some of the initiatives they have organized as well as provides an overview 
of existing research on Bosnian diaspora, which can help inform the homeland 
about the potential of its diaspora, with a particular focus on mobilization that is 
focused on transitional justice and peacebuilding understood more broadly. At the 
same time, this research offers insight into theory building in regards to diaspora 
and fragile states such as BiH. Diaspora mobilization often addresses poorly 
functioning governmental and political institutions in the country and thus can 
sometimes also be at odds or in direct opposition to local governments. In post-
conflict environment, it is thus imperative that the mechanisms which influence 
diaspora mobilization are understood better.   
2.4 Previous Scholarly Work on Bosnian Diaspora 
 
Scholarly work on the Bosnian diaspora often focuses on individuals within that 
population, and their lives in the host country, rather than collective actions 
undertaken by the diaspora within a larger context. Several monograph-length 
works based on empirical research with Bosnians, or individuals from former 
Yugoslav states, exist, detailing their links to their host land and, increasingly, their 
attachments to the homeland. This thesis builds on this work in part, but also 
expands it in several ways. Firstly, I bring typological theorizing in order to move 
beyond case studies and attempt to forward some potentially generalizable 
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observations, both for the Bosnian case study and beyond. Secondly, I combine the 
focus on the host country, which often focuses on integration and citizenship 
regimes, with the reality of the lived experiences of many diaspora individuals, 
translocalism, a transnational community that exists both in the host land but also 
beyond based on former localities in the homeland, in a comparative perspective. 
Finally, I do this through a systematic look at three countries with diaspora 
populations, focusing on how the collective claims they make to mobilize, usually 
based on grievances, can lead to different types od diaspora mobilization, in 
particular focusing on transitional justice and peacebuilding. The following 
paragraphs will provide an overview of the existing field of research around 
Bosnian diaspora. 
Valenta and Ramet’s book on Bosnian diaspora is perhaps the most 
comprehensive collection of work on the population, incorporating research from 
several countries across Europe as well as Australia and North America. 87 
Halilovich’s chapter on Bosnian diaspora in Australia highlights how diaspora often 
organize in ‘local’ clubs and associations which are, to various degrees, multi-
ethnic or mixed (i.e. include members of all Bosnian ethnic groups).”88 He argues 
that the general Bosnian diaspora population in Australia maintain a distance 
between larger umbrella organizations they consider as too nationalistic or victim-
centered around a certain ethnicity. Thereby, they further stress their independence 
in regards to political pursuits differentiating between the larger organizations’ 
pursuit of “the political and business agendas of their leaders than with the real local 
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Transnational Communities. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
88 Halilovich, Hariz. 2012. “Trans-Local Communities in the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians 
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issues ‘‘back there at home’’ or ‘‘over here in exile’’ of those on whose behalf they 
claim to be acting.”89 This reflects on their lack of interest in being identified as 
‘victims’ or otherwise taken advantage of by one of the existing political agendas 
in their homeland. In this way, the lack of activity in regards to larger diaspora 
organizations becomes a political stand as they do not want to be associated with 
the political dynamics present in the homeland.  
Halilovich expands his ideas about Bosnian diaspora in his own monograph. 
He argues articulately about how Bosnian communities across the United States, 
Europe, and Australia have integrated into their respective host communities, while 
nonetheless expressing some attachment to the previous homeland. For many, the 
homeland remains marred by a lack of economic opportunities and political agendas 
that do not align with their own views. The country they remember does not exist 
anymore, and the communities in which they find themselves become central to 
their identity construction.90 He adapts this belonging, with a focus on the shared 
past, as ‘trans-local,’ due to ‘deliberate and informed decisions when choosing 
destinations for their resettlement.’91 ‘They are rather both increasingly imagined 
as well as made up of concrete social relations.’92  
As such, they challenge, but at the same reinforce national identities of the 
larger diaspora group, and might not be recognized, or in other words, are seen as 
competing with larger umbrella organizations. This extends to individuals from 
Brčko, Mostar, the Podrinje region, and Prijedor, and is based on shared memories 
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of the local place of origin combined with those of the hostland. 'Displaced 
Bosnians are not only members of their broader ethnic or national diasporas, nor 
simply refugees waiting to return to their original homelands.'93 This thesis utilizes 
this thinking by treating this translocality as an independent variable rather than a 
framework to help think about diaspora. Thus, I examine the work of the translocal 
community in influencing diaspora mobilization across different host-lands.  
Korac, in exploring Bosnian communities in Rome and Amsterdam, has 
also touched on the importance of how diaspora build their communities. Rather 
than naming this 'translocal,' for her it is a matter of 'emplacement,' a process of 
pluralization which moves beyond citizenship and incorporation regimes, 
embracing both national borders within host countries as well as transnational 
processes of these communities across state borders. She stresses the importance of 
considering social networks and contextualizing relationships between places of 
origin and destination. Valuable in its empirical insights and rich interview material, 
Korac focuses on the individual agency of refugees from former Yugoslavia in 
building and reconstituting their communities, both in the respective cities she 
researched, as well as transnationally.94   
Nonetheless, this research focuses on how the lives of individuals are rebuilt 
and remade in the host countries, beyond the dichotomies of citizenship or non-
citizenship, assimilation and integration, and others, rather than also looking at the 
individuals' agency towards their homeland. She is much more focused on the 
migratory patterns refugees decide on when fleeing or choosing to settle in certain 
places, rather than their potential to mobilize once they have. This thesis takes these 
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questions on, examining how once these communities are shaped and take hold in 
particular host countries, this shapes their mobilizations towards their homelands.  
Other research has provided particular insight into Bosnian communities in 
particular countries. Franz’s research examines integration schemes in both Austria 
and the United States and the Bosnian immigrants and their assimilation processes 
through a comparative lens. She also stresses the importance of agency among the 
Bosnian refugees she interviews for her case study, around 25 from Austria 
(Vienna) and 20 from the United States (New York City). 95 However, this kind of 
research demonstrates a limited engagement with the post-conflict dynamics of the 
homeland. Rather, the interest remains on integration in the host country, rather 
than post-conflict processes in the homeland and the politics as a result of which 
diaspora mobilize. Still, it provides a useful comparison of the challenges Bosnian 
refugees encountered between political legal frameworks in the United States and 
Austria. She brings to light the importance of the host land contexts and opens up 
the field to examine how diaspora mobilization is influenced by host country 
policies, as further examined throughout this thesis. 
Perhaps the most concentrated research on Bosnian diaspora focuses on the 
case study of Bosnians in Sweden, often placed within the larger context of an 
ongoing discourse on integration within Swedish society and the welfare system.96 
Eastmond notes Bosnians used the system to their advantage sometimes, gaining 
further entitlements based on their status as refugees, whether job placement or 
social benefits. She notes how Bosnian diaspora members were not interested in 
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being labeled as victims, but wanted their prior lives and potential skills 
acknowledged in their new homeland.97  
 Further research has also focused on transnationalism and returnee 
dynamics with a particular look at the importance of local community dynamics. 
This research in turn speaks to the translocality research mentioned previously by 
examining the difficulties and risks associated with repatriation and reconstruction 
of one’s homeland.98  It calls into question that individuals might not consider 
themselves ‘diaspora’ because of the continued time they spend in BiH despite also 
living in their host countries. This becomes particularly salient for individuals who 
continue to be involved in their local communities in BiH, and who are in many 
ways more involved in their homeland as citizens than in their host land. It calls 
into question whether one can delineate clearly between homeland and host country 
and between individuals as diaspora or non-diaspora due to the time spent in BiH 
and, in many cases, the continued relationships they maintain on a local level within 
BiH.99  
Different models for the homeland to connect with diaspora populations 
have been considered, if briefly, with circular migration, or diaspora retiring back 
in the homeland. 100  This is also relevant when considering second-generation 
diaspora individuals, as relationships to the homeland can change depending on 
future generations, who have more ties to Sweden, as younger individuals have 
closer ties to Sweden and their Bosnian Swedish acquaintances rather than those 
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from the homeland.101 Eastmond also notes the negative impact Bosnians felt when 
they were separated in different parts of Sweden, away from others who had arrived 
with them from their respective hometowns.102 Hence, tracing the translocality 
variable, as will be done in the following chapters, is relevant in helping to examine 
how diaspora mobilization is shaped in different hostlands. For example, it can mea 
maintaining dual citizenship, two homes, and seasonal returns to a particular 
community in the homeland.103 The empirical chapters address these questions 
further with a particular emphasis on mobilization.  
Further research on Bosnian diaspora in Sweden has addressed questions 
about the relationship between diaspora and conflict. It demonstrates reconciliatory 
attitudes are actually stronger and that identity politics seems to play a smaller role 
in diaspora members’ lives than previous theories indicate. They explain this 
through increased structural integration in diasporas’ host countries, primarily 
inclusion into societal institutions as well as the labor market.104 This data relies on 
a national survey of diaspora from former Yugoslavia, rather than interviewing, 
offering a more comprehensive look at attitudes within the population. Hall and 
Kostić stress that socio-cultural integration does not play a role in affecting 
reconciliatory attitudes. Socio-cultural integration refers to informal social ties with 
both Swedes but also with their host societies.  
As such, their conclusion has potentially lasting impacts on how host 
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countries look at diaspora groups and the effect they can play in mitigating the 
negative aspects of diasporic activity. Additionally, through surveys conducted in 
Sweden with Bosnian diaspora, as well as in BiH simultaneously, these authors 
show that diaspora favor multiculturalism and have a greater propensity towards 
forgiveness. In fact, due to certain exposures in the host country, diaspora can 
develop different views of conflict from homeland populations.105 This conclusion 
points to the fact that issues of transitional justice and the importance of these 
processes for post-conflict environments potentially have more importance to 
diaspora members. 
Kostić and Hall’s research opens up the space for research on diaspora 
mobilization in light of transitional justice initiatives that seek to address post-
conflict homelands, particularly considering that reconciliatory attitudes are higher 
than expected. This indicates the potential of diaspora as being more prone to 
cooperative initiatives that seek to reconcile relationships in the homeland as well. 
Hall furthers this thesis through his doctoral work using survey data, adding to the 
argument by also addressing the levels of biculturalism in Sweden, the host state 
country.  
Biculturalism is ‘simultaneous identification with both one’s heritage 
culture and the dominant culture in the settlement country,’ as an acculturation 
strategy which is one of the most difficult, but also promising when considered in 
regards to diaspora’s reconciliatory attitudes.106 Here, Hall’s research points to the 
importance of recognizing the complexity of identity identification among Bosnian 
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diaspora in Sweden who ‘nurture a separate but inclusive Yugoslav (rather than 
ethnic) heritage.’107 By examining this individual-level variation among migrants 
within the Swedish incorporation regime, Hall’s research touches on similar themes 
to this thesis by examining initiatives of diaspora mobilization with the homeland 
in mind. This thesis departs from his research in an effort to examine actions rather 
than attitudes. Further, this dissertation also contributes to empirical knowledge 
through the French and German case studies, and brings new evidence to the already 
well researched Swedish case study.   
More ethnographic studies of Bosnian refugees in Sweden present their 
integration challenges in finding employment. While limited in scope, they 
nonetheless also point to the importance of integration in the homeland. However, 
it also correctly notes that this is not the only validation for diaspora individuals. 
“One could say that especially those who experienced downward mobility make up 
for it, or “catch up” with their former status, through their children’s “appropriate” 
achievements in Sweden.”108 Today, their employment rates are comparable and 
higher, depending on the municipality in Sweden, than other refugee groups.109 For 
those who were unable to find work or were underemployed, the education 
opportunities and potential for their children gave them an impetus to remain in 
Sweden.  
My own previous research has also focused on Bosnians in the United States 
and Sweden by documenting a specific example of transnational cultural production 
in response to the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. I argue that diaspora 
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cultural production can help move beyond ethnonationalist public political debates 
evidenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina while reaffirming belonging to the diaspora 
in respective host countries. 110  Through their emphasis on the importance of 
genocide recognition within a  Bosnian context rather than within a particular 
Bosniak political narrative, diaspora communities differentiate themselves and their 
commemoration activities from many of those that are dominated by 
ethnonationalist discourses in the homeland.111  
The comparative element of not only different localities within the 
homeland but also varied host-states is an important contribution of this thesis. In 
particular, how certain collective claims gain more prominence in particular 
hostlands or among different diaspora communities is also explored. Koinova has 
discussed the importance of ‘unresolved traumatic issues,’ particularly Srebrenica 
remembrance in the Dutch hostland context. The involvement and inaction of 
Dutchbat soldiers in the events leading up the Srebrenica genocide are considered 
a contentious issue for diaspora individuals, particularly Bosniaks, in the 
Netherlands. Koinova shows that this leads to more sustained diaspora mobilization 
rather than episodic diaspora mobilization, furthering victim-based approaches of 
mobilization.112 She acknowledges the need for further comparison in other cases 
besides the Dutch one in an effort to examine whether traumatic contentious issues 
in which the hostland is not directly affected have an impact on the types of diaspora 
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mobilization.  
Building on the importance of contextualizing and comparing diaspora 
mobilization across hostlands, in a joint article with Koinova, we linked diaspora 
mobilization with transitional justice, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.113 The importance of this work in the context of literature on the 
Bosnian diaspora is that it emphasizes the spatial dynamics of diaspora 
mobilization, hence, the understanding of diaspora that they can try to affect change 
not just on the local level in the homeland, but also in the hostland, nationally, as 
well as globally. This will prove to be an interesting topic to pursue in more detail 
in future research as well and is addressed to a degree in this thesis through 
transnational diaspora initiatives.  On a final note, this research informs the 
typology created in the following chapters and the variables which are examined 
more systematically in the empirical chapters. 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
With more than 2 million individuals who live outside of its borders, the Bosnian 
diaspora accounts for over half of the less than 4 million individuals who are 
considered to be living within BiH’s borders. While they are not a homogenous 
group, understanding the demographics and the historical background of this 
population, particularly its variations, including conflict-generated diaspora and 
guest workers, contributes to a better understanding about how individuals 
mobilize. BiH as a post-conflict state, while stable, does not provide the economic 
conditions for individuals to return, thus ensuring that BiH will continue to have a 
significant diaspora population for the foreseeable future. Bosnian citizens continue 
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to emigrate outside of the country in order to pursue better lives rather than face 
deteriorating economic conditions which include a 42% unemployment rate 
according to the Agency of Statistics in BiH, only further ensuring this.114 This 
chapter provided an overview of the politics of BiH as well as previous research on 
its diaspora. 
 The following chapter will review the existing literature on transitional 
justice as it relates to diaspora and diaspora mobilization, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the former Yugoslav states in more detail. It will examine the interconnections 
of diaspora research with transitional justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict 
states. Both host states as well as, increasingly, certain actors within the homeland, 
recognize the potential of engaging the diaspora population. Understanding the 
objectives of diaspora actors and their persistence about initiatives is imperative in 
better understanding how diaspora mobilization develops. It also informs about the 
role diaspora can play in their post-conflict homelands when it comes to issues of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding.  
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Chapter 3 Insights from Diaspora Research on Peace and Conflict and 
Transitional Justice 
The Bosnian diaspora is in large measure a conflict-generated diaspora, as the 
previous chapter has demonstrated. As a result of the conflicts that ensured due to 
the breakup of Yugoslavia, the region has generated a trove of empirical research 
from peace and conflict, transitional justice, democratization, and state-building 
literature. Research on diaspora has been focused in peace and conflict studies more 
thoroughly than it has in transitional justice literature. This chapter provides a 
review of diaspora literature within the context of peace and conflict followed by a 
section on transitional justice. A section that covers a variety of transitional justice 
research in the region follows, with a particular stress on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
considering the importance of the case study, both for these literatures as well as 
for the thesis. The aim of the chapter is to elucidate on the links between diaspora 
and transitional justice research in order to demonstrate how diaspora actors can 
influence these processes and should be considered as valuable potential partners.  
Although the research examined naturally seems aligned to address each 
other, the following section lays out this intersection between the literatures more 
explicitly before concluding the chapter. The Bosnian diaspora case study can help 
to illuminate the lacuna of research at the intersection of these fields, which is 
burgeoning.115 At the same time, it posits the importance of the deeper theoretical 
and empirical interconnection between peace and conflict and transitional justice 
literature that come into focus when examining diaspora as mobilizing actors in 
post-conflict homelands.  
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Using the case study of Bosnian diaspora in a comparative perspective to 
show the influence of diaspora in transitional justice settings serves to bridge in 
more detail two strands of scholarship, but also provides the empirical evidence that 
demonstrates there is much greater potential to address relevant questions inherent 
in post-conflict weak states by doing so. Diaspora actors bring their own 
perspectives and attempt to influence post-conflict domestic politics, framing their 
activities within peacebuilding or transitional justice. It is worthwhile to examine 
in more detail how their activities differ from local governments and whether there 
are tensions. 
3.1 Diaspora Research in Peace and Conflict Debates 
 
Diaspora research has flourished due to its interdisciplinary nature. This section 
focuses on diaspora literature that falls more broadly within peace and conflict 
literature, tracing some of the trends. Diaspora in peace and conflict studies has 
evolved from dichotomous views as diaspora either being more extreme in their 
outlooks or encouraging peacebuilding, to a more nuanced understanding of 
diaspora.116  
This academic debate can be traced back to the now infamous Collier and 
Hoeffler study at the World Bank in 2000. It offered a critical approach in relation 
to diaspora by focusing on the impact of remittances made by diaspora that support 
terrorist and criminal activity.117 Similarly, Kaldor reinforced this with the idea that 
diaspora groups are essential in the politics of new wars, with unrealistic notions 
and beliefs about their homeland that only serve to exacerbate conflicts.118 This led 
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to a number of responses, case study research, and new avenues of research into 
diaspora studies which continue to flourish amidst academic debates on migration, 
conflict, and peace, as well as policy discussions considering the more recent 
refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. This research has been integral in 
better understanding how diaspora mobilization can impact post-conflict processes 
in homelands as well as how host countries help to influence this diaspora 
mobilization. 
A seminal volume analyzing the importance of diaspora in peace and 
conflict included a chapter drawing on numerous case studies and offering a rather 
comprehensive overview of diasporas as emerging important international actors.119 
One of the chapters called for the development of a conceptual framework to look 
at the relationship between diasporas and homeland which incorporates different 
features in order to evaluate conflict process. This reflected an effort to include 
diaspora actors as part of conflict resolution. In each particular phase of a conflict, 
diaspora actors could be influential and thus improve knowledge about the complex 
relationships between diaspora, homeland and conflict. The framework takes into 
account political and diplomatic measures, economic and military support and 
socio-cultural impact, noting that diasporic influence can be positive, negative or 
neutral.120  
This conceptual framework represents a leap towards classifying diaspora 
involvement, signaling that diaspora influence is not on a binary spectrum simply 
between peace and conflict. It opens the field for diaspora in transitional justice, 
                                                
119 Smith, Hazel, and Paul B. Stares. 2007. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-
Wreckers? Tokyo ; New York: United Nations University Press. 
120 Bercovitch, Jacob. 2007. “A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution.” In 
Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?, edited by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, 
17–39. Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press. 
 		 60 
economic development, and other post-conflict processes. At the same time, it 
emphasizes that diasporas can be both peace wreckers as well as peace makers, 
sometimes within the same conflict, depending on how conflict and post-conflict 
environments develop. Thus, nuanced understandings of diaspora as actors before, 
during, and after conflicts in their homeland need to be considered as there are 
dynamics in the homeland which influence these mobilizations. Overall, the book 
highlights how future research can typologize the influence of diaspora in light of 
pre and post-Cold War contexts, and then, following the events of September 11, 
2001.121 It is worthwhile that the emphasis is often on the homeland rather than the 
hostland, where diaspora mobilization is initiated and can grow, something this 
thesis in turn explores, while nonetheless taking into account the homeland 
environment. 
Other research analyzes the intricate, often complicated nature of different 
diaspora groups. Through their comparative case studies using Irish and Sri Lankan 
diaspora, Cochrane, Baser, and Swain demonstrate that diaspora groups are not 
inherently good or bad, but rather act in response to developments around them. 
This research demonstrates the complex relationships between diaspora and their 
home and host countries, especially over time.122 This is an important distinction to 
consider when examining diaspora within a comparative context. The impact of 
diaspora on both politics within the host country, in regards to immigration and 
integration debates, and within homelands on political and social change has been 
explored when it comes to conflict-generated diasporas. It is also an important 
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methodological distinction to make when studying diaspora actors, but also the 
process of diaspora mobilization.  
Based on research with Kurdish, Irish, Ethiopian and Tamil diaspora 
populations, Østergaard-Nielsen’s work argues for political plurality and an 
increased dialogue between host country and diaspora representatives. She sees this 
as practical means to maximize diaspora’s interaction and role in conflict resolution, 
but also to minimize the perceived threat diasporas might represent in today’s 
securitized societies. 123  In essence, by incorporating diasporas into conflict 
resolution, they can become part of the solution.  
This approach is more amenable to addressing transitional justice 
scholarship as well, reviewed in further sections. It emphasizes how hostlands can 
help influence and steer diaspora mobilization in homelands through particular 
citizenship and integration policies which encourage maintenance of ties in the 
homeland as well as hostland. The connection between diaspora and peacebuilding 
potential can be considered as part of a ‘diaspora ethos,’ “defined as the attitude 
prevalent toward homeland as represented by the values and beliefs held by 
diaspora members or perpetuated by diaspora groups and organizations.124 
Orjuela examines the different roles diasporas play in exacerbating conflict, 
but also examines how diaspora networks could ultimately encourage peace. 
Diaspora remittances only exacerbate problems between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in 
the local population in addition to not being used with long-term development as a 
goal but for personal and short-term needs. As such, she views that remittances 
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often fuel violent conflicts further rather than encouraging peace. Regardless, 
Orjuela remains optimistic about diaspora development and humanitarian 
initiatives in the future that can work towards peace, in particular, diversity among 
diaspora populations. She argues coherently that identities are shaped differently in 
the conflict zone and the host country. As a result, the diaspora experience can 
“transcend” nationalist and highly politicized rhetoric as a result of the diversity in 
the host country or its policies, depending on context.125 Hence, the host land 
context increasingly comes into perspective when considering diaspora 
mobilization from a theoretical perspective.  
When considering the engagement of diasporas within peace and conflict 
frameworks, Shain explores the relationships both along the lines of different case 
studies and how they operate within the US context, especially the difference 
between the Cold War and shortly thereafter. In effect, the lobbying efforts of 
different diaspora groups on behalf of their homelands is particularly important in 
this context, and Shain’s comparative analysis stresses the importance of 
understanding the influence of both the diaspora experience in the homeland and 
the hostland.126 The typology developed in the following chapter takes this into 
account with the citizenship regime variable which examines the host land context 
and its importance for diaspora mobilization.  
Koinova builds on this by emphasizing the importance of hostland politics 
in which diaspora finds themselves, differentiating between ‘ad-hoc,’ ‘discursive,’ 
and ‘sustained’ diaspora mobilization. She finds that political developments within 
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host countries, such as her compelling discussion and consideration of the effect of 
the rise of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, can have an impact on reactions of the 
diaspora and result in increased levels of diaspora mobilization.127  Such work 
highlights the importance of the context in which diaspora finds itself embedded, 
and that this, in turn, affects how it will position itself and how it will act. This goes 
to show that while mobilization is increasingly becoming transnational, the 
influence and focus of politics remains local in many ways.128  
Baser’s monograph on diasporas and homeland conflicts elucidates this by 
focusing on how diaspora approach the Kurdish and Turkish questions in Sweden 
and Germany. By examining second generation diaspora members in both countries 
comparatively, she demonstrates how diaspora interpret and translate the politics of 
their homeland into the hostland. The transnational space and generational 
difference translates the conflict of the homeland into the host land space, 
sometimes ‘importing conflict,’ from the homeland, in particular in Germany. She 
demonstrates how diaspora continue to mobilize for their homelands, in essence 
reinterpreting grievances of their parents, even though they might not necessarily 
have connection to these homelands, as is the case for second generation diaspora 
members.129  
My thesis furthers this discussion by examining the effect of diaspora 
mobilization in a post-conflict environment in which peacebuilding continues and 
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the transition to democracy and a market economy is ongoing.130 Understanding the 
influences of diaspora mobilization can in turn influence host country policy 
decisions in an attempt to channel diaspora in more productive ways. On one hand, 
this can strengthen state infrastructures after a conflict, but also engage with 
transitional justice and peacebuilding processes.  
The following section introduces transitional justice scholarship, including 
empirically based work in the Balkans. By highlighting some of the significant 
developments in this literature, this thesis draws out parallels as well as different 
approaches to very similar questions, particularly involving homelands and post-
conflict states. 
3.2 A Brief Overview of Transitional Justice Scholarship 
 
Ruti Teitel initially defined transitional justice as “the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to 
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” 131  In times of 
continuous transition, usually understood from authoritarianism towards more 
democratic regimes, transitional justice has increasingly come to the forefront not 
only of scholarship but also of policy discussions. The prevalence of transitional 
justice in both academic and policy debates has, over the last few decades, become 
increasingly mainstream and interdisciplinary, moving beyond the legal remedies 
towards an understanding of other mechanisms and broader conceptions of what 
transitional justice is.  
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Rather than wondering about transitional justice and its applicability, 
research has instead shifted to the details of implementation and programming of 
transitional justice mechanisms. New research trends in transitional justice can help 
to incorporate questions of power, gender, and inequality, introducing critical 
dimensions that have traditionally not been considered in detail.132 The field has 
achieved not only recognition but also legitimacy. This is perhaps notable most 
recently by the inclusion of transitional justice mechanisms in negotiations for 
peace in Colombia through the work of organizations such as the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).133  Headquartered in New York City, it was 
founded in 2001 in order to address accountability after mass atrocity and human 
rights abuses through promoting the use of transitional justice mechanisms and 
frameworks.  
The ICTJ defines transitional justice as a set of judicial and non-judicial 
measures implemented following grave human rights abuses by governments. As 
part of a holistic approach, they note that measures can include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, institutional reforms, 
gender justice and memorialization efforts.134 This only highlights some of the 
ways a society can address transitional justice as most find a combination of 
approaches to be most effective. 
From an academic perspective, Olsen et al. lay out the mechanisms of 
transitional justice focusing on the importance of the process about the timing as 
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well as their effectiveness. “These mechanisms fall into three broad overlapping 
categories: mechanisms of accountability for past crimes, including trials, truth 
commissions, and lustration policies; victim-oriented restorative justice 
mechanisms, including reparations, construction of monuments, and public 
memory projects; and mechanisms of security and peace, including amnesties and 
pardons, constitutional amendments and institutional reform.”135  
Thus, transitional justice is increasingly understood to encompass more than 
legal mechanisms such as war crimes trials, lustration, and amnesties. Rather than 
only retributive mechanisms, restorative justice mechanisms that involve more 
incremental societal changes that help to foster the transition after conflict or 
atrocity are also considered as part of the transitional justice ‘toolkit.’ Scholars have 
proposed studying the importance of broader societal changes, both through the lens 
of education as well as a more general lens including local and national levels of 
engagement as well as institutional change. This moves the implementation of 
transitional justice beyond the state to include a wider number of actors who can 
influence and shape transitional justice, and in turn, peace building projects.136  
Widening the field of potential transitional justice actors does not make ease 
these processes. Often, transitional periods can take decades, and it might not 
always be clear in which direction a transition is moving, whether towards a more 
amenable way of resolving past abuse or not. Each country, depending on timing, 
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the political will and the number of grievances, approaches transitional justice and 
peacebuilding efforts in different ways, adopting strong or weak measures, 
cooperating with international institutions, or coming up with alternative creative 
responses. Practical challenges arise which cause mounting criticism, regardless of 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Discussions about how ‘truth’ and historical 
narratives are difficult to resolve, particularly in countries that incorporate former 
perpetrators back into society. Tribunals are costly legal measures that do not 
penetrate on all societal levels. 137  The Balkans are perhaps one of the best 
contemporary examples of this, with ongoing transitional justice processes that 
include both the traditional legal mechanisms such as the ICTY as well as wider 
approaches and attempts at traditional justice, explored in the following sections.  
While there are maximalist, minimalist, moderate and holistic approaches, 
scholars agree that a balanced, cooperative approach is most effective. Olsen et al. 
present a systematic analysis of transitional mechanisms encompassing 161 
countries’ approaches between 1970 and 2007 – a transitional justice database.138  
These 161 cases include 848 examples of transitional justice mechanisms, with 
amnesties and trials being the most common (50% and 32% respectively). They 
conclude that the justice balance, the most effective way to get to transitional justice 
results, defined by safeguarding human rights and democracy, should include trials 
and amnesties, with truth commissions as an added benefit. They differentiate 
between negotiated transitions and regime collapse, noting that there is a difference 
in the implementation of transitional justice efforts depending on the way a 
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transition has occurred.  Thus, the importance of looking at transitional justice 
situations from a broader perspective, and in more inclusive rather than exclusive 
ways, becomes pertinent.  
Transitional justice efforts often focus on governmental actors, or the 
implementation of mechanisms themselves, rather than transnational actors. This is 
in part because states or international institutions supported by states are 
traditionally understood as the actors who undertake transitional justice efforts. 
However, drivers for change in transitional justice processes, as evidenced by states 
after conflict or human rights abuses can also be based on the individual level.139 
This has led to more recent scholarship, both in academia as well as in policy 
discussions, to understand how to approach transitional justice from below, or from 
local perspectives, rather than from legal, top-down, and often, ill-fitted approaches, 
can create impact. 
These localized efforts at transitional justice have been the focus of 
scholarship more recently. In particular, the intersection of civil society and 
transitional justice and the impact of such efforts on the overall development of 
countries in transition is an important caveat to consider.140 The field has moved 
from more legalistic approaches to incorporating wider mechanisms as part of 
achieving transitional justice. Ruti Teitel notes the same in an essay in which she 
discusses the field in phases. This first phase of transitional justice is usually 
understood to incorporate the Nuremberg trials immediately following WWII 
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between 1945 and 1946 and the understanding that in order to deal with human 
rights abuses of past regimes, there was a need for international cooperation.141  
Teitel emphasizes that the second phase of transitional justice was 
characterized by a move towards more national solutions to transitional justice, 
balancing out approaches. 142  It is during this period, from the 1980s to the 1990s 
in particular, that there is an increase in the number of truth and reconciliation 
commissions, as well as amnesties and pardons, igniting the debate in transitional 
justice between the importance of peace vs. justice and truth vs. justice.143 The 
debate about whether peace vs. justice, while far from resolved, is increasingly 
considered to be intertwined with peace and conflict studies in the sense that 
transitional justice mechanisms play a role recently concluded conflicts or those 
still ongoing. Instead, it increasingly incorporates peace and conflict approaches 
into the transitional justice literature, as evidenced in the following sections.144  
The third phase of transitional justice is notable for representing transitional 
justice as understood to be part of the process that states have to address following 
human rights abuses and conflict. There has been a proliferation of transitional 
justice, thus this phase can be considered as representative of ‘normalized’ and 
‘global’ transitional justice.145 By no means are each of these phases exclusive from 
one another, rather they are thought to represent layers and the progression of the 
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field. “They pile up and intermingle as new concerns and debates arise and are 
added to the mix.”146 Along these lines, there have increasingly been efforts to 
incorporate the ‘local’ into transitional justice efforts, with Sharp noting that it is 
represents both a ‘fourth turn’ in transitional justice as well as an ambivalence 
between local, bottom-up approaches and top-down, international approaches.147 
However, the emphasis on past abuses and finding ways to come to terms with these 
abuses has remained, regardless of the actors involved in these processes.148 
Before focusing on local approaches to transitional justice in the Balkans, it 
is important to lay out in more detail what this entails for scholars of transitional 
justice and beyond. This importance of engaging with localities in which the 
practical work of transitional justice happens is important. As McEvoy advocates, 
by embracing ‘thicker’ versions of transitional justice that incorporate more than 
legal measures, sophisticated theoretical understandings about justice can prevail, 
leading to intellectual development of the field as well as better understandings of 
the practical nature of applying transitional justice mechanisms in local 
communities.149 Using a more place-based approach in addressing these concerns 
ties well into topics of translocality this thesis addresses in future chapters as well. 
In effect, examining transitional justice from local perspectives contributes 
to “a nuanced understanding of what justice, redress, and social reconstruction look 
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like from place-based standpoints.”150 It opens up the field to address not only the 
legal responses as in the first phase of transitional justice, but also addresses wider 
questions intertwined with socioeconomic justice and ‘the periphery.’151 Through 
this intertwining and exploration of the, at times, conflicting perspectives between 
the international and local points of view, the processes of transitional justice and 
post-conflict environments become more clear. As Sharp argues, this approach 
seeks to democratize the field “yielding a more just distribution of political and 
economic power in post-conflict societies,”152 as well as better integrate and learn 
from local approaches to, in turn, be able to utilize them in other contexts.153  
However, while localizing transitional justice is thought of as advancing the 
field, there remains ambivalence about what this means, and a critical perspective 
about whether it is necessarily better. Diaspora actors who mobilize both in their 
host countries and are intertwined in the local processes in their homeland are thus 
particularly relevant in order to theoretical as well as practical perspectives. Thus, 
per Sharp, I concur that “local and global therefore retain utility for purposes of 
both analysis and policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full 
complexity of transitional justice processes.”154  
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By utilizing these lenses, transitional justice can draw on potential lessons 
between top-down processes as well as bottom-up processes. Weinstein and 
Fletcher demonstrate how legal professionals from a local area view the 
international mechanism of justice in which they are involved, questioning its 
effectiveness.155 After all, power dynamics remain in communities, regardless of 
their size and scope, and the importance of understanding particular contexts, 
particularly in transitional justice settings, remains at the very center of debates 
about bottom-up or top-down approaches.156  
The following section explores transitional justice research and local 
contexts by reviewing some of the relevant works related to the Balkans which 
touch on many of the theoretical developments in the field discussed in this section. 
While the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
remains one of the most prominent traditional transitional justice mechanisms, there 
is increasingly more research that provides layers and nuance to the region through 
the transitional justice lens, whether through civil society actors or transnational 
initiatives. In the remaining sections, I will incorporate diaspora potential in 
transitional justice. 
3.3 Transitional Justice Research in the Context of the Balkans 
The Balkans feature prominently in transitional justice research as the region is an 
important site of many transitional justice interventions. Scholars have been 
concerned with the importance of contextualizing transitional scholarship in the 
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region. While the ICTY has traditionally been central to research in this area, this 
is not to discount other regional and local mechanisms that have had varied levels 
of success.157 In fact, much like elsewhere, today, local ownership is encouraged 
throughout the Balkans, whether as a means of peacebuilding, regarding transitional 
justice, or in order to resolve political stagnation. 
The implementation of transitional justice and peacebuilding is particularly 
difficult in the post-conflict environment of BiH. A unified national narrative is not 
present in BiH, as the state itself is split into two entities with governmental 
figureheads advocating for their own versions of the truth. Thus, transitional justice 
and peacebuilding processes are difficult to implement on the national level. 
Memorialization efforts glorify one group while discounting the other, polarizing 
already fragile post-conflict countries.158 In BiH, this is especially the case, as 
memorialization processes are often the result of local initiatives and official 
narratives about memory are antagonistic and do not acknowledge or apologize for 
past abuses, a critical step in the transitional justice process.   
Twenty years since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, each of the countries 
continues to cling to its own notions of what happened during the war, with the 
ICTY and other modes of transitional justice seen as ineffective both by the local 
population and some individuals in the diaspora due to the political agendas that 
fuel continued tensions regionally. Subotić eloquently coins this as ‘hijacked 
justice.’ Expectations for the ICTY were initially high yet the process of transitional 
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justice and the interplay between domestic politics and the political impact of the 
international institutions put into place did not converge with those expectations.159 
 The International Court for the Former Yugoslavia headquartered in The 
Hague has been the traditional, judicial, transitional justice mechanism in the 
region. While it has, in combination with local courts, brought about convictions 
and apprehended high-profile individuals including Ratko Mladić, the court’s 
impact on Bosnian society has indeed been difficult to pinpoint, in part due to 
competing domestic voices. Much of the population had high expectations in 
regards to the ICTY’s potential to achieve results regarding transitional justice, 
change within society, and reconciliation. Over the years, these expectations have 
dissipated, especially following the acquittal of Croatian Generals Gotovina and 
Markac in 2012.160  
However, the Court’s primary objective is to try individuals within its 
limited appointment, not to explicitly serve as the main source of information and 
reconciliation efforts within Bosnian society, as authors have pointed out. 161 
Gordy’s monograph, for example, addresses this gap by examining the Serbian 
case. He chronicles how international transitional justice institutions are perceived 
and responded to in the domestic context, noting important nuances among the 
Serbian population despite prominent denial in the political sphere.162 
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In BiH, most of the population is unaware and uninformed of the number of 
cases that have gone through the judicial process.163 The OSCE Mission to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has only recently, in the spring of 2014, created an interactive map 
of war crimes cases adjudicated in BiH, thus providing citizens a tool to learn more 
about individual cases. 164  For the diaspora, field work has shown that most 
members are similarly misinformed or unaware of proceedings unless covered 
extensively in the media, of if they are personally involved. Koinova has shown that 
those who live in the vicinity of the Hague and thus come into more frequent contact 
with the court’s activities, are generally more informed.165  
When asked about transitional justice, diaspora members involved in 
mobilizing usually scoff, noting that efforts of the courts have not brought any 
justice while everyone already knew the ‘truth.’166 “Transition?! Ha! And justice? 
No, there is none. There is a long way to go,” one interviewee noted emphatically 
for example.167 This will be further discussed in the empirical chapters of the thesis, 
but is worthwhile to mention here to establish already existing links between how 
conflict-generated diaspora view transitional justice efforts in the region and 
perceive the need to act. 
More recent research emphasizes transnational approaches that also stress 
the importance of local actors, particularly civil society. 168  Over the last two 
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decades, international institutions and governmental bodies such as the European 
Union have struggled to ensure that there are appropriate changes in the Bosnian 
system which lead to transitional justice mechanisms being implemented. Instead, 
civil society actors within the country have attempted to move these agendas 
forward, without much success due to a lack of political will by local politicians. 
There is ‘top down discourse embellished by a rhetoric of bottom-up 
empowerment’ when it comes to the relationship between NGO vs. civil society 
development in BiH.169 Nonetheless, smaller initiatives, often locally based and 
working towards building communities in a post-conflict environment foster 
relationships among citizens within that community but also a view towards a more 
viable economic future. They have proven to be relatively efficient, even though 
they remain understudied.170 
Scholars have contextualized the importance of the region, moving beyond 
considering it problematic and ‘other.’ Banjeglav suggests that a regional truth 
commission that would deal with atrocities of the past, how monuments are chosen, 
and how the narrative of the conflict that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia is 
discussed within public discourse would be relevant and provide a way to openly 
address and depoliticize pain suffered. 171  Further research has suggested the 
development of RECOM, “a regional commission for the establishment of facts 
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about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed in the 
former Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991 until December 31, 2001.”172 While it had 
much civil society support, without a proper mandate supported by politicians in 
the region, the RECOM coalition’s success remains questionable due to the lack of 
wider societal support across the region.173  
Duthie advocates to maximize transitional justice efforts and to increase 
their efficacy in general, regardless of the difficulties it might impose with 
additional actors.174 He advocates for engagement with those displaced by context 
within transitional justice efforts, something that it is usually not focused on due to 
“the practical challenges of addressing such a massive and complicated problem 
and of coordinating with other actors – with different mandates – already doing 
so.”175 This is particularly interesting as diaspora actors operate transnationally and 
can potentially partner with civil society actors, although this is not a topic explored 
by this research.   
In the case of BiH, there are competing versions of history in each entity as 
well as within each ethnic group.176 The ICTY is a particularly contested institution. 
Much of the Serb population believes the ICTY and the Bosnian War Crimes 
Chamber have continuously targeted them.177 Fletcher and Weinstein echo this in 
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their scholarship focused on a survey of legal professionals working on trials 
concerning the Bosnian context. “The truth is something that trials can 
acknowledge, but not something that legal processes are needed to discover.” 178 
They stress the importance of synergy with other mechanisms in addition to trials 
in order for social repair within a community after conflict. They note that trials are 
limiting since they do not address the whole society, rather focusing on certain 
figureheads.  
Ethnonationalist discourses on the topic within the country only serve to 
further antagonize the population and to separate public opinion and the Bosnian 
population rather than forwarding the society towards reconciliation through a more 
holistic approach.179 Clark puts forth an argument that a locally based fact-finding 
commission using the model of a truth and reconciliation commission should be 
established in BiH, to further the capacity of the state.180  This more inclusive 
process on a societal level implemented within BiH would give voice to those who 
felt slighted by purely judicial processes whose mandates do not include restorative 
justice mechanisms. At the same time, it would enable victims to share their stories. 
When discussing transitional justice mechanisms that go beyond the judicial 
mechanisms of the ICTY, there have been civil society based initiatives dealing 
with issues of transitional justice who have, through a variety of efforts, 
implemented change, if not on a national, at least on a local level within BiH. At 
particularly relevant example is the Investigation and Documentation Center (IDC) 
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which forwards a transitional justice agenda.181 Perhaps the biggest contribution of 
the IDC has been the so-called ‘Bosnian Book of the Dead,’ which has helped to 
establish the number of dead and missing (close to 100,000) as a result of the war 
in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. This has in turn been verified by several 
international organizations and has become authoritative.182 Further, their work has 
been digitized and put online in a project called the Bosnian War Crimes Atlas, an 
online database which uses Google Earth technology to provide information about 
different sites where violence occurred during the war in BiH. It is interactive in 
that BiH citizens can submit information to the portal, which is then verified by the 
team, thus making the effort collaborative and public to anyone with access to the 
site.183  
 Transitional justice scholarship has benefited from a rich number of cases 
in the former Yugoslavia, both examining international and legal mechanisms, as 
well as national responses, domestic and cross-border collaborations, and civil 
society initiatives. This section has laid out some of the more prominent among 
them. Considering the richness of the case studies, it is interesting to note that 
diaspora involvement has not been considered in this region, both from a theoretical 
or practical perspective as it has in countries such as Liberia.184  The potential 
influence of diaspora actors, while touched upon in this section, has not been 
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addressed in a more systematic way in relation to transitional justice, though there 
has been some research on select diaspora members’ role in conflict in the region.185  
3.4 Transitional Justice and Diaspora Research 
Diaspora have previously proven effective partners in transitional justice 
processes and have thus demonstrated potential for change in their homelands with 
the resources they have learned or imported from their host countries. A prime 
example of this can be in collaborating in building truth commissions, participating 
in similar processes, and raising awareness of transitional justice efforts both abroad 
and at home. 186  Focusing on the agency and importance of mechanisms in 
transitional justice, diaspora mobilization can greatly increase the potential of 
transitional justice processes. Such efforts can help to lead to the ultimate goal of 
transitional justice, reconciliation, which, in many ways, is only possible through 
the involvement of several actors on the ground, diaspora included.187  
Most research to date has included case studies of diaspora involvement in 
transitional justice processes without much theoretical background or framing of 
how such mechanisms can be incorporated into a larger literature. Integrating 
diaspora and transitional justice scholarship is particularly salient when considering 
that most conflicts today generate large diaspora groups who have an increased 
impact on transitional justice throughout post-conflict processes. Duthie advocates 
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for engagement with those displaced even though he understands that there are “the 
practical challenges of addressing such a massive and complicated problem and of 
coordinating with other actors – with different mandates – already doing so.”188 The 
applicability and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict 
settings is under examined, though it is a necessity advocated for by several 
scholars.189  Previous research on post-conflict BiH in regards to transitional justice 
and reconciliation has been slow to link it to its diaspora mobilization even though 
many diaspora mobilize in regards to transitional justice claims.  
However, very little research addresses diaspora in these wider societal 
contexts as having the potential to further transitional justice objectives. For 
example, the Liberian Truth Commission gathered more than 1,600 statements from 
diaspora members living abroad and not only collaborated but also engaged 
diaspora members in the process in order to increase its effectiveness and also boost 
the legitimacy of the process. There was an inherent understanding that diaspora 
members are affected by the results of conflict and citizens who remain within the 
country, and that building a rapport with the Liberian diaspora community would, 
while being challenging, bring with it further benefits such as increased economic 
development.  
The implementation of transitional justice within a society largely depends 
on the political will of the country’s political elite as bottom up processes of 
transitional justice, though successful in some countries, are usually more intensive 
due to the larger number of participants, and time consuming processes. Thus, the 
                                                
188 Duthie, Roger. 2011. “Transitional Justice and Displacement.” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 5 (2): 247. 
189 See for example: Dwyer, Susan. “Reconciliation for Realists," Ethics & International Affairs 
13, no. 1 (1999), 81-98. Weinstein, Harvey M. "Editorial Note: The Myth of Closure, the Illusion 
of Reconciliation: Final Thoughts on Five Years as Co-Editor-in-Chief." The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 5 (2011): 1-10.	
 		 82 
politics of transitional justice, about the implementation of what mechanisms and 
when remains a contentious topic for pragmatic reasons but is an academically rife 
topic to explore. In particular, the discussion about which actors can play key roles 
in transitional justice, or even be spoilers, thus either blocking, mismanaging, or 
devolving the process, is one increasingly explored in the literature on transitional 
justice, yet the focus has not been on diaspora beyond case-specific research. This 
is relatively disappointing, as diaspora actors have particular insights into local 
processes. They understand how important interconnected processes of transitional 
justice and peacebuilding are in their post-conflict homelands.  
Previous scholarship has addressed the relationship between diaspora and 
transitional justice using case studies and focusing on more traditional mechanisms 
of transitional justice such as truth commissions. Young and Park focus on truth 
commissions in East Timor and Sierra Leone, noting that diaspora participation has 
been incorporated.190 The US-based Liberian community helped to set up the Truth 
and Reconciliation Mission, as the majority became a diaspora directly related to 
the human rights violations for which the commission was set up for. Thus, by 
participating, they felt empowered in their homeland as well as participating in the 
transitional justice process. 191  Hoogenboom and Quinn expand on the role of 
diaspora in transitional justice mechanisms as having potential to influence post-
conflict homelands. They examine the diaspora influence in initiating the 
development of a Haitian Truth Commission from their diaspora community in 
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Montreal, Canada.192 The diaspora influence is further noted in bringing to justice 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. A diaspora based lawyer who was responsible 
for filing a suit in order to invoke universal jurisdiction in Spain.193 More recently, 
comparative work on diaspora influence and transitional justice has begun to 
address the potential of diaspora in influencing transitional justice processes in post-
conflict homelands. This kind of empirical work begins to unpack how diaspora 
influence in a variety of transitional justice processes is impacted. It focuses on the 
outcomes of the conflict, the diaspora profile, the nature of the human rights abuses, 
and the global contexts in which these processes play out.194  
In a joint paper with Koinova, we link transitional justice and diaspora 
mobilization at the site of a former concentration camp near Prijedor, Omarska, in 
an effort to show the development and evolution of diaspora efforts combined with 
returnee and local activists in BiH in a homeland context where a conflictual 
relationship with the local government exists. On a more theoretical basis, the paper 
demonstrates how through diaspora involvement moves from local,  national, and 
global scales utilizing transnational actors who raise awareness and advocate for 
action.195  
Taking into account the burgeoning research at the intersection of diasporas 
and transitional justice, it is also important to examine the variation in diaspora 
mobilization comparatively across different host countries. This kind of 
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comparative work offers an interesting theoretical engagement with the field that 
has previously not been examined in more detail.  
The Bosnian diaspora, a largely untapped resource that continues to keep up 
with developments in its homeland, is involved in its homeland politics, and their 
efforts warrant further academic examination. As this thesis demonstrates, this 
mobilization can help to forward community based approaches in incremental ways 
at least. Moreover, a typology of the potential diaspora mobilization can 
demonstrate a spectrum of diaspora mobilization around these issues that have not 
been examined previously. In this way, diaspora mobilization around issues of 
transitional justice and peace does not necessarily represent a bottom-up or a top-
down approach, but rather a collaborative, side-by-side effort with civil society 
actors and others on the ground as well as state and international actors working on 
a multitude of levels.  
3.5 Addressing the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Peace and 
Conflict through Diaspora Research 
 
Considering the complicated domestic puzzles at hand, diaspora can prove an 
effective transitional justice partner in countries such as BiH. Transitional justice 
can be a mechanism driving diaspora mobilization, especially when one considers 
memorialization efforts and the numerous fundraising activities instituted in the 
diaspora for such projects, some of which will be addressed in the empirical 
chapters. Research on diaspora has not been explored in depth in this field, which 
is surprising considering the lively discussion of diaspora influence in peace studies 
and the interconnection between transitional justice and peace studies. In part, this 
is because transitional justice efforts are often focused on the countries and 
developments within those countries that lead to change, rather than transnational 
actors. While the previous section discussed some of the research that has attempted 
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to address this gap in more detail, this section examines the interrelationship 
between transitional justice and peace and conflict research in more depth to explore 
the potential of diaspora involvement which will be examined empirically in later 
chapters. 
Hayner has noted the importance of record setting for transitional justice 
mechanisms such as truth commissions to clarify and minimize competing or new 
narratives from setting in.196 By exploring what motivates diaspora to undertake the 
kind of work traditionally reserved for states and courts when it comes to 
transitional justice, we can better understand processes of diaspora mobilization. 
This is particularly relevant if diaspora indeed do develop stronger reconciliatory 
attitudes in their host countries, as argued by Kostić and Hall.197  
Other authors develop theoretical frameworks that are useful to consider 
when employing transitional justice mechanisms, but do not include potential of 
external actors who can contribute and hamper these processes.198 Diaspora are 
such actors, often intimately connected to the processes but share different 
perspectives from local leadership or populations in their homelands. This 
relationship is important to consider, especially in the case of a diaspora such as the 
Bosnian one, many of whom often return and engage with the homeland. 
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Transitional justice efforts have the potential to aid in reintegration processes and 
trust building for those displaced by conflict, especially in countries such as BiH.199  
The intersection between transitional justice and peacebuilding scholarship 
and practice in fact has been highlighted more recently in an effort to demonstrate 
the interplay between practical and conceptual challenges. This is noteworthy as 
there is little scholarship which aims to connect the two fields, thus making 
exchange of concepts, analysis, and practice as well as findings limited.200 Focusing 
on post-Yugoslav case studies, the authors juxtapose similar turns in each literature 
that assert the importance of local ownership as well as the inclusion of justice in 
peace, creating ‘new possibilities for understanding the aftermath of conflict’201 and 
focusing on how communities address ‘subtle forms of dispossession and 
victimhood.’202  
Often, local actors are not examined in detail and their contributions and 
challenges to peacebuilding and transitional justice not understood in depth. The 
rest of the essays in the volume focus on this in particular, though none of them 
address the potential influence of diaspora. Hronesova203 focuses on victims groups 
who end up competing against one another for limited resources within a post-
conflict system as a result of post-conflict dynamics while Lai demonstrates that 
local actors with socioeconomic justice agendas are marginalized from transitional 
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justice discussions.204 O’Reilly examines the shortfalls of transitional justice and 
post-conflict processes in adequately addressing questions of gender, leaving local 
actors to take these on themselves through initiatives like the Women’s Court in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.205 
A systematic analysis conducted by Miller and Lecy using an innovative 
methodological approach, ‘structured literature review’ by examining cross-citation 
efforts between literatures, confirms what the previously mentioned articles discuss 
using empirical examples. They find a limited amount of bridging between more 
legal approaches and what they consider ‘psycho-social’ approaches. “In practice, 
where one calls for the funding and administration of criminal tribunals and 
international courts, the other calls for facilitated dialogue groups and collaborative 
cross-community projects, which go far beyond participation in negotiations and 
agreements.”206 The authors contend that more interdisciplinary research between 
the two needs to happen, an effort to sharpen scholarship on the interactions 
between local and international actors as well as to enrich understanding of the 
complexity and conceptualizations of post-conflict settings. 
Through the analysis of diaspora actors, the cleavages between local and 
international actors can be analyzed further and the gap between the literatures 
addressed. By examining diaspora mobilization, this thesis incorporates peace and 
conflict literature and transitional justice scholarship, contributing both empirical 
examples, as well as furthering theoretical knowledge. Hence, it contributes both to 
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the diaspora research which has traditionally been more focused on peace and 
conflict research, as well as to transitional justice literature, where this is more of 
an emerging topic.  
3.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has not only highlighted previous literature on Bosnian diaspora and 
diaspora mobilization, but it has also shown the links between transitional justice 
and diaspora, looking at the potential of diaspora actors in furthering transitional 
justice processes, as well as links between diaspora and peace and conflict literature. 
Further chapters will address how diaspora engage with issues of transitional justice 
in their homelands, both from their host countries and transnationally.  
Diaspora are increasingly recognized as viable actors in transitional justice 
processes and the existing literature examines processes on the local level and from 
bottom up perspectives. The translocal element of diaspora mobilization can shed 
further perspective on these approaches, as will be evidenced in the following 
chapters. In particular, these chapters will tease out how host countries influence 
diaspora mobilization, but also how the co-occurrence of other factors leads to 
different types of diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice and 
peacebuilding more broadly. This comparative engagement represents a novel 
contribution to these literatures and aims to bridge them in turn.  
This discussion is especially applicable when considering the proliferation 
of literature on BiH and its governmental structures, political gridlock after Dayton, 
and transitional justice and peacebuilding related academic literature, without much 
of pointed and detailed examination about the involvement of diaspora. As Jones 
has argued, “only by paying attention to the ways in which institutional 
transformations play out within the context of transition can one understand the 
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potential for, and challenges to, postwar transition.”207 The following chapter will 
examine the research design and methodology. It will address the puzzle presented 
in previous chapters and outline how the pathways that diaspora mobilization can 
take in relation to transitional justice processes in post-conflict homelands will be 
analyzed.  
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Case Selection  
Diaspora are external autonomous actors, but they are far from unified or 
homogenous. “This inherent diversity prevents any abusive generalization, as some 
diaspora members are highly politicized, while others are most certainly not.”208 
They can be in opposition to on another, or alternately cooperate to further similar 
agendas among more populous communities. Diaspora thus cannot be categorized 
strictly through transnational, economic, ethnonational, cultural, historical, or 
political factors, nor through positive or negative influences.209 All continue to 
shape the diaspora, both from its perceived homeland, but also its host country or 
countries.210 In this way, the diaspora is not just transnational, but also particular in 
the unique communities on each host country level.211  
Diaspora mobilization can take on engagement with a variety of claims, 
depending on these factors, and it is the mobilization through these claims that this 
thesis is interested in exploring. What kind of environment encourages 
mobilization? What kinds of claims help diaspora mobilization? 
To gain a better understanding of how diaspora mobilize, it makes sense to 
examine this from a comparative perspective to better analyze how the contexts in 
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which diaspora finds itself influences mobilization. When looking at integration, 
the academic literature has argued that the level of integration in a host country 
affects how ‘extreme’ diaspora becomes. 212  Thus, those who are not as well 
integrated find more orientation towards their homeland, becoming ‘long-distance 
nationalists,’ as Anderson’s now infamous research argued.213 On the other hand, 
diasporas who find themselves integrated into host countries can nonetheless 
mobilize, importing conflicts into their new communities in hybrid ways, 
potentially mobilizing differently than anticipated.214  
Thus, this thesis is concerned with typologizing diaspora mobilization, 
particularly conflict-generated diasporas. This chapter will briefly outline the 
puzzle of the thesis and proceed with the methodology of the research, noting the 
importance of the research design. It will then proceed with the conceptualization 
and operationalization of diaspora mobilization before moving on to introduce the 
hypotheses and the typological table that results from it. Then, it will highlight how 
a two-level comparative analysis will help to answer the puzzle of the thesis. It will 
also elaborate on the case selection. Further, this chapter outlines the fieldwork and 
provides a overview of the interviews undertaken for this research. 
The central puzzle of the thesis is concerned with diaspora mobilization, in 
particular around claims related to transitional justice and fostering peace in post-
conflict societies. How do conflict-generated diaspora utilize the political 
environments in which they are embedded to mobilize? By looking at diaspora 
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mobilization from a comparative perspective, I allow for a detailed look at the 
differences in homeland contexts to come to the forefront when diaspora 
mobilization is concerned, as well as the analysis of transnational cooperation when 
it comes to diaspora mobilization. Thus, the case selection is based on one 
homeland context, Bosnia and Herzegovina, with three different hostland contexts 
– Germany, France, and Sweden. Further, in the case of France, I also examine how 
the hostland context encourages transnational mobilization with Bosnian diaspora 
in Switzerland. In this way, the thesis aims to analyze diaspora mobilization through 
a transnational lens, by examining how different environments foster diaspora 
mobilization, both between host countries and between host and home countries. In 
a post-conflict environment such as BiH, it is important to understand the influence 
of external actors, whether institutions, other states, or non-state actors such as 
diaspora. In particular, the ways such actors can maintain or further peace or 
antagonism is integral to helping to move such environments to advance transitional 
justice and democratization goals. 
Prior research demonstrates that the more integrated a diaspora is within a 
host country, the more of a role it can play in transferring liberal values to its 
homeland,215 which in the case of post conflict societies is a particularly salient 
potential of diaspora mobilization. On the other hand, Koinova argues that diaspora 
are acutely aware of the environments in which they operate and thus can mobilize 
using different frames within their host countries, which in turn can sustain their 
activities.216 In either case, diaspora mobilization results through the actions of 
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diaspora members who, within a smaller group, initially mobilize amongst each 
other, and then spark further engagement among the diaspora population through 
collective claims which resonate within the community. The following section will 
outline in more detail what this thesis is concerned with when discussing diaspora 
mobilization as well as operationalize it to better showcase the empirical data at 
hand.  
4.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 
 
In this thesis, I interested in examining and tracing the level of diaspora 
mobilization, the dependent variable. I conceptualize diaspora mobilization as acts 
and incentives by diaspora members in an organized fashion based on claims and 
goals rooted in the homeland as well as the hostland. In this thesis, I am interested 
in further exploring how collective claims rooted in transitional justice, the 
citizenship regimes of host countries, and the translocal community within the 
diaspora influence conflict-generated diaspora mobilization. In the case of diaspora 
mobilizing for collective claims, these are often made not only on behalf of the 
diaspora population, but local actors in the homeland population such as returnees 
as well, who might be affected by transitional processes in the homeland.  
Diaspora mobilization has been examined from different perspectives in the 
academic literature. One strand of research focuses on diaspora as viable actors in 
civil war situations and their potential for influence.217 Other research has focused 
on the influence of diaspora and economic remittances, or to their significance in 
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transnational networks.218 Empirical case studies have been particularly rich in 
examining the ways in which diaspora mobilize, both from political science as well 
as sociological perspectives.219 However, theorizing about mechanisms has been 
limited,220 particularly when considering diaspora mobilization in connection with 
transitional justice and peacebuilding related claims in post-conflict homelands. 
There are nonetheless exceptions which inform this thesis and shape the 
thinking about examining diaspora mobilization as a dependent variable. Adamson 
focuses on transnational dynamics by examining the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and 
the Turkish state during the 1980s and 1990s. She treats diaspora mobilization in 
two different ways, both examining the process as well as the impacts of diaspora 
mobilization. She argues for studying mechanisms in order to learn more about the 
micro-processes involving diaspora actors in violent conflicts as well as the 
dynamics which might in turn help to influence them.221 
Koinova emphasizes the duration of as well as the channels through which 
diaspora mobilization occurs. She notes the importance of traumatic contentious 
issues which lead to sustained mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas. In 
the post-conflict time period, this contention remains a key driver of diaspora 
mobilization rather than conflict dynamics that might be at play.222 This article 
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builds on Koinova’s previous work on different channels of mobilization. However, 
Koinova provides more comparative examples utilizing sovereignty based claims 
among Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian diaspora groups in the United 
Kingdom. She examines the hostland’s foreign policy stances towards the diaspora 
groups’ claims as well as the diaspora’s positionality vis-à-vis the host state in 
helping to determine whether diaspora groups pursue transnational diaspora 
mobilization or not.223   
The typology of diaspora mobilization developed here follows on these 
approaches but focuses on collective claims related to transitional justice and 
peacebuilding. Specifically, it is concerned with the post-conflict period rather than 
the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization during conflict. Thus, diaspora the 
pathways that lead to it are analyzed rather than their impact considering the 
transitional homeland environment which is influenced by a number of other 
factors. In this sense, it examines how different variables play a role in the process 
of diaspora mobilization comparatively, rather than focusing on the duration or 
particular channels of mobilization.   
This does not discount the external factors which influence the potential of 
diaspora mobilization such as geopolitics, ongoing conflicts, or other internal 
political issues inherent to the homeland or the hostland. Some of these will be 
addressed in the empirical chapters as well, and considered more thoroughly in the 
conclusion of this thesis. These types of diaspora mobilization might also fall into 
either inactive or reactive diaspora mobilization types. At this point it is worthwhile 
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to introduce the four types of diaspora mobilization developed by incorporating 
typological theory with existing research on diaspora for this thesis.  
Inactive diaspora mobilization is signified by a lack of transitional justice 
claims around which to mobilize. Thus, the diaspora finds other means to reinforce 
belonging to the diaspora society such as cultural activities without political 
engagement. This might include involvement in purely social activities with other 
diaspora members in order to build community, or it might involve taking trips 
together to socialize. It might even involve engagement within the hostland society. 
However, it does not include political activities geared at the homeland. In some 
ways, this mobilization echoes the mobilization that Koinova notes among Croat 
and Serb diasporas in the Netherlands who only mobilize sporadically in the post-
conflict period.224 In this dissertation, inactive diaspora mobilization due to the lack 
of transitional justice based claims serves the role of also typologizing a negative 
case225 of diaspora mobilization. While diaspora might mobilize in other ways, they 
will not always mobilize around issues of transitional justice. It is nonetheless 
important to understand inactive diaspora mobilization in order to better examine 
why positive cases of diaspora mobilization occur and how these pathways might 
coincide.  
Reactive diaspora mobilization on the other hand envisions diaspora 
mobilization in the sense that it does not engage with host country actors and instead 
focuses on individual diaspora members’ claims. It thus reacts on its own rather 
than building networks and attempting to mobilize larger groups within a diaspora 
community or across diaspora communities. On one hand, it can mean that reactive 
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diaspora mobilization can potentially sabotage post-conflict processes in terms of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding in the homeland since it does not cooperate 
nor coordinate with actors in either of the countries, nor transnationally. In this 
instance, reactive diaspora mobilization echoes the kind of diaspora involvement 
that can exacerbate conflict dynamics and is usually considered as representative of 
a lack of integration within hostlands. However, on the other hand, reactive diaspora 
mobilization can also mean that particular individuals within a hostland engage on 
their own initiative in order to affect change. This might be representative of 
particular individuals who feel they have more social capital in the homeland and 
thus are more likely to make overarching claims in reaction to the homeland.  
 Often, reactive diaspora mobilization is  a result of not being part of a more 
vibrant diaspora community. In this way, diaspora mobilization would be a reaction 
to a lack not only of integration within the host community but also a lack of 
belonging to a local diaspora community, hence the lack of a translocal community. 
Reactive diaspora mobilization is further operationalized through a lack of 
connection with the homeland in regards to political claims and a lack of 
community around which to congregate in order to further claims.  
Involved diaspora mobilization represents the most diversity of diaspora 
mobilization as well as the most comparative possibilities on two levels – between 
different hostlands, as well as within the same hostlands. Involved diaspora 
mobilization engages hostland resources and opportunities if possible, yet is at the 
same time signified by the potential of translocal community structures carrying out 
most of the diaspora mobilization, or collective claims mobilizing diaspora 
members towards action. An example thereof might be considered cooperation with 
a host country government in order to further diaspora claims. Involved diaspora 
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mobilization might occur in response to events that happen in the host country or 
political issues that are related to the diaspora or its status within the host country. 
In this situation, involved diaspora mobilization is exemplified through the 
engagement of diaspora actors who seek to become part of the dialogue within the 
host country in order to improve the image of the community or to further a 
particular claim or advance a goal of the community. Involved diaspora 
mobilization can foster more transnational diaspora mobilization in order to 
strengthen the overall impact of diaspora mobilization. This reflects on the 
examples that Koinova notes at diaspora mobilization in the United Kingdom.226  
The final category of diaspora mobilization is engaged diaspora 
mobilization. In this type, diaspora mobilize in transnational ways and involve both 
local actors in the homeland as well as in the host country. Engaged diaspora 
mobilization is signified by diaspora action both in the host country as well as the 
homeland. The engagement in the homeland can be focused more locally on a 
particular community or may tackle more general issues in regards to transitional 
justice. In the host country, engaged diaspora mobilization is signified through 
involvement in host land politics as well as public engagement. Engaged diaspora 
mobilization shows the most agency in that it requires an engagement in both 
countries and a continued networking among its members who are ready to act and 
mobilize towards shared goals. Engaged diaspora mobilization is signified by the 
highest autonomy by its members, who act with particular goals for their homeland 
in mind. This can support or push policy in the homeland in a particular direction, 
as well as attempt to influence policy in the hostland. Engaged diaspora 
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mobilization is signified by its actors who are proactive and innovative in furthering 
their goals, and not only seek recognition but also want to have input into political-
decision making. Engaged diaspora activists are interested in participating in 
decision-making. In this way, they can potentially also further their claims on a 
transnational basis, working with similar actors in other countries.  
It must be noted this thesis is not interested in individual remittances and 
sporadic actions that might be considered a means of mobilization. Rather, the focus 
is understanding the process of diaspora mobilization that is organized through 
groups of individuals who share similar claims and in turn attempt to advance the 
transitional justice processes of their post-conflict homelands. The thesis seeks to 
understand how the factors present in their host countries influence this 
mobilization, and demonstrates this through comparative case studies.  
4.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
 
If we look at diaspora mobilization through the lens of engagement on four different 
levels, the question arises about how the homeland context influences diaspora 
mobilization, in particular across different host countries. There are three different 
independent variables this thesis considers for diaspora mobilization to take effect.  
The first independent variable is the level of migration integration based on 
the openness of the incorporation regime of the host country. This variable takes 
low, medium and high as values, based on the differing citizenship regimes.227 The 
second independent variable is a translocal diaspora community, based on the 
homeland local community, though increasingly also in the diaspora community 
developed in the hostland. The third independent variable relates to claims, which 
                                                
227 The ERC project utilizes Marc Howard’s classification in order to select the cases. Howard, 
Marc Morjé. The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 		100 
often revolve around issues of genocide remembrance and commemoration. The 
following three sections conceptualize and operationalize these three independent 
variables in more detail.  
4.2.1 Citizenship Regime 
The citizenship regime of a country indicates the host country environment an 
immigrant or refugee population might find itself in and represents the ways in 
which it is expected to integrate. In turn, how an immigrant or refugee population 
can participate in a host country can in turn influence how diaspora mobilize, 
whether their actions are focused only on the homeland or whether they choose to 
be active within the hostland as well.   
The first independent variable is based on Howard’s ‘Citizenship Policy 
Index’ or CPI, as the rest of the research in the ERC ‘Diasporas and Contested 
Sovereignty’ project. Howard devised a coding scheme based on whether a country 
grants citizenship at birth, residency requirements that qualify individuals for 
naturalization, and the allowance of dual citizenship. The CPI was developed with 
the comparison of fifteen EU countries in mind, bringing citizenship to the forefront 
of a comparative politics framework. Even though most countries have liberalized 
their citizenship regimes over the last thirty years, he groups countries based on 
anti-immigrant sentiment and right-wing politics that have resulted in a restrictive 
backlash to account for the change of policies with similar values.228 
 The CPI values are calculated for EU countries in the 1980s and in 2008 
with scores between 0 and 6. Zero represents the most restrictive citizenship regime 
and 6 represents the most liberal citizenship regime. Howard groups countries into 
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four different empirical chapters based on the liberalizing trends of citizenship 
regimes during this period. Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal were liberalizing their citizenship policies over this period. Austria, 
Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Greece are grouped as representative of ‘restrictive 
citizenship policies.’ Germany, a particular case, is examined as having partially 
liberalizing policies despite some backlash, and France, Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland as having historically liberal citizenship regimes that have 
nonetheless had periods with citizenship battles in the political sphere.  
 As countries have liberalized citizenship regimes, their CPI values have also 
been adjusted. Germany, France and Sweden present a diverse set of cases along a 
spectrum of the CPI. Sweden, due to a liberalized policy has moved from 1.72 to 
5.47. Germany’s partial liberalization is reflected in a move to 2.04 from 0. France, 
already considered liberal during the 1980s, has only been adjusted slightly to 
4.97. 229  This presents three values along the developed index of citizenship 
regimes. Moreover, considering that both Germany and France had substantial 
populations of Yugoslav citizens as guest workers, different waves of individuals 
from the region have been subject to changing citizenship regimes. Conflict-
generated diaspora members who arrived in the 1990s were subject to particular 
citizenship regimes in each of the three countries examined. They exhibit varied 
levels of integration and feelings of belonging to adopted countries. For example, 
they might be more inclined to mobilize hostland institutions as citizens of those 
countries than those individuals who are not. As a result of the previous migration 
wave from the same region, the way the conflict-generated diaspora group interacts 
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with those who might have different status as former guest workers might also 
differ.  
I operationalize this variable using Howard’s framework. Using these four 
different values makes more sense than Howard’s initial CPI values only because 
it takes into account the historic dimension and change in citizenship policies that 
European countries have undergone, mentioned previously. Considering that many 
countries had Yugoslav guest worker migration and established migration trends 
under which Yugoslav, and later Bosnian citizens, fell, this independent variable is 
better to operationalize in this way rather than simply through the CPI. The four 
values are ‘Liberalizing Change,’ ‘Restrictive Continuity,’ ‘Partial Liberalization,’ 
and ‘Historically Liberal Countries.’ Sweden falls under the first category. 
Germany is considered ‘Partial Liberalization,’ while France is historically 
liberal.230  
While some of the conflict-generated diaspora throughout countries in 
Europe had previous experience, or where potentially guest workers themselves, 
the citizenship regime variable will help to determine how these individuals 
experience their host country and its politics. Sweden has liberalized its citizenship 
policy, thus ensuring that refugees and immigrants who arrive have a clear path to 
citizenship within five years. On the other hand, Germany, with several changes in 
its citizenship laws, particularly throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, complicated 
the path to citizenship for some of the diaspora population, as well as their children, 
who were not allowed to hold dual citizenship with Bosnia and Herzegovina until 
recently. In France, the path to citizenship as well as provisions for dual citizenship 
have been relatively similar to Sweden, yet there was already a particular guest 
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worker community in France when the conflict-generated group arrived. Further, 
France, while allowing for citizenship, has somewhat different approaches to how 
its migrants are represented in the public sphere with more emphasis on French 
values than Sweden, which allows for more diverse approaches. Thus, in each of 
the cases the citizenship regime influences diaspora mobilization in different ways, 
which will also be explained further in each of the empirical chapters.   
4.2.2 Translocal Diaspora Community 
 
Local-level politics in the homeland are important to consider with conflict-
generated diaspora. These local communities are the ones to which diaspora 
continue to have ties, yet to which they might not be able to return. When post-
conflict homelands are concerned and the importance of local dynamics considered, 
the importance of a translocal community becomes rather apparent. These 
translocal ties form the basis of relationships among diaspora members and can 
reinforce and build community in the hostland. Thus, the second independent 
variable examines the presence or absence of a translocal diaspora community in 
the host country context. 
Translocality, translocalism, and translocal are used interchangeably to 
emphasize the local-local connections within transnationalism. 231  This can be 
thought of as a triadic relationship between “transmigrants, the localities to which 
they migrate, and their locality of origin.”232 This research stresses the importance 
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Publishers.; Velayutham, Selvaray and Amanda Wise. 2005. Moral economies of a translocal 
village: obligation and shame among South Indian transnational migrants. Global Networks, 5(1), 
pp.27–47. 
232 Smith, M.P. & Guarnizo, L. eds., 1998. Transnationalism from below, New Brunswick, N.J: 
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of localized contexts for social action which can shape transnational processes. 
“Research on translocality primarily refers to how social relationships across 
locales shape transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic 
space.”233 However, these ‘translocal’ connections, embedded in particular places 
that diaspora members maintain, have been largely unexplored in the literature on 
diaspora mobilization. The importance of social relationships between individuals 
that travel across borders and help to shape diaspora networks, this thesis argues, 
lies inherently in the translocal community presence. Hence, this thesis examines 
the importance of translocal community for diaspora mobilization.  
Previous research has examined translocality from a geographical and 
anthropological perspective, by situating it in urban contexts or by stressing the 
importance of hometown associations in fostering relationships between homelands 
and host states. Translocal connections are the building blocks for hometown 
associations, and maintain their focus on their homeland, whether to send 
remittances or help organize migrant networks in their countries of settlement.234 
Sinatti examines translocality among Senegalese in Italy, noting how connections 
made in the homeland, or based on the homeland, ultimately help immigrants to 
relate to one another and build community.235 Research on a rural South Indian 
village and its connection abroad in Singapore highlights the importance of the 
translocal connections as existing and bridging “the local community, the host 
society, to the homeland nation to a broader Hindu identity.”236 This thesis adopts 
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this concept of translocality and seeks to apply how it influences diaspora 
mobilization.  
I contend that diaspora mobilization happens especially in translocal 
communities, those remain rooted to the places to which they originally belonged, 
sometimes even on a small-scale level such as a specific village. In this way, these 
transnational networks are not strictly deterritorialized as they remained tied to one 
another through perceived shared connections.237  
Halilovich focuses on translocality in Bosnian diaspora communities with 
an emphasis on their new homes. He notes that ‘trans-localism complements 
transnationalism, especially when debating forced displacement and the 
reconstruction and performance of local identities in refugee and migrant 
communities…’238 It is a shared connection of a place that helps to drive their 
mobilization as it binds them in the transnational spaces in which they find 
themselves, across different host countries and communities. This is no way 
particular to Bosnian communities, but in general to migrant communities, which 
might be clustered in their host countries by the localities in which they originally 
come from, for example, through chain migration.  
The variable is dichotomous in that I differentiate between the presence or 
absence of a translocal community in the host country. I argue that translocal 
communities can be catalysts for diaspora mobilization. Shared memories, 
experiences, and perceptions of a place, usually the community in the homeland, 
and trust of one another enable mobilization. The translocal community manifests 
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in two different ways in the diaspora – either through formal hometown associations 
and connections, as noted in previous research, or through informal ties developed 
in diaspora that are based on shared belonging to a particular community, most often 
delineated by the original locality in the homeland. Formal hometown associations 
or factions of groups from one hometown or region are often very vocal and present 
among diaspora populations, and are thus readily discernible. Informal translocal 
community ties are teased out during fieldwork through semi-structured interviews 
with questions about diaspora mobilization related to localities in the hometown. 
Ultimately, translocality underlines the transnational connections that diaspora have 
but also emphasizes their situatedness in the places from which they come from as 
well as the places to which they migrate or to which they settle. 239  Without 
examining whether there is a translocal community within the host country, 
diaspora mobilization cannot be understood completely.  
Finally, utilizing translocal community as an independent variable 
implements the approach that Wimmer advocates for in thinking about research 
designs including diaspora, focusing on localities, individuals, class or institutional 
settings rather than simply ethnicity.240 This helps to shift the focus from ethnic 
origin, often at the center of discussions on BiH, and advocates for a more inclusive, 
multi-level research design that incorporates other mechanisms that potentially 
have an effect but are often neglected. “The obvious task ahead is to develop a 
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systematic comparative explanation of differences and similarities in the social and 
categorical boundaries that structure these [neighborhood] settings.”241  
4.2.3 Collective Claims 
The third independent variable focuses on collective claims made in relation to 
transitional justice or peacebuilding processes or grievances diaspora feel due to a 
lack thereof. When these claims are made effectively, diaspora mobilize in different 
ways. In a post-conflict homeland environment, claims are usually related to 
grievances regarding unfulfilled transitional justice goals towards which the 
diaspora mobilizes. BiH remains at an impasse when it comes to transitional justice 
implementation, as discussed in the previous chapters. Thus, there is a variety of 
grievances which could be iterated by the local community and the diaspora in order 
to become collective claims. It is particularly interesting to examine which claims 
diaspora utilize and how they mobilize over particular issues, as these often become 
defining claims for the diaspora to mobilize around. At the same time, examining 
these claims in different host lands provides further contextual analysis about the 
pathways to diaspora mobilization around these issues. By collective claim, I mean 
here the different ways in which diaspora expresses its frustrations and aims for 
peacebuilding and transitional justice to be implemented. This is not to discount 
mobilization that is not inherently political, such as on a cultural level involving 
social gatherings meant to reinforce connection to the diaspora community within 
a host country. Rather, the focus of this thesis is to examine the claims which have 
a particular transitional justice or peacebuilding perspective and which are, in turn, 
made by the diaspora repeatedly in order to mobilize. These collective claims help 
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to strengthen diaspora mobilization and to maintain it at the same time as it brings 
individuals together.  
Collective claims are often related to commemoration, attempting to correct 
for homeland political narratives. They are also often related to discrimination in 
the post-conflict period, particularly of returnees or minority populations, 
discriminatory practices in education, and claims about political corruption. Claims 
associated with transitional justice are concerned with furthering transitional justice 
processes, going beyond trials, truth commissions, investigations, and amnesties.242 
In fact, collective claims utilized by diaspora reflect their attempts at civic 
engagement in the homeland. In this sense they help to influence bottom up 
approaches to transitional justice within the diaspora. This is important when 
considering that transitional justice activism is increasingly all-encompassing in 
regards to addressing transitions from conflict to post-conflict states, and often 
blurred with peacebuilding.243  
Often, diaspora respond most clearly to collective claims related to genocide 
recognition and remembrance, as evidenced through their transnational 
mobilization around the Srebrenica Genocide.244 How these claims are made in the 
diaspora in order to gain support will be examined throughout the thesis, in 
particular how such claims might be divisive for the community. Diaspora 
communities are also able to transcend these claims and translate them beyond its 
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community to mobilize within the host countries as well.245 This thesis furthers this 
analysis by examining how claims in conjunction with the other two variables 
influence different outcomes of diaspora mobilization. They are observable in that 
they are placed at the forefront of diaspora activities, often given as motivation for 
mobilization, and reinforced repeatedly as a means of soliciting greater 
mobilization among diaspora. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
 
The table above represents the four types of diaspora mobilization as outcomes of 
the three different independent variables discussed in the preceding section. This 
typological approach leads to better comparison across different examples of 
diaspora mobilization and provides a framework for helping to explain the causal 
paths of diaspora mobilization from a theoretical perspective. Process tracing 
examines how these variables in conjunction with one another lead to different 
kinds of diaspora mobilization.246  
While the thesis explores four conceptualized levels of diaspora 
mobilization using the case studies, it starts with a simple assumption around the 
collective claim variable. This assumption can be expressed as follows: In the 
absence of a collective claim being made, there will not be engaged diaspora 
mobilization for transitional justice.  
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The table presented above leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Open citizenship regimes, whether liberalizing or historically 
liberal, and the presence of a translocal community within them where collective 
claims take hold, lead to engaged diaspora mobilization. Thus, the more open the 
citizenship regime is, permitting diaspora to freely maintain and exercise its 
identity, as well as maintain dual citizenship, the more likely it is to take action and 
work with the host country as well as homeland organizations. Engaged diaspora 
mobilization reflects a wider repertoire of claims on which to mobilize and sustains 
this mobilization through engagement both in the hostland and homeland.  
In turn, this reflects what Koinova describes about diaspora behavior by 
utilizing ‘the responsiveness of their host-state to these claims that helps sustain and 
expand their initial moderate behavior and prevent other diaspora individuals and 
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groups from becoming more radical over time.’247 At the same time, this builds on 
Shain’s research reflecting on diasporas in an American context.248 Through this 
typology, it expands Shain’s research within a European context. Moreover, it 
demonstrates how a more open citizenship regime enables diaspora mobilization in 
potentially productive ways in the homeland and at the same time contributes to its 
development within the host land through more integration with host land 
institutions. The translocal community here plays an essential part in mobilizing a 
greater number of diaspora individuals and reinforcing its mobilization in a 
sustained manner. There is familiarity in these translocal connections that is only 
built further over time spent in the hostland.  
I expect that in countries where there are larger translocal communities from 
BiH, there will be more diaspora mobilization, especially towards issues of 
transitional justice when that translocal community comes from corresponding 
communities in BiH, such as Prijedor. Previous research conducted points in this 
direction as well using examples from the Netherlands.249 Thus, this hypothesis 
seeks to explore this relationship in more detail.  
(H1: Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + collective 
claim made à Engaged Diaspora Mobilization) 
 
Hypothesis 2: Open citizenship regimes that have liberalized more recently and 
the presence of collective claims without a translocal community lead to involved 
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diaspora mobilization. I hypothesize that there will be involved diaspora 
mobilization in the presence of collective claims and liberal citizenship regimes. 
But, due to the lack of translocal community, this diaspora mobilization will not be 
engaged. A translocal community allows for engaged diaspora mobilization to 
develop and flourish, enhancing it and rendering it as an important vehicle for 
mobilization among the group. However, involved diaspora mobilization could be 
symbolic of a high presence of diaspora entrepreneurs,250  rather than a larger 
translocal community, indicating that there are highly motivated individuals who, 
even without a translocal community, engage in sustained diaspora mobilization, 
likely on a transnational basis.  
(H2: Open citizenship regimes + absence of translocal community + collective 
claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Partially liberal citizenship regimes with collective claims lead to 
involved diaspora mobilization, regardless of the presence or absence of a 
translocal community. Similar to the hypothesized interaction of independent 
variables in Hypothesis 2, involved diaspora mobilization is predicted here. The 
partially liberal citizenship regime acts as a limiting factor to the kind of diaspora 
mobilization. This hypothesis emphasized the host country influence on the 
diaspora mobilization. Process-tracing during fieldwork illuminates how the same 
diaspora mobilization outcome is possible in different citizenship regimes. At the 
same time, this hypothesis also emphasizes the potential of transnational diaspora 
mobilization in citizenship regimes that are not fully open.   
                                                
250 Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 2016. Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs: The in-
between Advantage. forthcoming.  
 		113 
(H3: Partially liberal citizenship regimes + collective claim made à Involved 
Diaspora Mobilization) 
 
Hypothesis 4: In a more closed citizenship regime, with the presence of a translocal 
community and collective claims made, there will be involved diaspora 
mobilization. Here, the interplay between the citizenship regime, the translocal 
community and the claims demonstrates the importance of the translocal 
community and the claim in interacting in order for diaspora mobilization to occur. 
Thus, this mobilization is similar to the mobilization hypothesized in the previous 
hypothesis, yet there is less involvement with the hostland politics due to the more 
restrictive regime.  
(H4: Restrictive Citizenship Regimes + presence of translocal community + 
collective claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization) 
 
Hypothesis 5:  In a relatively closed citizenship regimes, as well as historically 
liberal countries that restrict their citizenship regimes, there will be reactive 
diaspora mobilization without a translocal community with a collective claim made. 
The hypothesis qualifies previous academic work by denoting reactive diaspora 
mobilization as not producing desirable outcomes based on the closed integration 
regime, which does not foster participation of the diaspora community in the host 
land environment. Østergaard-Nielsen argues that ‘radicalization feeds on 
marginalization. If an organization is excluded from dialogue with host-country 
authorities it has less incentive to modify its aims and strategies.’251 In the case of 
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reactive diaspora mobilization, members might be considered more along the lines 
of a ‘confrontational actor.’252 Reactive diaspora mobilization is exemplified by 
individual diaspora members who act out in their host communities in order to gain 
a voice but are often unsuccessful in their endeavors due to a lack of engagement 
with both their host as well as homelands. Thus, they are unable to forward 
transitional justice goals in their homeland and might be considered disruptive. This 
can also lead to a perception of their lack of integration in the host land, or put 
simply, a lack of fitting in.  
(H5: More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime + absence of 
translocal community + collective claim made à Reactive Diaspora Mobilization) 
 
Hypothesis 6: Regardless of the type of citizenship regime and the presence or 
absence of a translocal community, there will be inactive diaspora mobilization, 
without collective claims made. This hypothesis posits there needs to be a collective 
claim made to have diaspora mobilization for transitional justice or peacebuilding. 
Thus, the importance of claim-making and the context within which it is made is 
highlighted, a connection that academic literature is increasingly exploring, and one 
this thesis builds on.253  
(H6: Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + 
absence of collective claims à Inactive Diaspora Mobilization) 
The following section will further explain the research design and case 
selection of this thesis to explore how the causal relationships posited by the 
                                                
Solution?” Danish Institute for International Studies, March. 
252 Ireland, Patrick R. 1994. The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in 
France and Switzerland. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
253 Haider, H., 2014. Transnational Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: The Participation of 
Conflict-generated Diasporas in Addressing the Legacies of Mass Violence. Journal of Refugee 
Studies 27, 207–233. 
 		115 
hypotheses will be examined. The empirical cases help to examine the typologies 
created and allow for further development as well as a more detailed understanding 
of the processes leading to each of the types of diaspora mobilization developed by 
the typological theory.254 
4.4 Comparative Method and Case Selection 
 
This study is based on a qualitative research design using a two-level comparative 
lens, focusing on three countries (Germany, France and Sweden) with Bosnian 
diaspora populations as well as different cities within BiH (namely Prijedor, Banja 
Luka, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica).255 Three different cases enable a more in-depth 
analysis while at the same time encouraging comparative analysis.  The four cities 
serve as translocal sites of diaspora mobilization. One of the strengths of the 
comparative approach is that it aims to analyze why the differences in policy lead 
to different outcomes, in this case, varied diaspora mobilization. Examining 
diaspora mobilization on the spectrum of integration regimes aids the typological 
analysis. Each of the countries has fostered different types of mobilization and 
teasing out these differences is a key feature of this thesis.  
Lijphart outlines four different strategies to strengthen the comparative 
method – increasing the number of cases as much as possible, reducing the 
‘property-space’ of the analysis, focusing on ‘comparable’ cases, and focusing on 
‘key’ variables. 256  His seminal article remains a lucid account of the main 
challenges and advantages of the comparative method and is thus valid to utilize 
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here. His suggestions have been considered in the development of the research 
design and are discussed further in this section. The thesis employs these different 
strategies and attempts to rectify the challenges of using case studies in combination 
with the comparative method – namely, external validity.  
The three countries were chosen for four reasons. First, each country case 
can be represented on the continuum of citizenship regimes. Thus, they are 
comparable based on the first independent variable and elucidate the significance 
of citizenship regimes for diaspora mobilization. Using Howard’s framework, as 
discussed in the previous section, Sweden and France are both liberal countries, 
though Sweden is a more recent adapter, while France is considered ‘Historically 
Liberal.’ Germany is country that is considered as partially liberal, having 
undergone many changes in its citizenship regime.  
Second, each of these three countries hosted guest workers from the 
previous regime (Yugoslavia), and each country was the recipient of conflict-
generated diaspora during the 1990s. Sweden hosted the least guest workers, yet 
accepted a high number of refugees. Germany hosted the highest number of guest 
workers and also accepted the highest number of refugees, though most of them did 
not stay in Germany over the long-term. France had a stable yet low number of 
guest workers and accepted a lower number of refugees. The different dynamics are 
explored further through process-tracing, discussed in the next section.  
Thirdly, each of the three country cases provides different environments for 
translocal communities to develop, both as a result of a combination of former guest 
workers and refugees, or diaspora communities that develop in the hostland based 
on similar transnational experiences they share. This has been explored with the 
hypotheses and the typology noted above. The strength of local communities and 
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feeling of membership as part of that community is something that has been 
acknowledged within the academic literature within BiH. I am interested in seeing 
how these relationships hold and sustain themselves when individuals live in 
diasporic spaces.257 At the same time, the comparative lens on the level of the 
hostland countries will explore the new relationships that diaspora build among 
themselves when mobilizing in new communities and how these new environments 
encourage or discourage such actions. Thus, the two-level comparison allows for 
tracing the combination of both host country and local influences.  
Finally, these three countries provide different environments for transitional 
justice based collective claims to take hold. Having three different country cases 
provides the opportunity to explore potential collective claims and explore how they 
take different shape in different citizenship regimes and translocal diaspora 
communities. The second level of comparative analysis is also helpful in examining 
collective claims as localities in the homeland can serve to activate particular claims 
within particular diaspora communities. Here the interaction between translocal 
community and collective claims are highlighted through process-tracing, as 
discussed in this chapter. 
Banja Luka and Sarajevo are the two largest urban centers in BiH, while 
Prijedor and Srebrenica are both smaller cities. The demographic picture in each of 
the four localities has changed as a result of the war, with some return in each of 
the cities as well internal migration flows. Prijedor stands out as there has been a 
larger number of returnees to Prijedor than to Banja Luka. As a result, Prijedor and 
                                                
257 See for example: Bringa, Tone. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community 
in a Central Bosnian Village. Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press.; Toal, Gerard, and Carl T Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade : Ethnic Cleansing 
and Its Reversal. New York: Oxford University Press.; Valenta, Marko, and Sabrina P Ramet, eds. 
2011. The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities. Farnham, Surrey, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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its surrounding region should also have more translocal connection across the globe. 
These local elements have different implications on the way that diaspora mobilize 
on issues of transitional justice, depending on the actors they have on the ground as 
well as abroad to help them further their claims.  
Thus, understanding the importance of the factors in the host countries 
becomes essential in understanding how diaspora mobilization might differ. At the 
same time, this will become evident when examining the translocal community. 
While diaspora mobilization examined in this thesis is not exclusive to these four 
cities, they provide a strong starting point due to different potential collective claims 
that can arise from each of them.  The local communities in the homeland today 
look different demographically than they did in pre-war BiH. At the same time, 
neither Prijedor and Srebrenica are mono-ethnic communities today.258  
4.5 Process Tracing and Typology 
This thesis utilizes process tracing as one of the main methods to examine how 
diaspora mobilization develops, diffuses, and continues to influence in the post-
conflict setting. As George and Bennett explained in their exemplary methods book 
on case studies, ‘Process tracing provides a check on whether the explanations 
developed from typological comparisons are spurious.’259 By using a two-level 
approach, both in different countries as well as different localities, I can draw on 
and compare not only several types of diaspora mobilization but also variety among 
them.  
                                                
258 Hasić, Jasmin. 2016. “Involvement of Diasporas in Peace-Building Processes - A Comparative 
Analysis of Views and Attitudes towards the Bosnian Diaspora as an External Peace-Building 
Factor in the Country.” PhD Dissertation, Université libre de Bruxelles/Libera Università 
Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli di Roma. 
259 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 254. 
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Process tracing helps to explain how diaspora mobilization takes place, 
adding a structured and focused comparative element when examining the 
typological analysis. 260  It lends itself well to “to the study of the intentional 
behavior of individuals and organizations because this often involves the use of 
qualitative variables that are difficult though not necessarily impossible to quantify 
in a fruitful way.”261 The Bosnian diaspora in Sweden organizes in part through 
diaspora associations for youth, women, and hometown associations in combination 
with ‘clubs,’ centered in a variety of Swedish towns and cities where diaspora 
members meet, gather, and organize. In many ways, this diaspora is the most visible 
of the three, both in the host country as well as the homeland. Their focus on 
projects that raise the visibility of their community both in Sweden and BiH is 
interesting in itself. The German diaspora population from BiH is complex in that 
there is a large group that is second generation, some of the so-called original 
Gastarbeiter (guest workers), who migrated to Germany before the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. Thus, the wave of Bosnian refugees accepted by Germany during the 
1990s had a sizeable network to interact with. This created specific dynamics and 
relationships within the host land, different from other countries.262 The diaspora 
population in France is the most understudied and the empirical contributions of 
this thesis will cast a new light on the types of mobilization present there. 
Thus, hypotheses and the typology developed can be tested and potentially 
improved on. I am interested not only in purely successful efforts, but also how they 
might change over time or ultimately fail. Even failed initiatives are of interest as 
                                                
260 Landman, Todd. 2008. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. 3rd ed. 
New York: Routledge. 
261 Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George. 1997. “Process Tracing in Case Study Research.” 
MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods. 
262 Valenta, Marko, and Sabrina P Ramet, eds. 2011. The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in 
Transnational Communities. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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the process by which they a group of individuals mobilizes to forward these claims 
contributes to a more succinct understanding. This will help to adjust the typology 
if necessary and to add further independent variables, which might be causally 
relevant for diaspora mobilization. Here, the process retains the significance as it 
tries to identify how diaspora mobilization happens in different settings and what 
contributes to it, thus identifying the intervening causal process between the 
independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable.263 Interview data 
and participant observation during fieldwork is supplemented with data from a 
variety of media sources chronicling processes as they occur. 
4.6 Interviews and Field Work 
 
Semi-structured interviews with diaspora actors elucidate on their engagement 
processes, but also inform comparative analysis of individuals’ experiences. They 
also shed lid on their understandings of the homeland and host land contexts in 
which they mobilize. Diaspora members are aware of each other’s transnational 
activities, sometimes even collaborating together, as will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5. During interviews, diaspora members interviewed would remark on the 
activities of Bosnians in the United States, or in Norway, or the UK, and in turn 
question the researcher about these further. One respondent mused, responding to 
his own question, “I mean, we all know how well they are organized in Sweden, 
but what is it like in the US? They work so much, they don’t even have time for the 
community!264  
Diaspora members were interviewed in each of the three countries where 
diaspora mobilization was analyzed: Sweden, France, and Germany. Interviews 
                                                
263 Ibid., 205-206.  
264 Respondent DE24 (2014) Interview in October, Munich, Germany. 
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including probing question about what motivates individuals to mobilize, how the 
experience within their host countries influenced these decisions, or whether other 
factors did so as well, and to what extent. The questions draw both on actual events 
and activities they have participated in as well as their political views about events, 
which might, in turn, motivate their actions. Further interviews were conducted in 
Switzerland in order to capture transnational diaspora mobilization in France, as 
well as the United Kingdom and the United States, in order to triangulate 
information gained from interviews.  
The questions asked were similar in each country, depending on the 
individual being interviewed, thus allowing for structured comparison. 265  This 
allows for comparison of the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization originating in 
the different host countries. Interviews and participant observation combine 
positivist and reflexive scientific methods. Further, this  inductive approach moves 
towards middle range generalization using specific cases, in an effort “to move from 
the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro.’266 
Lastly, interviews were conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
participant observations of commemoration and diaspora organized events, as well 
as with returnees who collaborate with diaspora actors, and Bosnian government 
officials and civil society actors. Moreover, several focus groups were organized in 
order to gather information in both France and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to 
capture the uniformity of opinions by diaspora members or returnees, respectively. 
Interviews with the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees and several other 
Bosnian politicians and institutions helped to shed light on the way the diaspora is 
                                                
265 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
266 Burawoy, Michael. 1998. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory 16 (1): 4–33. 
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perceived as well as how its significance and political potential within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is considered. Conclusions drawn in the thesis were informed by these 
interviews, focus groups, as well as the fieldwork conducted and are referenced by 
footnotes throughout the thesis. A more detailed interview guide can be found in 
the Appendix of this thesis.  
The average time of interviews was 90 minutes, though some interviews 
were considerably longer due to interviewees’ desire to relay biographical data at 
the beginning of the interview. Interviewees ranged in age from their late 20s to 
their late 70s, with the majority of individuals in theirs 30s to 50s. A third of the 
interviewees were women. 25 interviewees, about a quarter, noted they were not 
Bosniak. More than three quarters of the interviewees stressed they were Bosnian 
and did not want to be classified only by their ethnic background, as mentioned in 
the introductory chapter. The individuals who explained they were not Bosnian but 
Bosniak diaspora members were from the Sandžak region in Serbia and 
Montenegro. There were no interviewees who were Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian 
Croats who felt the need to accentuate that. Instead, they simply called themselves 
‘Bosnian’ in the same way that Bosnian Muslims also did more often than 
identifying themselves as exclusively Bosniak. All of the interviewees were 
involved with initiatives or were in leadership positions in diaspora organizations 
in their communities, or had insights about the community in their professional 
lives. In Germany and France, several of the interviewees had experience as guest 
workers prior to the war, and then as conflict-generated diaspora during and after 
the war. They maintained different levels of contact with the homeland, including 
individuals who spent months in BiH on an annual basis. However, most of them 
spend the majority of their time in their host countries, most of them have dual 
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citizenships or permanent residence statuses in their host countries, and are involved 
in their new communities in a variety of ways.  
 The information gained in interviews was triangulated using a variety of 
primary and secondary sources in Bosnian, German, Swedish, and English. These 
included academic books, articles, working papers as well as reports and policy 
papers published by non-governmental organizations, political party documents, 
news websites, as well as diaspora Facebook sites. 267 Additional information has 
been gathered through further conversations with journalists and through 
participant observation. These have included rallies, cultural gatherings, 
commemoration ceremonies, diaspora organization meetings to which the author 
was privy to, embassy events, as well as events where diaspora met with non-
diaspora in their homelands to promote their activism.  
Attendance at these events helped to contextualize how diaspora see the 
world and how they communicate amongst each other as well as continue to build 
their translocal communities. I had repeated interactions with a majority of the 
interviewees either through follow-up e-mails or phone calls or through attendance 
at the aforementioned events. Though there are always methodological challenges 
with this kind of research, I sought to triangulate the information and the process 
tracing for this thesis in a comprehensive way through this approach. 268  The 
following section will discuss in more detail issues of positionality that I 
encountered as a researcher as well as how I addressed my own potential bias.  
                                                
267 There are several Facebook groups that diaspora is particularly active on. These include more 
specific groups such as the Čuvari Omarske / Guardians of Omarska, Svjetski Savez Dijaspore 
Bosne i Hercegovine, as well as more general groups such as DIJASPORA BiH. 
268 Tarrow, Sidney, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1995. “Bridging the 
Quantitative Qualitative Divide in Political Science.” The American Political Science Review 89 
(2). 
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4.7 Positionality of the Researcher 
Academic debate in the field of political science ethnography has a rich tradition in 
regards to the importance of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ statuses as well as the 
implications thereof on fieldwork. 269  A more recent volume provides a good 
overview of the limited ways in which political science methods have moved 
towards pushing researchers to not only consider their positionality but also the 
power of their authorship and their interviewees and informants’ participation in 
the research process. Perhaps in an effort to encourage this kind of reflexivity, they 
note it is interviewees appreciate honest exchanges and a demonstrable 
understanding of the researcher’s role as it helps to build trust but also reinforces 
more rigorous processes during field work.270  
Further, the insider-outside divide has been examined in migration research 
and problematized. In particular, five different types of ‘third positions’ that a 
researcher might find themselves in, ranging from an ‘explicit third party’ position 
to an ‘apparent insider’ have been considered. “It is conceivable that an ethno-
national insider researcher would want to emphasize insider status as source of 
legitimacy and authority, but that the informants would see the researcher as a clear 
outsider on other grounds.”271 This continuum of insider-outsider is defined through 
markers including name, age, and gender, but also considers markers such as 
                                                
269 See Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler. 1987. Membership Roles in Field Research. 
Qualitative Research Methods, v. 6. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications.; Horowitz, Ruth. 
1986. “Remaining an Outsider: Membership as a Threat to Research Rapport.” Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 14 (4): 409–30.; Krieger, Susan. 1985. “Beyond ‘Subjectivity’: The 
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270 Mosley, Layna, ed. 2013. Interview Research in Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
271 Carling, Jørgen, Marta Bivand Erdal, and Rojan Ezzati. 2014. “Beyond the Insider-Outsider 
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language skills as well as language used, cultural competence, sustained 
commitment, religion and migration experiences.  
I identified with the position of an ‘apparent insider,’ though this varied 
depending on the country in which I was doing fieldwork, complicating my 
positionality further. From the initial planning of this thesis, to conducting 
fieldwork, to writing, I have been acutely aware of the hybrid position I hold in 
relation to my research informants, and the potential benefits as well as drawbacks 
this brings to how I conduct my research. As an individual born in Yugoslavia, with 
a grandmother who was married to a Gastarbeiter and lived in Germany since the 
1980s, my family and I escaped Banja Luka, my hometown, to become refugees in 
Germany, by virtue of this connection. In the late 1990s, we immigrated to the 
United States. Finding initial interviewees in Germany who would be able to 
provide more historical perspectives about Bosnians in Germany proved to be easier 
by virtue of utilizing my parents’ knowledge of the community during the early 
1990s. Due to my previous research in Sweden, I had also already developed 
relationships with diaspora organizations and diaspora representatives, which eased 
data gathering and provided me references to mention when contacting potential 
interviewees. This presented more of an initial challenge in France, in part also due 
to my limited knowledge of French. Nonetheless, by virtue of being Bosnian, and 
speaking, reading, and writing the language fluently, I was able to contact and gain 
access to communities which might otherwise be reluctant to respond to interview 
requests. What they perceived as a shared identity helped me to promote richer data 
gathering. Further, by virtue of my ‘insider knowledge,’ I was able to draw on 
analytical insights that could be lost on a researcher without ‘diaspora’ experience.  
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Often, interviewees assumed my political leanings, or understanding of 
certain dynamics because of my name,272 or the knowledge they gathered of my 
background. In interviews as well as exchanges with one another, diaspora 
members often asked when I was last ‘down there,’ referring both to BiH in general, 
as well as the local community in Banja Luka, if applicable. During interviews as 
well as participant observation at diaspora events, I was often asked what kind of 
coffee I drink, in part to establish a mutual connection, but on another level, in order 
to assert a level of authenticity which might otherwise be questioned for a variety 
of reasons, including my age. While this might initially sound strange to a reader 
unfamiliar with Balkan coffee culture, it is something diaspora members are acutely 
aware of. During interviews, it was often noted that they had made Bosnian coffee 
rather than espresso or drip coffee which they might otherwise drink by themselves, 
without other Bosnians around, especially for me. One interviewee noted, “This 
interview feels extra special because I made Bosnian coffee.”273 
As a researcher, understanding some of these subtle differences led to 
building trust with interviewees by showing knowledge of their own region as well 
as understanding how to differentiate it from the regional cuisine of another part of 
the country. While cuisine tends to be one of the clearest examples, any similar 
cultural markers also apply, from greetings, dress, to popular culture knowledge 
and ability to reference it back to diaspora members. Sometimes, these cultural 
norms might be translated in unique ways and incorporated into host land contexts 
                                                
272 One’s ‘ethnic background’ as Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, or Bosnian Serb can often be 
assumed by either the first name or the last name. In my case, there are strong Bosnian Muslim 
connotations as my first name means Heaven or Paradise in Arabic and is generally rare. 
273 Respondent SWE7 (2014) Interview in June, Varnamo, Sweden 
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such as home decorations, which mimic those in Bosnia, with additional American 
or Swedish influences, as Halilovich also notes in his research with diaspora.274  
However, as an apparent insider, there are often situations where a 
researcher might feel that they are also considered a potential collaborator of the 
diaspora due to the level of perceived ‘familiarity.’ Understanding and managing 
expectations of diaspora as well as local dynamics in both their host country 
community as well as the local politics in the homeland remained highly relevant 
throughout my fieldwork. Often, I reinforced my own political neutrality in 
explaining why I did not engage in political discussions with diaspora members, 
but rather wanted to know their opinions and reflections.  
On a final note, I was surprised to find how often language skills were 
invoked during my fieldwork. Language remains a key marker, in particular in 
migrant oriented settings where retention of language can be seen as an important 
tool in maintaining contact with a homeland. Almost two decades following much 
of Bosnian diaspora’s arrival in various countries across Europe, fluency in the 
native language is particularly treasured and appreciated, as many, in particular 
second generation individuals, as well as those who arrived in their host countries 
at younger ages, are less skilled at speaking their native languages without foreign 
accents or grammatical errors. Throughout my fieldwork, the ease with which I 
used Bosnian, as my level of fluency in the language, something I took for granted, 
was repeatedly remarked upon by interviewees. Thus, I was often perceived as more 
‘Bosnian’ than ‘diaspora,’ and in part, I felt, taken more seriously.  
4.8 Conclusion 
 
                                                
274 Halilovich, Hariz. 2013. Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory, and Trans-
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This chapter has focused on the research design and case selection, addressing 
methodological questions as well as setting out the perspective of the researcher as 
an apparent insider. The dependent variable, diaspora mobilization, was 
conceptualized and operationalized, as well as the three independent variables: 
citizenship regime, translocal community, and collective claims. The chapter also 
introduced the typology of diaspora mobilization for transitional justice claims as 
well as the hypotheses this generated as a result.  
 In the section thereafter, I moved on to further elucidate on the comparative 
method as well as the two-level research design including case selection. In 
particular, it also highlighted the qualitative research methods used and their 
applicability for this research, as well as their complementarity in helping 
researchers trace causal relationships. The chapter concluded with a section about 
the unique positionality of the researcher with diaspora, in diaspora, as diaspora and 
the advantages as well as challenges this presented during fieldwork.  
 The following three chapters will apply the research design developed in 
this chapter and discuss the empirical findings of the field work in Sweden, 
Germany, and France respectively. They will tease out the differences between the 
three cases, as well as within the cases themselves, to generate a better 
understanding of the host land environments and their influence on diaspora 
mobilization, as well as the pertinence of translocal community in the hostlands, 
and the collective claims which are used to encourage mobilization in the first place.  
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Chapter 5 Bosnian Diaspora in Sweden – Modeling Citizenship 
Transnationally  
The underlying question of this thesis is interested in the pathways of diaspora 
mobilization in different political environments. The Swedish case study, 
representative of an open citizenship regime, is thus an important one to consider 
in regards to diaspora organization, integration, transnational activities, and 
ultimately, diaspora mobilization. It provides a valuable comparative case study to 
examine how mobilization emerges, how it is triggered, and how it persists. The 
typological model introduced in previous chapters hypothesizes three different 
types of mobilization to be discernable in Sweden as a state representative of the 
‘Liberalizing Change’ citizenship regime: engaged, involved, and inactive. In the 
model, the engaged category remains singular, as a result of the presence of a 
translocal community as well as an open citizenship regime, when collective claims 
are made. Involved and inactive diaspora mobilization are also possible in other 
citizenship regimes. This corresponds to hypotheses 1, 2, and 6.  The empirical data 
will show the variation between engaged and involved diaspora mobilization as 
well as elaborate on examples of inactive mobilization. In engaged diaspora 
mobilization, each of the independent variables play a demonstrable role in 
mobilization, whereas in involved and inactive mobilization, the presence or 
absence of a translocal community or collective claims help to determine what kind 
of diaspora mobilization will result. This variation will continue to be drawn upon 
throughout the following chapters as well.   
While previous studies are insightful about the integration of Bosnians in 
Sweden, echoing the research in migration, political perceptions and levels of 
diaspora mobilization remain understudied, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. It is 
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certainly true that there are Bosnian Swedes who have run or hold political office 
in Sweden, such as Aida Hadžialić,275 Amna Ibrišagić, and Jasenko Selimović, to 
name a few. However, how Bosnian Swedish diaspora members mobilize towards 
with a focus on contentious issues that are at the heart of transitional justice and 
peacebuilding debates has not been explored in more detail. Diaspora understanding 
of what incorporates transitional justice is representative of broader understandings 
and is firmly rooted in the belief about the potential of activism by citizens to further 
these agendas.276 This chapter tests the hypotheses generated by the typology in the 
previous chapters using the Swedish case study. The following section provides 
some of the context of Bosnian diaspora in Sweden. It provides a unique case study 
not just for Sweden, but generally on migration and integration of refugee 
populations debates. 
5.1 Overview of Bosnian Organizations and Diaspora in Sweden 
 
Previous studies have placed the number of diaspora members at an estimated 
80,000 individuals.277 According to Statistics Sweden, as of 2014, there were a little 
over 57,000 Bosnian born individuals living in Sweden, with around 39,000 with 
Swedish citizenship, acquired between 2000 and 2014. The same agency reports 
that around 6,500 individuals have Bosnian citizenship without a Swedish 
citizenship as of 2014. This number has declined from a high of over 55,000 people 
in 1996. According to the same, there are approximately 72,000 people born in 
                                                
275 Aida Hadžialić resigned from her position as Minister for Upper Secondary School, Adult 
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Yugoslavia who lived in Sweden in 2009.278  Most have established residency and 
citizenship since the mid-1990s as a result of Swedish policy towards Balkan 
refugees. 96% of the Bosnian refugees who arrived in Sweden during this period 
have stayed, in comparison to Germany where only 6% of the population 
remains.279 Hence, this group represents one of the largest transnational populations 
of Bosnians in Europe and the world.  
While exact numbers are difficult, it is estimated that at least half of these 
individuals are members of voluntary associations, many of them Bosnian-Swedish 
clubs for example, which are generally encouraged and supported by the Swedish 
state as a way of building social capital and engagement with local communities.280 
Within this organizational structure is the umbrella organization of Savez 
Bosanskohercegovačkih Udruženja u Švedskoj (Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
Association of Sweden). Within it many individual associations operate. They are 
based on hometowns such as the Savez Banjalučana u Švedskoj (Association of 
Banja Lukans in Sweden), or as women’s organizations, Savez Žena u Švedskoj 
(Association of Women of Sweden). Then there are also local clubs which combine 
the name of the Swedish town and something symbolic of BiH, such as Ljiljan 
Motala (Motala Lillies). There are over 100 of these organizations, often in each 
Swedish municipality, offering a place for Bosnians to gather.281  
                                                
278 Statistics Sweden (2014). Population Statistics. Retrieved from: http://www.scb.se/sv_/ 
[Accessed June 2015]. 
279 Valenta, Marko, and Sabrina P Ramet, eds. 2011. The Bosnian Diaspora : Integration in 
Transnational Communities. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. p. 4. 
280 Jane Toerell provides an overview of voluntary associations in Sweden. Teorell, Jan. 2003. 
“Linking Social Capital to Political Participation: Voluntary Associations and Networks of 
Recruitment in Sweden1.” Scandinavian Political Studies 26 (1): 49–66.  
281 Respondent SWE14 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
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While many echoed concerns from their initial time spent in Sweden, being 
disoriented and not belonging, under trauma, and not speaking the language, most 
retain gainful employment almost two decades after settling in Sweden. Over time, 
they start to feel a sense of belonging within the communities in which they find 
themselves.282 As a minority group in Sweden, Bosnians can admit their children to 
Bosnian language courses through the Swedish school system, and nearly all 
interviewees with children have done so, with some who have even taught 
themselves. This helps the second generation maintain a connection to the 
homeland, and to form friendships with others who they might not otherwise get to 
know. In many ways, the Bosnian community in Sweden has integrated well.  
Many within the Bosnian diaspora community in Sweden know each other 
and have built networks, collaborating on projects most often focused on 
highlighting the diaspora community in Sweden, and promoting their homeland in 
a positive light, through cultural events. During the early 1990s, they were 
instrumental in helping to open a BiH Embassy in Sweden, and some served in 
different capacities over the last twenty years as translators, and advisors, whether 
informally or formally. A majority cited using the diaspora networks they have built 
in Sweden to engage with citizens in BiH outside of their own familial and 
friendship ties in BiH today. They have created and continue to publish a range of 
periodicals for the consumption of the Bosnian diaspora which, deduced from 
interviews, is often their main source of keeping up with the situation at home. In 
the past, they have undertaken voter registration drives and often attempt to spend 
                                                
282 Frykman, Maja Povrzanović. 2001. Beyond Integration : Challenges of Belonging in Diaspora 
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at least a few weeks in BiH every other year, if not on an annual basis. These 
spontaneous activities have helped to contribute to building a translocal community 
based on the Swedish Bosnians who are active within these organizations.283  
The next sections will focus on the types of diaspora mobilization that are 
hypothesized in the Swedish case study: engaged, involved, and inactive. This 
empirical work helps to specify the typology of diaspora mobilization developed 
throughout this thesis, as well as further and enrich it through examples. It is 
worthwhile to remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization 
for a citizenship regime such as Sweden, represented as ‘Liberalizing Change’ using 
Howard’s framework.   
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5.2 Engaged Mobilization in Sweden 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts the interplay between independent variables that leads to 
engaged diaspora mobilization. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as 
                                                
283 This general overview of the community is informed by the interviews with the leadership of 
several of the largest Bosnian diaspora associations noted in this chapter.  
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follows: (H1: Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + 
presence of collective claims à Engaged Diaspora Mobilization). 
Thus, this section will examine in more detail several initiatives to examine the 
different processes that nonetheless can lead to engaged diaspora mobilization. It 
provides insight into the impact of the citizenship regime in combination with 
translocal community as well as collective claims. 
5.2.1 The APU Network – Engaged Diaspora Mobilization 
This section emphasizes the open citizenship regime of the Swedish state as being 
one of the three mechanisms of this diaspora mobilization type. The APU’s 
initiatives confirm the hypothesized relationship which leads to engaged diaspora 
mobilization. They utilize both translocal relationships within the Bosnian Swedish 
community, but also actively work on recruiting new members to build 
collaboration and to grow. Through these Swedish built networks, as a result of the 
citizenship regime, the diaspora is able to utilize their networks and experiences to 
mobilize around a number of collective claims.  
These two initiatives demonstrate how diaspora in an open citizenship 
regime, with collective claims, and a translocal community mobilize towards 
transitional justice and peacebuilding. Fieldwork in Sweden established this 
engaged diaspora mobilization has led to a multitude of other projects as well, 
discussed in the sections below. Through the sense of creating impact around 
transitional justice and peace activism, the diaspora mobilization also branches out 
into more initiatives, both related to the homeland, but also in order to continue to 
sustain its own community in the host land. Throughout fieldwork in Sweden, 
interviewees noted their sustained involvement in Swedish non-profit organization, 
as well as the communities in Sweden in which they live. For many of them, this 
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might include serving on an organization or town board, being involved with drug 
and alcohol abuse prevention, as well as women’s groups. “Swedes do not socialize 
like we do. They join clubs. So I joined associations and clubs. And then we started 
doing the same among each other. There is support in the community here for all 
kinds of activism.”284 Repeatedly, these instances of involvement in the hostland 
were cited as helping to inspire them for similar advocacy work when it comes to 
the issues important for the future of their homeland.285  
In Sweden, the diaspora utilize resources in the host land to help further 
their initiatives. Through this, they continue to stress their Swedish citizenship and 
belonging as well as their appreciation of Swedish organizations in helping them to 
spread awareness about particular claims related to their homeland. This includes 
for example a solidarity among the members of the APU to being multi-ethnic and 
focusing on their ‘Bosnian roots’ and shared ideas about their homeland at peace, 
rather than on members’ ethnonational background. One interviewee noted that she 
found it unnerving that Bosnian institutions they worked with required them to 
declare particular members as Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Muslim 
and bring three representatives to a roundtable that was organized in Sarajevo.286 In 
fact, APU’s members note specifically that they are Bosnian, rather than focusing 
on their ethnonational background. A Bosnian Serb member noted, “I can just be 
Bosnian here, focus on the good things about our country, and I don’t have to 
explain my background. That’s how it was before the war. We don’t use labels, 
here.”287 This sentiment was echoed repeatedly in interviews with APU members. 
 
                                                
284 Respondent SWE17 (2016) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
285 Respondent SWE7 (2014) Interview in June, Varnamo, Sweden.   
286 Respondent SWE5 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
287 Ibid. 
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 The APU Network was formed in the early 2000s through informal 
gatherings of Bosnian Swedes enrolled as students at the Royal Institute of 
Technology (KTH) in Stockholm. APU, an acronym, stands for Akademici, 
Poduzetnici, and Umjetnici. Translated it means academics, entrepreneurs, and 
artists, highlighting the founders’ belief that there is a need for collaboration among 
these three fields among diaspora members. According to the organization’s 
President in 2014, by calling it a network, they wanted to emphasize the importance 
of it being “transparent, dynamic, social, flexible and effective.”288 There are a little 
over 300 members who pay annual dues, which go towards the events and activities 
the network coordinates. Through socializing, the group found that they were 
interested in carrying out projects and ideas to support both the Bosnian Swedish 
community as well as their homeland. Understanding that for it to be successful, 
they needed more of the community members to be engaged, the idea of the APU 
network came to light.  
 The group initially aimed to promote relationships between Bosnian Swedes 
in the three fields mentioned earlier, and to promote entrepreneurship and education 
in their homeland, as its members believe this is the prime way for the country to 
move forward. They have built their translocal community around their Bosnian 
experience in Sweden as well as their shared experiences in Prijedor, Banja Luka, 
Sarajevo, and other cities. When asked about the importance of their homeland 
locality in their relationships, interviewees noted that their experience in Sweden 
brought them together more than their lives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as many of 
the members were too young to have established networks ‘back home.’ However, 
                                                
288 Respondent SWE14 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.  
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they still noted that they utilized their parents’ connections or social media based 
on translocal ties when they organized events in Sweden.289  
While the network is expressively apolitical in the sense that its leadership 
and members do not officially endorse any political candidates, do not campaign on 
their behalf, and are distrustful of what they consider a hostile political climate in 
their homeland, its mobilization is nonetheless political in other ways. However, 
they approach many of their initiatives and projects utilizing the framework of 
human rights and discrimination, genocide awareness, and democracy promotion. 
In this sense, they consider the importance of transitional justice and peacebuilding 
agendas in their homeland and choose to incorporate it into their activities. As 
translocal actors, they are well positioned to do so as they have relevant 
understanding of both the homeland environment as well as the opportunities in the 
hostland that can help to enable them.290  
 Over time, the aim of the volunteer-based network has also become to foster 
public debate in Sweden not only about their homeland, BiH but also about how 
Bosnians contribute to Swedish society. Thus, they remain devoted to encouraging 
their unique perspective as Bosnians in Sweden, as well as strengthening Swedish 
economic development and political policies in their homeland. According to 
members interviewed, they envision the network acting as a bridge between Sweden 
and Bosnia in helping to strengthen the relationship between the two countries. 
Over the last few years, the group has worked hard in order to become a viable 
partner in both Sweden and BiH. The APU network was the only group invited 
                                                
289 Respondents SWE12 and SWE14 (2014) Interviews in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
290 Ibid. 
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from Sweden for a roundtable discussion and meeting about diaspora engagement 
and investment in 2014.291  
Its members believe that the Bosnian state does not do enough to promote 
its interests, nor the interests of the diaspora, and thus they consider themselves as 
filling this void. Many are frustrated with the bureaucratic political set-up in their 
homeland and feel no allegiance towards any political party. Even though they vote, 
they do not think their vote makes a difference as they consider the politicians 
corrupt and uninspiring.292 For example, one of the interviewees spoke at length 
about the lack of viable political candidates in the Republika Srpska that he felt 
represented him and other diaspora members whose home is now part of the Serb-
dominated entity.293  
The APU network is considered a partner and valuable interlocutor by the 
Swedish Embassy in BiH. They were instrumental in gathering funds after the 
floods in the region devastated BiH in spring of 2014, raising more than 755,000 
SEK (close to 60,000 GBP) from Sweden in their aftermath. This shows its capacity 
and ability to react to events in the homeland.294 Here again, they demonstrated no 
prejudice towards raising money for communities across the country. “The whole 
country suffered from the floods, this is not about the RS or the Federation.”295 
                                                
291 Participant Observation at Bosnian Swedish APU Annual Event, June 2014, Stockholm, 
Sweden; Participant Observation at Roundtable Event organized by Bosnian Government with 
APU Invited Members in attendance June 2014, Sarajevo, BiH. Respondent SWE12 (2014) 
Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.  
292 Respondent SWE1 (2013) Interview in August, Sarajevo, BiH. Respondents SWE3, SWE4 
(2014) Interviews in March, Motala, Sweden.; Respondents SWE12, SWE13, SWE14, and 
SWE15 (2014) Interviews in June, Stockholm, Sweden.; Participant Observation at Bosnian 
Swedish APU Annual Event, June 2014, Stockholm.  
293 Respondent SWE13 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.   
294  The role of critical events for diaspora mobilization is developed further in a joint paper 
comparing the Bosnian and Iraqi cases. Koinova, Maria, Dženeta Karabegović, and Oula Kadhum. 
2016. “Diasporas and Weak States: When Does Nationalist and Sectarian Transnational Diaspora 
Activism Give Way to Civic Initiatives?” paper presented at International Studies Association (ISA) 
Annual Convention. Atlanta, GA, March 16-19, 2016. 
295 Respondent SWE14 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
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However, the Network also has several ongoing projects that have been sustained 
over the years and offer an insight into its vision for the homeland from a Swedish 
perspective.296  The following sections will first explore their activities directly 
related to collective claims, and the following sections will highlight other projects. 
5.2.1a APU and Commemoration 
 
In May 1992, the Bosnian Serb government in Prijedor issued a ‘white armband 
decree’ for the community which declared all non-Serbs needed to hang a white 
flag from their windows and wear white armbands in public. This marked the 
remaining non-Serb individuals who had not been sent to several concentration 
camps in the area and served as a general tactic to instill fear in them. Since 2012, 
on the 20th anniversary of this event, returnees, diaspora members, organizers from 
the community, and others have commemorated this event on May 31st by wearing 
a white armband for the day to raise awareness. The event also serves to remember 
102 children killed in the city during the war and the close to 700 individuals who 
are still missing from the locality duet to the political regime of the period. Around 
53,000 non-Serbs were expelled from the city, 3173 civilians were killed, with 
thousands being subjected to concentration camps such as Omarska, Manjača, and 
Trnopolje in the area during the 1992 – 1995 period. 297 This collective claim related 
to the injustices in Prijedor298 has gained attention from diaspora communities and 
has in turn been taken up by them all over the world, and is particularly evident 
through the mobilization in Sweden through the APU Network.  
                                                
296 Respondent SWE13 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.   
297 A blog post by Prijedor resident and US-based diaspora member Refik Hodžić chronicles this 
well. Hodzić, Refik. 2015. “Flowers in the Square.” https://www.ictj.org/flowers-square-prijedor/. 
298 Koinova, Maria, and Dženeta Karabegović. 2016. “Diasporas and Transitional Justice: 
Transnational Activism from Local to Global Levels of Engagement.” Global Networks, April.  
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 In 2015, the APU Network organized a discussion event in Stockholm for 
White Armband Day seeking to raise awareness of the crimes committed in Prijedor 
and the lack of political action in BiH in this regard. Members wanted to highlight 
the local government’s denial of atrocities, the unequal treatment of non-Serbs in 
the Prijedor region, and the challenges of the returnee community to an audience 
outside of the Balkans. One of APU’s members, Haris Grabovac, who works for 
the EXPO Foundation (of Stieg Larsson fame), Satko Mujagić, a long-time activist 
from Prijedor who resides in the Netherlands and is a concentration camp survivor, 
Holocaust survivor Emerich Roth, and Mona Sahlin, a Swedish politician, were all 
part of the panel. The discussion focused not only on how to prevent future 
atrocities, remembrance of the Prijedor victims but also featured an exhibition of 
photographs from the region to provide a clearer picture of BiH and the aftermath 
of the conflict for attendees. The discussion focused on local transitional justice 
initiatives as well as the returnee community in Prijedor. The panel also discussed 
local government’s denial of atrocities that occurred between 1992 and 1995. They 
drew parallels from WWII to engage the topic and stressed the importance of 
standing up to nationalism in Sweden. Nearly 200 people attended including 
Bosnian diaspora members and Swedish individuals who were interested in 
learning more about the country. Thus, APU was able to spread their message 
beyond the diaspora community. Moreover, they helped to promote transitional 
justice agendas in the homeland and to offer support for truth-seeking and 
commemoration activities such as the White Armband Day.299  
                                                
299 The event was co-organized with a Swedish organization, ABF Stockholm, a non-profit 
organization that provides adult education. Information about the event can be found at 
http://abfstockholm.se/event/2015/05/vitabandsdagen/. 
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 Unlike diaspora communities who showed solidarity with the White 
Armband Day through social media, Swedish diaspora members organized an event 
that focused on providing education about White Armband Day and its significance 
for BiH, but also connected this to Swedish society. This ability to move beyond 
the individual experiences of the Bosnian diaspora members to relate to the wider 
audience is commendable. By engaging speakers who were not from the region, 
they demonstrated the universality of their collective claim not only within the 
diaspora but also beyond. This created a dialogue about lessons for Swedish society 
gleamed from the diaspora’s homeland, BiH. The Swedish citizenship regime 
encourages this kind of transnational engagement. Commemorations and annual 
events such as White Armband Day provide a platform for continued engagement 
and learning, ensuring diaspora visibility. The APU Network members to co-
organized the event with a Swedish non-profit organization, and also showcased the 
diaspora’s integration within Sweden as the diaspora panel members from Sweden 
are recognized as prominent journalists and activists themselves. Thus, they are able 
to elevate transitional justice discussions about processes in the homeland within 
the host country as well, mobilizing as theorized. 
 The ability of the Network’s members to utilize collective claims from their 
homeland to bring awareness of it both within their homeland contexts as well as 
their hostland confirms this hypothesized relationship of engaged diaspora 
mobilization. The translocal community the APU Network has sustained helps them 
organize events which promote activism and engagement around issues in BiH. 
Thus, their engagement occurs in both communities. Grabovac also took Swedish 
diaspora and non-diaspora members to Prijedor to relate the pertinence of the 
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collective claims the diaspora raised to the Swedish audience.300 This initiative, as 
hypothesized by the typology, is representative of engaged diaspora mobilization. 
While the White Armband Day engagement focuses on remembrance, 
memorialization, and awareness around Prijedor, the APU Network also engages 
collective claims related to the Srebrenica Genocide, as evidenced in the following 
section. On both occasions, the rhetoric of these initiatives is not nationalistic in 
tone and exclusively is inclusive rather than focused on propagating a Bosniak 
diaspora identity. Instead, it encourages dialogue and emphasizes the APU’s 
multiethnic membership in supporting these kinds of activities.  
5.2.1b APU Network and Srebrenica Genocide Awareness 
 
The original collaboration between EXPO and the APU Network began after a 
Srebrenica genocide denial campaign started in Sweden, initially through the 
showing of a Norwegian documentary film, Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed. 
Members of APU organized by writing op-eds in Swedish newspapers, along with 
EXPO, to argue against the film being shown on Swedish Public Television. 
Originally, a Swedish Facebook group called “Swedish Television spreading lies 
about Srebrenica,” organized the campaign. Within one day of being launched in 
2011, it had over 5,500 followers, the majority Bosnians who live in Sweden.301  
Jasenko Selimović, a prominent Bosnian Swedish diaspora member who, 
served as Minister of Integration with the Folkspartiet Party, a centrist party in 
Sweden, wrote widely read editorials in Expressen criticizing the film for pandering 
to conspiracy theories that denied the Srebrenica genocide and the suffering, 
                                                
300 Grabovac writes extensively in Swedish for EXPO, and his reflections on Facebook from the 
aforementioned visit can be found online 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1551671455097736&set=pb.100007646881308.-
2207520000.1472811481.&type=3&theater. 
301 The group can be found at https://www.facebook.com/groups/svt.srebrenica.reagera/ 
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arguing it was Islamophobic and anti-immigrant in nature.302 In it, the organizers 
were clear about differentiating that the campaign was against genocide denial and 
not about any internal politics within BiH. The diaspora was interested in ensuring 
that genocide denial would not be permitted within Sweden, as many felt deeply 
connected to the issue. This spillover of a lack of transitional justice in the homeland 
was obvious in the homeland and Bosnians quickly mobilized against it. 
On September 4th, 2011, several days after the first editorial was published, 
diaspora members laid flowers next to a picture of Srebrenica victims’ coffins in 
front of the Swedish Public Television offices in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and 
Malmö, as a sign of protest. Bosnian diaspora members continued to show up in all 
three cities throughout the day, laying flowers and taking moments of silence for 
Srebrenica Genocide victims. Some of the individuals were Bosniak, though the 
majority of the organizers, including Selimović, do not prescribe to ethnic labels, 
instead preferring to be called Bosnians, or Swedes from former Yugoslavia.303  
Along with EXPO, Swedish politicians, most notably Fredrik Malm, who 
was previously engaged with Armenian genocide recognition in Sweden as well as 
Kurdish diaspora activism, joined Bosnian Swedes in condemning the showing of 
the documentary as well as writing op-eds in support of the facts about Srebrenica 
that were established at the ICTY.304 The political editor of one Swedish newspaper 
examined the background of some consultants on the documentary, determining 
                                                
302 Selimović, Jasenko. 2011a. “Sanningen Som Offrades Av SVT.” Expressen, August 31. 
http://www.expressen.se/debatt/jasenko-Selimovic-sanningen-som-offrades-av-svt/.; Selimović, 
Jasenko. 2011b. “Folkmordets Slutfas är Alltid Förnekelse.” Expressen, September 6. 
http://www.expressen.se/debatt/jasenko-Selimovic-folkmordets-slutfas-ar-alltid-fornekelse/. 
303 Respondent SWE6 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.   
304 Voronov, Alex. 2011a. “SVT Sprider Lögner Om Srebrenica.” Eskilstuna-Kuriren, August 30. 
http://ekuriren.se/asikter/kronikor/1.1167405-svt-sprider-logner-om-srebrenica. 
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they were all historical revisionists with Serb nationalist links, including a Bosnian 
Serb wartime nationalist propaganda radio host, Ozren Jorganovic.305   
Collectively, they started a conversation in Sweden about BiH, genocide, 
nationalism, and segregation in society in the most-read newspapers in the country 
to acknowledge genocide denial as well as a small group of extremist leaning Serbs. 
The Swedish Review Board for Radio and Television (Granskningsnämnden för 
radio och TV (GRN)) received over 40 complaints about the film. 306 Fredrik Malm, 
the Swedish MP, was heavily targeted by Serb nationalists in Sweden and harassed 
due to his activism through social media and e-mails as well as verbally.307  
 The events following the documentary showing and response to activism in 
Sweden led members of the APU Network to organize efforts for Srebrenica 
commemoration activities in Sweden on an annual basis to continue to work against 
genocide denial and hate in Sweden. While there were some sparsely organized 
Srebrenica commemoration activities throughout the country prior, a centrally 
organized manifestation was not part of the Bosnian diaspora activities before. The 
most notable previous commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide occurred in 
2009 as a result of several Bosnian organizations along with the Islamic Society in 
Sweden helping to organize an art installation, a so-called public nomadic 
monument, Što Te Nema?, on Norrmalmstorg, a central square in Stockholm.308 In 
the aftermath of the documentary showing in Sweden and the subsequent 
discussions about how best to respond, Bosnian Swedish diaspora individuals as 
                                                
305 Voronov, Alex. 2011b. “Konsten Att Förneka Förnekelsen.” Eskilstuna-Kuriren, September 6. 
http://ekuriren.se/asikter/kronikor/1.1175211-konsten-att-forneka-fornekelsen. 
306 Respondent SWE6 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.   
307 Ibid.  
308 Karabegović, D., 2014. Što Te Nema?: Transnational Cultural Production in the Diaspora in 
Response to the Srebrenica Genocide. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 20(4), pp.455–475. 
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well as Swedish activists had organized around a collective claim and felt 
compelled to continue their work.309  
Starting in 2013, APU Network organized a central, annual commemoration 
event on the same main square, with a minute of silence, several speakers, notably 
those who are involved in anti-extremism in Sweden. Close to 300 people attended 
the event.310 The commemoration ended with the attendees collectively walking to 
Malaren, a nearby lake, and placing lilies, the Bosnian national flower, into the 
water, in symbolic commemoration to the victims. Further, leading up to the event, 
they hosted a panel discussion about BiH, Srebrenica, and genocide, as well as 
initiated several article in Swedish newspapers about the events, commemoration, 
and the political situation in BiH.311 One of the panelists, Borka Pavićević, is a well-
known Serbian playwright, pacifist, and liberal as well as founder of a non-profit 
called the Center for Cultural Decontamination, named for its work to combat a 
‘contaminated’ political culture in Serbia. By inviting a Serbian as one of the 
panelists, the event also highlighted the importance of standing up to genocide 
denial and ethnonationalist politics in the region of their homeland, regardless of 
one’s ethnic background. At the same time, it added important context for attendees 
from Sweden without diaspora background who did not have previous knowledge 
about Srebrenica.312    
Like many, Bosnians felt that the Russian veto of a UK resolution in front 
of the UN in early July 2015 declaring Srebrenica a genocide was an egregious 
                                                
309 Respondents SWE5 and SWE6 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.   
310 Poohl, Daniel. 2013. “Srebrenicas Offer Hedrades.” EXPO, July 12. 
http://expo.se/2013/srebrenicas-offer-hedrades_6023.html. 
311 Malm, Fredrik, and Larisa Aganović. 2013. “Ultranationalism Bakom Folkmordet.” Expressen, 
July 11. http://www.expressen.se/debatt/ultranationalism-bakom-folkmordet/. 
312 Ferhatović, Marina. 2013. “Alltid Viktigt Att Prata Om Srebrenica.” Göteborgs Posten, July 
11. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/v%C3%A4rlden/alltid-viktigt-att-prata-om-srebrenica-1.561336. 
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offense, for which they mainly blamed the Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić and 
the president of the Republika Srpska entity Milorad Dodik. Again, editorials were 
published to voice their opinion and their anger at what they consider genocide 
denial and ethnonationalist political agendas in the homeland. Alen Musaefendić, a 
Bosnian Swedish journalist and a Banja Lukan, wrote about this, connecting 
genocide denial of Srebrenica to the greater ethnonationalist politics dominating the 
region today. ‘I neither can nor want to forget,’ connecting being expelled from his 
hometown in Banja Luka at gunpoint, and the Srebrenica genocide.313 Selimović 
evoked memory in his editorial leading up to the Srebrenica genocide 20th 
anniversary, connecting it to the Holocaust. In this way, Bosnian diaspora members 
are interested in incorporating themselves into transitional justice processes in the 
homeland but are also invested in doing so in their host country in an effort to 
promote these processes and highlight their potential role.314  
Media attention in Sweden around the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica 
Genocide further focused on Srebrenica as Carl Bildt, a Swedish politician who 
served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a mediator in the Balkans for the UN at 
the time. He continues to comment on the region in Swedish media. 315  In 
combination with the media attention and APU’s sustained efforts at creating 
commemoration activities in Stockholm over the years, hundreds of individuals 
gathered in the square, Bosnian diaspora members as well as Swedes. 
 Refik Hodžić, the Communications Director of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, a Bosnian living in the US who is originally from Prijedor, was 
                                                
313 Musaefendić, Alen. 2015. “Srebrenica: Jag Har Varken Glömt Eller Förlåtit.” Expressen, July 
10. http://www.expressen.se/debatt/srebrenica-jag-har-varken-glomt-eller-forlatit/. 
314 Selimović, Jasenko. 2015. “Om Folkmordet Kan Det Bara Finnas En Sanning.” Dagens 
Nyheter, July 8. http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/kulturdebatt/jasenko-selimovic-om-folkmordet-kan-
det-bara-finnas-en-sanning/. 
315 He continues to tweet his insights on the region @carlbildt. 
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one of the key speakers. His speech consisted mostly of what he called a message 
of warning to Swedes as well as a political plea for help in moving towards 
transitional justice in BiH, instigated through Sweden’s connection to Bosnia and 
the number of diaspora members: 
“I did not come to you to talk as a victim. Bosnians are not victims. 
That is not our identity. We are a proud people…We are not here to 
cry to you about how something horrible happened to us. We are here 
to warn you. As I described to you, Srebrenica genocide, was a final 
outcome of a political goal. That political goal was based on ethnic 
discrimination, ethnic exclusion, and racism. And you have to keep 
this in mind as you struggle with your own problems…”316  
 
This speech shows the Bosnian diaspora’s taking back of their identities, 20 years 
after the end of the war, so as not to be labeled victims anymore. This reflects that 
they are not just re-negotiating their labels vis-à-vis Swedish society when it comes 
to finding employment or gaining medical access to trauma benefits as Eastmond 
notes,317 but also negotiating the importance of this identity when it comes to being 
Bosnian, regardless of their ethnic background. Diaspora members with little 
personal experience and memory of the war, having arrived in Sweden at a young 
age, attended the event as well. There is clearly more to being Bosnian, or Bosnian 
Swedish in their case, than the victim identity, or an exclusive ethnonational 
identity, and this is slowly coming to the forefront. It reflects a more productive 
dialogue among the community that goes beyond a well-established victim identity 
towards one that is more forward-looking, both in the Swedish as well as Bosnian 
political contexts. Other speakers echoed the same sentiment.318 
                                                
316 Refik Hodžić Speech, Stockholm, July 11, 2015. It can be accessed online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?sns=fb&v=Awu4VwpSV5U&app=desktop. 
317 Eastmond, Marita. 2011. “Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes 
of Refugee Integration in Sweden.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (2): 289. 
318 Respondent SWE16 (2014) Interview in June, Motala, Sweden.   
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Hodžić spoke of how it was possible for genocide to occur in Europe after 
the Holocaust and followed up with how genocide denial continues to occur in not 
only BiH as well as in Sweden.  
“Sweden is our friend. Sweden opened its doors to Bosnians when 
they needed it most. Sweden plays a very important role as a 
member of the EU. We need your help. 20 years later, we did not 
overcome the legacy of genocide in BiH. You can see that today. If 
you see the news from Srebrenica, you will see how badly we need 
a political project of reconciliation…A political project that is based 
on truth and justice.”319  
 
These sentiments mirror the sentiment of Bosnian diaspora activists in Sweden who 
are involved in the APU Network. While there is no interest in participating in what 
they consider a ‘political circus,’320 mobilization on issues of minority rights and 
transitional justice and peace claims continue to fuel them.  
These two initiatives stress the importance of diaspora mobilization in 
Sweden to help raise awareness of ongoing transitional justice and peacebuilding 
processes related to the homeland, and genocide denial and remembrance issues at 
large. They emphasize the strength of their community in influencing public 
perception and understanding of their homeland in Sweden. This engaged diaspora 
mobilization, focused on both the homeland as well as the hostland, has led to 
further diaspora mobilization initiatives discovered during fieldwork chronicled in 
the following sections. While this activism is also rooted in the same principles as 
the initiatives discussed until now, it also moves beyond them in an effort at 
sustainable peace in the long run, rather than only transitional justice processes.  
                                                
319 Refik Hodžić Speech, Stockholm, July 11, 2015. It can be accessed online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?sns=fb&v=Awu4VwpSV5U&app=desktop. 
320 Respondent SWE4 (2014) Interview in March, Motala, Sweden.; Respondent SWE12 (2014) 
Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.     
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5.2.1c APU Network and Våra Barn   
The APU Network has created a hub for diaspora engagement in Sweden, 
collaborating with smaller initiatives to raise their profile and further causes they 
find important about their homeland. One of these has been a long-time 
collaboration with Våra Barn, or Our Kids, an initiative launched in England and 
Sweden by Bosnian diaspora members from the Mostar region, to help improve the 
lives of children in an orphanage. The organization’s mission is focused solely on 
bettering the life of the orphans and young adults in need in BiH. Over the years, 
the organization has also built a group home to which orphans and children with 
disabilities transition to after they turn 18, modeled after group homes for young 
adults in Sweden. In fact, the organization’s diaspora members often implement 
solutions they see in Sweden in BiH, tailoring them to local needs, and focusing on 
the idea of local empowerment, to encourage sustainability of its projects.321  
While the collective claim here is expressed more regarding supporting a 
particular population in the homeland locality, diaspora members are cognizant of 
the importance of their engagement in helping to rebuild the community. Their 
donation drives stress the lack of state financing for the orphanage in the post-
conflict period. Particularly in Mostar, politically divided between Bosniak and 
Bosnian Croat politicians, the post-conflict period has only weakened the city’s 
institutions and its ability to care for vulnerable populations. The collaboration 
between the APU Network and Våra Barn in supporting the locality in Mostar 
through the orphanage and encouraging local ownership among the orphans is one 
of the few ways that positive change in post-conflict environments can develop, 
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particularly around peacebuilding in this divided society. 322  Utilizing their 
translocal connections in Mostar in combination with the diaspora network in 
Sweden, the organization demonstrates another example of engaged diaspora 
mobilization, albeit using a collective claim more broadly related to peacebuilding 
than to transitional justice.  
 The initiative started as a result of the Mostar translocal diaspora community 
in Sweden. In conversations with one another in England and Sweden, they 
remembered the orphanage, which existed before the war, and how the community 
in Mostar would come together to support orphans. One interviewee noted that she 
felt like and her sister had more siblings growing up because of the orphans who 
they played with regularly.323 This inspired them to create a non-profit organization 
which aims to provide support for the orphanage in the post-conflict environment.  
The board of directors and many of those involved in the organization are 
originally from the Mostar area and think of themselves as citizens of Bosnia rather 
than signifying themselves based on their ethnic background, even though there are 
both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who are in leadership positions.324 By 
operating independently of the politicized environment within their homeland, they 
promote an inclusive, post-conflict BiH through their initiatives focused on 
orphaned youth, usually as a result or consequence of the war. Koinova has 
discussed the diaspora’s autonomy and the implications thereof on diaspora 
activism.325 This engagement demonstrates their resolve to their local community 
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in the homeland despite the lack of government support for orphanages. It is 
important here to note that these projects are geared towards rebuilding the social 
fabric and should not be be considered as development projects solely. Rather, as 
Duthie argues, this kind of work is often complementary to transitional justice 
efforts.326  
The APU Network has been collaborating with Our Kids through 
fundraising efforts and by way of social media, to spread their latest news and other 
relevant information widely. Some members have visited the orphanage in person 
during travels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many donate to the organization on 
a monthly basis. They stressed the importance of investing in the next generation in 
BiH, as they consider the failure to take care of the youth in BiH and the general 
lack of good education opportunities to be one of the major failures of the Bosnian 
government towards its citizens.  
Education and youth often were often at the forefront of interviews with 
Bosnian diaspora members, in part because many also had to return to school once 
they moved to Sweden. They acknowledge the importance of access to education 
in opening up opportunities for them in the hostland.327 They recognize the benefit 
of their activism for the homeland community for long-term peacebuilding. At the 
same time, the opportunities afforded diaspora members through the Swedish 
integration regime are reflected back to their activism in the Mostar region through 
their engagement with the homeland. The translocal variable is particularly relevant 
here as activism is focused on the particular locality in the homeland. 
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5.2.1d APU Network and Homeland Non-Profits through a Transitional Justice 
Lens 
 
Diaspora is able to incorporate their collective claims into their mobilization in both 
the host country and the homeland when there is an open citizenship regime. This 
section addresses how diaspora actors utilize the resources of their host country in 
helping to channel diaspora mobilization. This section presents further examples of 
the hypothesized relationship noted at the beginning as well as demonstrating the 
richness of the engaged diaspora mobilization type enabled through the open 
citizenship regime beyond issues of transitional justice and to broader 
peacebuilding initiatives, in particular related to development and working with 
non-profits.  
Working with the city of Stockholm’s Office for Voluntary Return, the APU 
Network has helped to establish a connection between the civil society sector and 
diaspora members by organizing the ConnexChange since 2012. This event serves 
to connect civil society actors who focus on improving the post-conflict 
environment of the diaspora’s homeland through innovative means. This 
conference and networking are meant to help transfer knowledge about working in 
civil society and has focused on youth and education over the last couple of years, 
in an attempt to further the peacebuilding process in BiH through these areas.  
  Through the ConnexChange event, the APU Network established a 
partnership with an organization in Bosnia, Bosana, that provides funding for 
students in BiH to attend college and receive job training to be competitive. 
Diaspora actors involved with APU repeatedly cited the importance of education in 
BiH as creating opportunities and strengthening the post-conflict environment.328 
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The charity is led by a Bosnian American returnee who is invested in building a 
brighter future for children in post-conflict BiH.  
Education in the post-conflict period has been divided and contested 
between the two entities, with curriculums highly politicized, examined at length 
elsewhere, through both policy and academic sources.329 Unlike state or sub-state 
level programs that are limited and sponsored by the government, Bosana’s students 
are picked based on their merits and need, and are not selected based on ethnicity, 
which entity they live in, or whether or not their families have ties to political 
parties. Each year, the organization sponsors around twenty students and helps to 
fund their living expenses as well as room and board while they are in college as 
long as they maintain good grades.  
This mission aligns with the goals of the APU Network.330 By collaborating 
with a local organization that has diaspora ties, they feel comfortable engaging in 
issues they consider the state neglects. APU leadership members noted that one of 
the main attractions to working with the Bosana Foundation is its founder, who 
lived ‘in diaspora’ before returning to BiH, and thus was able to connect with them 
in more succinct ways than local organizations.331 Bosana focuses on supporting 
students in BiH, mostly orphaned or those with financial difficulties who might 
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otherwise not be able to go to school due to financial difficulty. Their mission 
statement is clear about their aspirations for Bosnian society: “We hope that through 
the empowerment and education of youth history does not repeat itself and that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina can once again be a country that boasts peaceful multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural traditions.”332 This speaks to wider transitional justice 
goals of a post-conflict state that incorporates education within its agenda.333  
The APU Network demonstrates, through its various engagement in both 
homeland and hostland, the ability to be flexible in the ways they create impact, 
continuously innovating through collaboration with other actors and organizing 
with a variety of partners to forward their mission. While the hypothesis developed 
demonstrates the interaction of the independent variables theoretically, this section 
has enriched this through empirical examples that showcase the variety of ways in 
which engaged diaspora mobilization could further be channeled in the future in 
countries with open citizenship regimes.  
5.3 Involved Diaspora Mobilization in Sweden 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts the interplay between independent variables that leads to 
involved diaspora mobilization. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as 
follows: (H2: Open citizenship regimes + absence of translocal community + 
collective claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization). This section describes 
in more detail some of the pathways that led to involved diaspora mobilization, in 
an effort to test this hypothesis. It demonstrates the kind of collective claims that 
forward this kind of diaspora mobilization without the presence of a translocal 
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community, or a weak translocal community. The SDBiH, a diaspora political 
party, exemplifies the hypothesized diaspora mobilization. While they mobilize 
based on particular collective claims, due to the lack of a translocal community, 
their diaspora mobilization remains involved.  
5.3.1 Stranka Dijaspore – The Party of the Diaspora  
The Party of the Diaspora BiH, or Stranka Dijaspore BiH (SDBiH), was formed in 
2007 in Gothenburg, Sweden. The party’s founders are Bosnian diaspora members 
who felt unrepresented by the local politicians in their homeland. In particular, their 
platform consists of increasing representation of Bosnian diaspora citizens in BiH 
as well as Bosnian citizens on a civic basis rather than on an ethno-national basis. 
They want to strengthen the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland in 
more formal ways as a political party in power. Its founders envisioned it as an 
alternative amidst the political climate in BiH. At the inaugural event of the party, 
around 120 individuals gathered in Gothenburg to show their support. Its leadership 
at the time was based in Sweden, with the exception of one individual, Senada 
Telalović Softić, based in Australia.334  
While most of the leadership team has remained in Sweden, the 
headquarters of the party has since been relocated to Sarajevo. The party holds its 
annual meetings in BiH, with the most recent one being held in Banja Luka. In its 
initial stages, the SDBiH focused on getting its message out to members in the 
diaspora and encouraging diaspora voter registration. They spearheaded voter 
registration of Bosnians in diaspora by helping to organize voter registration drives 
and collaborated with Bosnian civil society organization Prvi Mart to do so. 
Organizers from BiH gave presentations hosted by the SDBiH throughout Sweden 
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at different Bosnian Swedish diaspora events to spread the message. The activists 
from BiH usually stayed with SDBiH members or their accommodation was 
otherwise organized through them.335   
By 2014, it ran 146 candidates at all levels of government in BiH, and won 
two seats, one in the National Assembly in the Federation entity of the country, and 
the other at the cantonal level in Gorazde. They boasted of having over 10,000 
members worldwide. Throughout the 2014 election campaign, the party cooperated 
and collaborated with the Domovina (Homeland) coalition. This was a shared 
platform between smaller political parties that stressed a civic minded approach to 
Bosnian politics. Their political agenda had a transitional justice approach as it 
stressed the importance of recognizing the rights of returnees and truth-seeking 
measures in relations to ethnic cleansing and genocide. This agreement also 
stipulated that if elected to office, politicians would work towards changing the 
political system set up by the Dayton Peace Accords in order to moderate the 
dominant ethnonational discourses and to have stronger relationships with the 
diaspora.336  
The SDBiH have strong collective claims, outlined in their party platform 
and reiterated on a regular basis as the political party is organized around them. 
Many of the claims center around opposition to existing political rhetoric and 
policies which they see as obstructing transitional justice and peacebuilding 
processes. They have identified a number of ineffective policies within both the 
Federation as well as RS which in turn are often echoed by other political parties 
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that are similarly oriented at changing the political environment in BiH. Issues 
surrounding education are often also the focus of the claims. For example, they 
support joint language teaching in schools in BiH rather than divided classrooms 
for students of different ethnonational backgrounds with Bosnian, Croatian, and 
Serbian in turn. Thus, they focus on the uniting factors among Bosnians, regardless 
of their ethnic background, rather than the divisive elements, although stressing the 
importance for an understanding of past events and commemorating atrocities 
remains at the forefront of their activities.337 Their platform does not evoke Bosniak 
ethnic identity, rather choosing to focus on a multi-ethnic Bosnian label.338  
Even though the party continues to exist and attempts to gain momentum in 
the fragmented political environment of BiH, they have not been able to mobilize 
large groups of diaspora. There is very little translocal community presence. The 
party’s leaders are from different cities within BiH including Sarajevo, Banja Luka, 
Mostar, Bratunac, Goražde, and others. The party is composed of individuals who 
share beliefs and are trying to build a political party outside of the homeland, 
without particular connections to any city in the homeland. Their networks are 
based on individual ties rather than on a reliance on their translocal ties amongst 
each other. This was to a degree admitted by one of its political candidates when he 
noted that they were really more of a ‘Swedish political party’ than anything else in 
an interview during the 2014 election period. 
To be fair, their inability to mobilize strong support speaks to the difficulty 
of establishing a political following amidst the political environment in BiH where 
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the same wartime parties have dominated the political scene since the end of the 
war in 1995. The three leading parties have managed to ensure their longevity 
within the consociational political structure in BiH through nationalist claims, 
which leave little room for multi-ethnic political parties succeeding. Hence, party 
competition in BiH remains within ethnically homogenous electoral constituencies, 
despite incremental steps forward.339 These challenges remain equally difficult for 
new parties formed in the homeland as well.340  
Despite their limited success in Bosnian elections or within the wider 
diaspora community in Sweden, the SDBiH represent an alternative political path 
in the politics of their homeland and utilize collective claims to energize diaspora 
voters about practical things such as registering to vote. Utilizing the size of the 
Bosnian diaspora community in Sweden, they established and registered a political 
party that managed to compete in local elections even though they were largely 
unsuccessful. While their success is limited in part due to their lack of a translocal 
community, their mobilization nonetheless demonstrates the validity of the second 
hypothesis to a large degree.  
5.4 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in Sweden 
 
Hypothesis 6 describes the combination of independent variables that lead to 
inactive diaspora mobilization generated from the typology developed in chapter 4. 
To remind the reader, it can be expressed as follows: (H6: Any citizenship regime 
+ presence or absence of translocal community + no collective claim made à 
Inactive Diaspora Mobilization) This section examines different variations of 
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inactive diaspora mobilization of Bosnians in Sweden in order to determine how 
well the hypothesis holds. Inactive diaspora mobilization, while not necessarily 
politically engaged around issues of transitional justice, can still provide interesting 
insights about how the interaction of different independent variables results in one 
kind of diaspora mobilization.  
5.4.1 Banja Lukans in Sweden  
In the case of Banja Lukans in diaspora, inactive diaspora mobilization occurs 
amidst a multitude of potential collective claims, which are nonetheless not taken 
up, as the translocal Banja Lukan community manifests itself much more in the host 
countries than in the homeland locality. This section examines the translocal 
community variable in one of the more significant translocal groups within the 
Bosnian Swedish diaspora, Banja Lukans. It examines how the lack of organizing 
around a collective claim ultimately leads to inactive diaspora mobilization. Due to 
the lack of a narrative that includes collective claims related to transitional justice 
or peacebuilding that take hold within the community, Banja Lukans struggle to 
mobilize for their local community in BiH, unlike individuals from Prijedor. 
 Banja Lukans are one of the largest translocal groups within Sweden.  They 
make up as much as a quarter of the diaspora population in Sweden.341 Thus, it 
makes sense that there is both an umbrella organization of Banja Lukans in Sweden 
as well as many smaller clubs within Swedish municipalities that have Banja 
Lukans as the main constituency. These individuals identify as Bosnian or Bosniak, 
with Bosnian taking precedence during interviews, noting their lack of religiosity 
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as well as their disassociation with the homeland’s ethnonational classification in 
the post-conflict period.342  
Nearly all of these individuals became refugees in Sweden by virtue of the 
fact they were identified as Bosnian Muslim, and thus, unwanted, in their hometown 
during the war between 1992 and 1995. For those who were lucky to leave the city 
towards the beginning of the war, in 1992, the memory of pre-war Banja Luka lives 
on, a multiethnic second city to the capital, Sarajevo, in the southeast of the country. 
For others who escaped Banja Luka thereafter, these memories are in addition to 
being internally displaced within their hometown, often going into hiding as it was 
being taken over by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, before escaping.343  
Unlike Sarajevo, there were virtually no battles, nor a siege during the war. 
The city was taken over almost overnight, ethnically cleansed of its previously 
multi-ethnic character, most of its non-Serb population dispersed, or marginalized 
to the extent that they disappeared from the public sphere. This included the 
destruction of the Ferhadija, a mosque in the city center for which Banja Luka was 
famous, the removal of busts from statues within city parks that were non-Serb, and 
the renaming of streets as well as city boroughs that had non-Serb connotations.344 
Banja Luka’s character was thus changed from the outset of the war, with the city 
designated as Serb territory within BiH. City parks were altered, built over, and 
replaced with nationalist monuments and squares, further emphasizing the now 
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Serb character of the city.345 An interviewee noted that she always finds it strange 
to see any remnant of belonging to Bosnia in Banja Luka today. “At least they left 
Hotel Bosnia,” referring to a popular meeting spot and hotel in the city center.346 
Srđan Šušnica, a Bosnian Serb in Banja Luka who is often cited by diaspora 
members recently wrote about this frustration. “It brings me no pleasure to live in 
the street that bears the name of Chetniks from World War II,347 let alone for 
someone whose family was expelled or killed by the Serb army.”348 Realizations 
like this have halted diaspora mobilization in Banja Luka, unlike in other places 
such as Prijedor, where collective claims have mobilized diaspora. For Banja Luka 
diaspora members, they see little that resembles a viable future in a city that is 
similar to the city which they left before the war, and no institutional collaboration 
to engage them in becoming part of the character of their homeland city again. In a 
sense, the translocal community exists only in certain limited spaces within the city. 
The translocal community is maintained in Sweden and other hostlands, with very 
little in the locality in the homeland. Their activities are thus mostly focused on the 
few events they have annually as well as encouraging broader Bosnian diaspora 
mobilization in Sweden beyond Banja Luka.  
Banja Luka remains the capital of Republika Srpska today. It remains the 
center of Serb ethnonationalist rhetoric, with threats that undermine the country’s 
sovereignty dominating the political rhetoric, as exemplified by the entity’s 
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President, Milorad Dodik. 349  For Banja Lukans abroad, the Dayton political 
structure has created a problematic relationship with their former city of residence. 
Diaspora members often echo that Banja Luka is now an unknown city to them 
upon returning. Street names and anything else in the city that reminds one of its 
once multiethnic character, in particular Bosnian Muslim influences, have been 
erased or changed. They consider this not only a reflection of change, which is 
inevitable in any environment, but change that is purposefully meant to eliminate 
them from the public eye and narratives about their homeland. In this sense, they 
consider the continued existence of the RS, with its political elite, a grave injustice 
to them.350  
Initial return to Banja Luka in the postwar years was thus difficult. 
Individuals did not feel welcome in their own cities anymore. This uneasiness with 
the homeland on a local level, the level of hometown, has remained for many Banja 
Lukans, as noted in interviews repeatedly. Property return after the war entailed a 
bureaucratic process they were unfamiliar with and one which often took longer 
than they anticipated, with some individuals needing several years before they had 
cleared up their property claims.351 This has proven to be disastrous for the retention 
of the city’s multi-ethnic character. Due to initial struggles, many diaspora members 
sold and exchanged their apartments and homes for property in the Federation entity 
of the country. 352  Thus, diaspora members have in effect broken their own 
translocal relationships with the city, and maintain the translocal relationships 
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outside of it, through social networks, and at get-togethers with other Banja Lukans 
in diaspora.  
Those individuals who have retained their property and thus their physical 
connections to Banja Luka, as well as the small returnee community of the city, 
confine themselves to a neighborhood outside of the city center and only meet in a 
few places within the city. They collaborate with returnees in Banja Luka and 
organize an annual memorial event to civilian victims of the war in Banja Luka. 
Each summer, they gather on one of Banja Luka’s bridges in the particular 
neighborhood where many returnees are, overlooking the Vrbas river to 
commemorate victims, regardless of their ethnic background. As part of the 
ceremony, they throw flowers in their name, and take a few moments of silence in 
their honor. However, the event goes by mostly unnoticed in the local media and 
does not engage with the politicians in the RS or the Banja Luka community. It 
serves as a symbolic event for them, and is, in large part, simply ignored, or 
responded to with silence by the Bosnian Serb authorities.353  
Along with returnees, diaspora members have also advocated for the return 
of street names to what they were before the war, as well dedicating a particular 
boulevard in the Mejdan part of the city, to the prolific Banja Luka children’s 
author, Nasiha Kapidžić-Hadžić. They have not voiced this around a collective 
claim and rather discuss it in terms of its symbolic significance for Banja Luka. 
However, such initiatives remain in the beginning phases, and like the previous one 
noted, remain ignored by the local media outlets. Rather, the poetry readings the 
diaspora members organize to commemorate the author feature prominently in 
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Bosnian diaspora magazines. They are utilized to socialize with other diaspora 
members who happen to be in Banja Luka during the summer.354  
Nonetheless, some effort has been made, despite the lack of a collective 
claim, to mobilize the diaspora from Banja Luka. Over the last decade, a small 
portion of the diaspora community, in large part through the help of the Banja 
Lukans in Sweden, and with the declarative approval of the Bosnian Serb 
government in Banja Luka, has organized several annual events to highlight both 
the diaspora community as well as Banja Luka’s non-Serb community. The 
“Traditional Days of the Diaspora,” which happen during the second week in July, 
help diaspora build relationships with the Banja Luka government, as well as with 
Banja Lukans across the diaspora and those in Banja Luka proper.  
Often, the diaspora hosts a concert with musicians from Banja Luka, to 
contribute to the cultural scene of the city. Similar events do not happen in Sarajevo, 
indicating the separation between the diaspora and the local population in Banja 
Luka. The president of the Banja Lukans in Sweden nonetheless stressed that 
hosting such events not only maintains relationships, but also that it can encourage 
reconciliation amongst each other, and strengthen the bonds between the diaspora, 
particularly the younger generations, with Banja Luka. 355  He hopes that by 
maintaining a presence in the Banja Luka community, there will be more 
discussions and that reconciliation among its citizens can also occur. While this is 
an optimistic and hopeful outlook, it has not led to more diaspora mobilization in 
the Banja Luka community.  
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While fieldwork revealed little diaspora mobilization move recently, 
interviewees did note previous diaspora mobilization around Banja Luka around the 
reconstruction of the Ferhadija mosque. It was destroyed in 1993 during the war, 
much like other Ottoman architectural symbols within BiH, including an arched 
bridge in Mostar called the Old Bridge, perhaps one of the most recognized 
architectural symbols in the Balkans. After the war, diaspora members rallied 
around plans to rebuild the mosque, though this was mostly in support of the local 
Islamic society and individuals who had remained in Banja Luka rather than 
stemming from the diaspora.  
The official opening of the reconstruction was scheduled in May 2001 on 
the anniversary of the mosque’s destruction during the war. Buses arrived in the 
city, both with Banja Lukans who were living in the Federation, as well as Bosnian 
Muslims who wanted to support the event. Swedish diaspora members made the 
trip back to BiH specifically to be able to attend the ceremony.356  However, it 
ended prematurely as the attendees were attacked, rocks thrown at them, buses lit 
on fire, and the building in which they were meeting was vandalized. International 
dignitaries who were in attendance remained locked in a building nearby until 
SFOR forces were able to attend to them.  
 Ultimately, the Banja Lukan diaspora in Sweden has been able to replicate 
some of their former community in their new homeland due to the sheer number of 
individuals from this city living in Sweden today. Together, they attend events in 
both Sweden and Banja Luka and reinforce their translocal connection. Due to a 
lack of organized political mobilization around particular collective claim, their 
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mobilization remains inactive. However, the translocal community remains active 
in the diaspora and supportive of broader overall Bosnian diaspora initiatives.   
5.4.2 A Caveat on Inactive Diaspora Mobilization  
Through participant observation of diaspora events in Sweden organized by a 
variety of these kinds of diaspora organizations, this inactive participation, as set 
out by the typology, became evident. Without a collective claim, their focus and 
mobilization remain cultural. Mobilizing politically is often not voiced explicitly. 
There is an inherent absence of a collective claim being voiced, or an outright 
disdain for politics, dismissed as something they left behind when they left the 
homeland. Many of the Bosnian Swedish associations fall into this category. 
While not engaged with collective claims that foster diaspora mobilization 
around issues of transitional justice or peacebuilding, these associations and 
organizations should not be discounted. They provide a meeting place for Bosnians 
to gather, to celebrate holidays, and to speak their language. Translocal 
communities can develop, be maintained, and sustain themselves, as Halilovich has 
also pointed out within particular communities in Australia.357 In turn, collective 
claims can potentially come to the forefront at a future time. Considering the 
openness of the citizenship regime, it is possible for diaspora to mobilize in different 
ways if this was the case.  
Over the last few years, there has been an increased interest in cultural 
manifestations, most often in the form of folk dancing, passed down to the second 
generation. Often, these are teenagers, some born in Sweden, who feel connected 
to their homeland through this activity, but are also able to make connections with 
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other Bosnian Swedish youth as a result. According to several respondents, this 
becomes an easy way to get the second generation involved, speaking the language 
and engaging with one another. They worry that otherwise the second generation 
will lose their connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina and will not have friends who 
are from their homeland either, no sense of community among the diaspora. Older 
individuals in the repeat the importance of maintaining these cultural connections 
to the homeland, even as they speak disparagingly about the political environment 
in BiH.358  
5.5 Conclusion 
Sweden’s citizenship regime has enabled Bosnian refugees who arrived in the 
country from former Yugoslavia to integrate and become citizens. Many of these 
individuals are part of hometown associations in Sweden and participate in the 
Bosnian Swedish community in the municipality they live in, visiting their 
homeland on a regular basis during the summers, and maintaining transnational 
lives. This chapter discussed three different types of diaspora mobilization as 
theorized by the typology, reflecting on the openness of the citizenship regime, the 
translocal community and collective claims.  
The APU Network is the hub of engaged diaspora mobilization in Sweden. 
It is concerned with implementing change in BiH as well as networking for that 
change amongst its members in Sweden around issues of transitional justice and 
peacebuilding. Its members are involved with governmental actors in both 
homeland as well as hostlands and encourage economic development as well as 
political goals in line with European integration, and a multi-ethnic model of 
                                                
358 Respondent SWE2 (2014) Interview in March, Stockholm, Sweden; Respondent SWE10 
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citizenship for the country. When it comes to issues of transitional justice, the 
diaspora mobilizes not only to voice injustice in their homeland, but also to correct 
misperceptions abroad, in the belief that this will create pressure in the homeland 
and support civil society actors on the ground lobbying for change. 
The establishment of a political party for the diaspora in Sweden 
demonstrates the involved nature of the Bosnian Swedish diaspora, and ability to 
balance transnational lives between host and homeland for its members. While this 
is a relatively recent political party on the Bosnian scene, their willingness to 
coalition with local actors to balance more ethnonationalist parties in the RS as well 
as in the FBiH demonstrates a political understanding of the homeland that is 
forward-looking. Finally, inactive mobilization is evidenced by the lack of 
collective claims being made focused on transitional justice and peacebuilding 
agendas in the Banja Lukan community as well as throughout more cultural 
associations of Bosnian Swedes in the country. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility for future mobilization should there be a collective claim around which 
diaspora can mobilize. In particular, this chapter also elaborate on the importance 
of the translocal community and the ways in which this variable is more 
complicated.  
The following chapter will explore variations of diaspora mobilization in 
Germany as well as show different pathways among initiatives that fall within the 
same type of mobilization. The chapter will also touch on the different emphasis 
each of the independent variables plays on diaspora mobilization. This is 
particularly interesting to consider as Germany’s significance as a historical 
migration destination for Bosnians and former ex-Yugoslavs remains relevant in 
the way diaspora members mobilize. 
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Chapter 6 Bosnian Diaspora in Germany – Historically Involved Diaspora 
Mobilization 
The previous chapter noted the different pathways of diaspora mobilization in 
Sweden and how they correspond to the typology of diaspora mobilization. This 
chapter will highlight some of the relevant empirical data about Bosnian diaspora 
mobilization in Germany in relation to the typology created. There is limited 
diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice, and the mobilization that 
is evident fits within the involved diaspora mobilization category, as hypothesized 
by the typology created, even though there are variations between different 
initiatives. Most notable are efforts in Germany by diaspora members interested in 
the role of Islam in German society, thus promoting the Bosnian Muslim identity 
within Germany within a larger framework of immigrants. Inactive diaspora 
mobilization is also evident, as predicted by the typological model.  
This chapter will delve more deeply into how translocality and 
transnationalism differ in the Bosnian German community due to the historical 
migration from the region. It will juxtapose the mobilization of Bosnian diaspora in 
Germany to Sweden, which will be further addressed in the conclusion as well. The 
following sections will examine the historical links of migration between former 
Yugoslavia and Germany, before delving into the analysis of examples of involved 
and inactive diaspora mobilization.  
6.1 Overview of Migration between Former Yugoslav Countries and 
Germany with a Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Germany’s relationship with the countries of former Yugoslavia dates back further 
than the other two case studies examined. Hence, this chapter will first briefly go 
over the history of migration in Germany from Yugoslavia. Throughout the period 
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of the 1960’s until today, the relationship between Germany and Yugoslavia was 
marked by cooperation in terms of guest workers and later, refugee admission. 
During the 1990s in the midst of war outbreak in BiH Germany accepted some of 
the highest numbers of refugees from the fledgling country, approximately 
320,000.359  
Today, the Bosnian population in Germany is estimated to be around 
160,000.360 This is slightly lower than the number of Croatian born individuals 
living in Germany, which is close to 163,000, and is almost four times the number 
of those born in Serbia living in Germany, close to 41,000.361 Today, individuals 
coming to Germany from BiH today are students and some guest workers. Bosnian 
citizens who seek asylum in Germany today are mostly Bosnian Roma citizens, 
based on discrimination claims in BiH. According to the Bosnian Embassy in 
Germany, very few of these individuals succeed, especially as there are asylum 
claims from refugees from the Middle East more recently. They are thus often 
rejected, and the individuals deported. Consular officers in the Embassy also echoed 
that most of the citizens they work with are Bosnian Roma who are trying to settle 
in Germany, rather than conflict-generated diaspora. The remaining population that 
finds itself in Germany has largely adjusted to post-war life in Germany, whether 
as ex-Yugoslavs, Bosniaks, Bosnian citizens who are in Germany to study or work, 
or as permanent residents and citizens of Germany.362  
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This population represents some of the most diverse Bosnian diaspora 
populations in Europe. It includes former guest workers (Gastarbeiter) and conflict-
generated diaspora members who came to Germany during the 1990s. Further, it 
also includes individuals who arrived to Germany to study or work in the post-
conflict period, yet might nonetheless identify as diaspora and mobilize with 
conflict-generated individuals. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine this population in 
more detail and how their mobilization has changed over the last two decades. 
 Individuals from former Yugoslavia started arriving in Germany in the late 
1960s on a regular basis as many were recruited to work in what, at the time, was 
Western Germany. The bilateral agreement in 1968 envisioned more than half a 
million workers to come to Germany over a period of five years. It was beneficial 
to both countries due to growing unemployment in Yugoslavia as a result of 
structural economic changes and the need for workers in Western Germany. Thus, 
despite initial ideological concerns by the Western German about Tito, the president 
of Yugoslavia, the agreement proved viable for both countries. Shonick sums this 
up well:  
‘Despite the political difficulties that plagued the relationship 
between the two states, the FRG was an attractive destination for 
many Yugoslavs looking for work because of its proximity to 
Yugoslavia, the availability of jobs, and the comparatively high 
wages paid by West German companies. For its part, the Yugoslav 
government sanctioned the labor migrations because they decreased 
the problem of unemployment in Yugoslavia and because the 
remittances of these guest workers also proved to be crucial for the 
Yugoslav economy.’363 
 
From the outset, remittances back to the former Yugoslav countries became a staple 
of the Gastarbeiter, or guest worker, experience. For many of the individuals, 
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coming from poor, rural, and uneducated backgrounds, the remittances sent back 
home were essential for their respective families’ survival back home. The 
Yugoslav state encouraged this by creating cultural policies that focused on 
increasing the sending state’s reach to its increasing guest worker numbers. The 
same also feared emigrants and political exiles to Germany, afraid that they guest 
workers would negatively influence the population back home or abandon the ideals 
of socialism altogether while abroad. Nonetheless, remittances during this period 
rose, not just from Germany. In 1963, the amount received by the country was the 
equivalent of 41 Million US Dollars. By 1974, Yugoslavia received 1.6 Billion US 
Dollars from remittances. The number increased to a little over 2 Billion by 1977 
and was close to 5 Billion by 1980.364 According to the German Federal Statistics 
Office, the number of Yugoslavs in Germany during this period reached as high as 
239,519 individuals in 1970.365  
 Similar to concerts attended by diaspora from the region today, the 
Yugoslav state was adamant about guest workers to attend cultural entertainment 
activities, which the Yugoslav state helped organize.366 These events were meant to 
help Gastarbeiter maintain connection to their homeland, with expressively 
ideological messages in support of the homeland political regime. The performers 
gave tours across Germany. Often, these happened around the same time as relevant 
state holidays in Yugoslavia. Due to financial challenges, the state enlisted non-
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governmental associations based in Germany to help them, even though both the 
state and the associations were often averse to each other. This in large part as some 
of these Matice Iseljenika were associated with anti-state actions and often 
propagated respective republics such as Croatia or Serbia, rather than the 
‘brotherhood and unity’ political viewpoints of Yugoslavia as a whole.367 “Behind 
the curtain of spontaneous patriotism and impeccable brotherhood and unity 
displayed on stage, concurrently, interrepublic conflicts and constant paranoia of 
nationalist excesses kindled backstage.”368 Overall, this demonstrates that for both 
Yugoslavia and Germany, the migration that occurred during this period was 
considered temporary. However, many of the Gastarbeiter in Germany continued 
to work and stay in Germany on a repeated basis leading up to the conflict.  
While the migration debate heated up in Germany during the 1980s, 
Yugoslavs remained relatively unaffected in the public sphere. This is interesting 
as they constituted the second-largest group of foreign residents in Germany after 
Turks from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, even though Germany’s bilateral 
agreement with Yugoslavia was ratified later than other countries, in 1968. By the 
early 1980s, German political and media debates centered around how best to 
resolve the status of individuals who had ended up staying in Germany, some 
bringing over family members, both from the perspective of integration into 
German society as well as legal status. The idea of guest workers who would return 
to their homelands once they were finished working had proven unrealistic. German 
policy makers were faced with the fact that their country was one in which many 
                                                
367 Bakovic, Nikola. 2015. “Song of Brotherhood, Dance of Unity: Cultural-Entertainment 
Activities for Yugoslav Economic Emigrants in the West in the 1960s and 1970s.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 50 (2): 354–75.  
368 Ibid., 375. 
 		174 
guest workers were instead living more permanently than they had anticipated. 369 
Yugoslavs were inconspicuous in these debates and were perceived as integrating 
well however. Within both German as well as Yugoslav circles, they were referred 
to as Jugovići and Jugošvaben, respectively, connoting their combined identity as 
both Yugoslav and German. In the case of Jugovići, this usually had the connotation 
of guest workers from Yugoslavia, while Jugošvabe also indicated and 
acknowledged the fact that guest workers often settled with Germans. Hence, their 
children were considered Jugošvaben, literally combining the words Yugo and 
Schwabe, a colloquial term used for German in the former Yugoslav space. In 
former Yugoslavia, they were often referred to as 'Švabe' or 'Gastarbajteri,' playing 
on the same names as in Germany.370  
In a longitudinal study of migrants in Germany between 1985 and 1997, 
(ex)Yugoslavs had the highest amount of interethnic contact with Germans. The 
other groups included in the study were Turks, Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks.371 
Previous studies of integration within German society among Yugoslavs and other 
migrant groups also note that Yugoslavs achieve higher social standing as compared 
to Turks.372 This helps to explain why they were often not the target of German 
debates on immigrants compared to Turks or Greeks. For many Germans, 
Yugoslavia was not so foreign itself due to their frequent summer trips there during 
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the 1970s and 1980s.373 More recent studies of second-generation Yugoslavs in 
comparison with second-generation Turks in Germany show that Yugoslavs tend to 
fare better with integration, particularly when looking at education, though they are 
still not precluded from discrimination altogether.374 In part, this reflects how well 
positioned Bosnian Muslims in Germany are to take a leading role in the debate 
about the influence of religion, particularly Islam, in the public sphere, as will be 
evidenced in the later sections.  
For the former refugees, trauma has been a consistent factor that influenced 
their staying in Germany and was continuously stressed in several interviews with 
Bosnian diaspora members in Germany, as opposed to those in Sweden and France. 
Trauma claims were able to prevent them from receiving the dreaded 
'Abschiebung,' being deported, from Germany back to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
after the war. Ultimately, only 6 percent of the Bosnian refugee population 
remained in Germany after the war.375  Third destination countries such as the 
United States, or return to the homeland were the two most common end results for 
most of the population by the late 1990s.376 This dynamic changed the conflict-
generated diaspora population in Germany, reducing it to individuals who associate 
their relationship to the homeland with trauma, making mobilization difficult.  
Since the end of the war, around 15,000 people are estimated, according to 
the Bosnian Embassy, to have renounced their Bosnian citizenship for German 
citizenship. Unlike France or Sweden, German law did not allow for dual 
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citizenship until recently.377 As Germany has a semi-open citizenship regime, the 
typology predicts that most of the mobilization will be involved, rather than 
engaged or reactive. Following the reasoning of previous research, this chapter also 
notes certain differences across Germany, as cross-local perspectives are 
increasingly relevant when considering claims made by migrants.378  There are 
markedly different kinds of mobilizations in different cities in Germany. Berlin has 
an active ex-Yugo scene, particularly on a cultural level, while Munich has more of 
a Gastarbeiter community. Bosniak Islamic Centers are peppered throughout the 
country. The following sections highlight this, noting the differences between 
communities this mobilization falls within. These are by no means exhaustive, but 
serve to be reflective of the fact that while there is a large population of Bosnians 
in Germany, very few of them are conflict-generated and thus diaspora mobilization 
is thus somewhat more nuanced than typologized.  
 The following sections will focus on diaspora mobilization in Germany in 
relation to the typology. The fieldwork conducted brought additional variables to 
the forefront in the German case, in particular due to the historical migration of 
former Yugoslav and later Bosnian guest workers to Germany. These will be 
discussed in more detail in the following sections. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to 
remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization for a 
citizenship regime such as Germany in the period most relevant for Bosnian 
diaspora, represented by ‘Partial Liberalization’ using Howard’s framework.  
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6.2 Involved Mobilization in Germany  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts one of the pathways that lead to involved mobilization. To 
remind the reader, it can be expressed as follows: (H3: Partially liberal citizenship 
regimes + collective claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization). In this case, 
the presence or absence of translocal community does not impact the level of 
mobilization but might lead to different pathways. 
These sections will draw on further details to potentially differentiate 
whether there are other factors that might explain or predict differences in diaspora 
mobilization. The empirical research in Germany provides insight into the variety 
of involved diaspora mobilization. At the same time, due to the limited 
opportunities in Germany for homeland claims within German public debates, 
involved diaspora mobilization is exemplified through an engagement with relevant 
topics in Germany such as multiculturalism and Islamophobia in order to foster 
diaspora mobilization. This is also evidenced in similar research on Kurds and 
Turks in Germany, in both first and second generations.379  
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6.2.1 Bosniaks in Germany 
 
German incorporation is understood not to include collaboration with migrant 
organizations, nor does it seek out political participation from them on a federal 
level, but rather relegates this to the subnational level, to each particular Land.380 
Fieldwork on Bosnian diaspora organizations in Germany initially differed from the 
Swedish case study as contacts were more difficult to find regardless of the high 
number of individuals living in Germany from the region. Migrant and diaspora 
organizations in Germany are rather insular from one another and few have 
transnational links or represent themselves as representative of the Bosnian 
diaspora in Germany. One of the key Bosniak diaspora organizations, established 
originally in 1989 as the first such organization in Germany, is the Islamski kulturni 
centar Bošnjaka, or Islamic Cultural Center of Bosniaks in Berlin.  
Berlin and Stuttgart both have large Bosniak populations and thus both have 
similar organizations involved in the daily lives of its community, established 
within a few years of 1992 primarily as religious centers by guest workers and 
refugees. During the war period between 1992 and 1995, they organized fundraising 
and provided help to Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether it was sending aid convoys 
to war zones within the country, or helping incoming refugees get settled in 
Germany.381 Today, their activities are not as focused on the homeland as they are 
on ensuring that the second generation in Germany remain fluent in the Bosnian 
language and providing them with community engagement opportunities. This 
diaspora mobilization, while at times more active in relation to homeland politics, 
largely conforms to the involved diaspora mobilization type. The organization in 
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Stuttgart differs slightly in that it is more focused on maintaining the religious 
identity whereas the community in Berlin is younger and more reflective of their 
mobilization, and thus identifies beyond their Bosniak identity as Bosnian diaspora. 
 For this community, highlighting a ‘Bosnian’ style of Islam,382 which is 
more moderate and in line with integration in Western society, is highly important. 
Bosniaks in Berlin seek to represent a version of being Muslim disassociated with 
extremism and easy to accommodate in European countries. Their activism in 
Germany around ‘Migrantenpolitik’ is especially relevant due to the refugee crisis 
in the Middle East and increased Islamophobia across Europe. Beyond this, they 
are interested in bringing to the forefront something about Bosnia and Herzegovina 
that is not associated with the conflict of the 1990s, to showcase their contribution 
to their hostland, as well as to move beyond the war trauma many carry. 383 
‘Otherwise, you have an identity crisis!,’ Travljanin, the organization’s President, 
notes by way of explanation.384 Bosniaks in Germany are more likely to engage 
discussions about dual citizenship in Germany, how to integrate incoming refugees 
to the German way of life, and how to ensure that they are part of shaping this 
debate within their hostland.385 
Prior research has shown that the “the impact of individual rights (such as, 
citizenship rights) often goes hand in hand with that of group rights (such as cultural 
rights).”386 As such, it has found that political mobilization is more difficult in 
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Germany for Muslims, particularly in an atmosphere of Islamophobia. Thus, it 
becomes instructive to consider the mobilization of Bosniaks in Germany as they 
have attempted to carve out space for themselves within the political discourse of 
multiculturalism and Islam in Germany. The Bosniak population in Germany is 
particularly interesting as they do not necessarily conform to stereotypes of the 
Muslim ‘other,’ in the same way that Yugoslavs did not to the migrant or guest 
worker ‘other’ during prior debates about migration in Germany. 
 Travljanin is involved in German politics, particularly around issues of 
Islamophobia. Under his leadership, the organization has become part of a larger 
consortium of Islamic organizations in Germany who lobby for minority rights, and 
note the increase of Islamophobic commentary within German society. This has led 
to involvement in both the Berlin Senate as well as the SDP party, traditionally 
associated as being more friendly to immigrants. 387  For those involved with 
migrants in Germany and German politics more generally, they realize the 
importance of migrant rights with new waves of refugees arriving. ‘These are all 
partial solutions, not comprehensive ones.’388 By involving his community in the 
current debates in Germany around integration and migrant rights, he believes that 
the Bosniak community can create a bigger impact than in BiH proper. Whether 
this involves building dialogue with other religious communities throughout 
Germany or building a German speaking transnational Islamic community that 
encompasses more than just Bosniaks, in both cases the effort remains focused on 
the hostland. In effect, the community does not express collective claims towards 
the homeland. 
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 The Bosniak leadership in Germany is relatively young. They have come of 
age in Germany and have learned the language and experienced Germany as home 
in a different way than the guest workers before them. The association to the 
homeland is very different as there is little of the ‘Yugoslavia’ they remember, 
unlike generations before them. They are largely conflict-generated. Their political 
participation and discussions often center around German debates rather than those 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They believe that the Islamic Society is not responsible 
for the political engagement of the diaspora and that separate organizations need to 
organize this. This was echoed on numerous occasions by Bosniaks in Germany. 
The understanding of ethnonationalism in the homeland, what Travljanin calls the 
‘three-headed monster presidency,’ discourages Bosnian visions within politics and 
he thinks that strengthening Bosniak institutions is not helpful for the Bosnian 
state.389 It is interesting that they emphasize their Bosniak identity in Germany, yet 
do not want to be politically engaged with the homeland as Bosniaks, choosing to 
forego the local political structures in BiH.   
However, Bosniak diaspora organizations retain institutional connection to 
the Rijaset, which considers the various Bosniak Islamic Centers part of its 
congregation. Thus, they separate their religious identity from their political 
identities. 390  When asked about membership and support of Bosnian political 
parties, responses varied. Individuals responded with Stranka Demokratske Akcije 
(SDA) – the Bosniak right party usually associated with Bosniak ethnonationalism 
and aligned with the Rijaset, Socijaldemokratska Partija (SDP) – the former 
Communist, now Social Democratic party, Demokratska Fronta (DF) – an offshoot 
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of SDP and a relatively new party with a similar party platform, and Naša Stranka 
– a relatively new party focused on civil belonging with a stronghold in Sarajevo 
politic.391 This demonstrates more variety among the Bosniak diaspora members in 
regards to political party membership than expected. Since there is little to no 
political campaigning in the diaspora, this is a potential avenue for political parties 
to utilize in the future, particularly considering the potential of diaspora voting. 392  
At the same time, it recognizes that the Bosniak diaspora members in Germany are 
open to political parties that are not expressively Muslim, and that there is less 
support for the Bosniak ethnonationalist leading party, SDA, than anticipated.  
 It also represents a more nuanced belief about homeland politics than is 
often expressed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it discourages the monopoly of one 
ruling Bosniak political party. When asked to elaborate on this in interviews, several 
leaders of the Islamic Society of Bosniaks in Germany, in both Berlin and Stuttgart, 
noted how the SDA, the dominant Bosniak party in BiH, takes for granted the fact 
that it represents all Bosniaks in BiH as well as in diaspora. They do not feel 
particularly acknowledged or represented by these individuals. Instead, they hold 
them in part responsible for the political ‘standstill’ (zastoj) when it comes to certain 
issues such as EU accession, or not ensuring basic services for all citizens in BiH. 
Several individuals highlighted a stronger relationship between the state and 
diaspora was necessary, to engage the diaspora in a more productive way. 393 
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Speaking of the SDA, one respondent noted, “They come when the election is near, 
and we don’t hear from them otherwise. They are stuck in the past.”394 
 Fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that Bosniak organizations 
were instrumental in supporting diaspora voter outreach across Germany through 
the Prvi Mart initiative during Bosnian elections in 2014. 395  Spearheaded by 
returnees from the Srebrenica region in elect a Bosniak mayor in Srebrenica in 
2012, this collective organized a ‘pro-Bosnian’ umbrella coalition called 
‘Homeland’ or Domovina in time for elections in 2014, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
Here, Bosniak religious organizations found an opportunity.  They 
supported diaspora voter outreach, helping Prvi Mart organizers disseminate 
information among its members. Prvi Mart was organized to raise awareness of 
Bosnian citizens living abroad who were still eligible to vote in their pre-war 
districts, many of which fell under the jurisdiction of Republika Srpska. Prvi Mart’s 
claims about the importance of providing political voice for returnees and those 
who were eligible to vote in Republika Srpska, with the potential and promise to 
provide a platform for less ethnonational, Bosnian Serb-centered politics, helped to 
mobilize Bosniaks in Germany. In Berlin, where many members were from the 
Srebrenica region, the translocal community mobilized around the belief that the 
Domovina coalition, if elected, would be able to effect change in homeland politics.  
 In discussion about collective claims they would mobilize around 
potentially, representatives of Bosniak organizations in Germany agreed about the 
importance of commemorating Srebrenica. However, they did not see it necessarily 
                                                
394 Respondent DE16 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany. 
395 Respondent BH14 (2014) Interview in July, Srebrenica, BiH; Respondent BH15 (2014) 
Interview in August, Srebrenica, BiH. 
 		184 
as a mobilizing tool for their community. One of the interviewees noted that 
Germans are understanding of the importance of genocide remembrance and 
commemoration and that there is little room for genocide denial in the German 
public sphere, whether in regards to the Holocaust or Bosnia and Herzegovina.396 
This does not mean that Srebrenica is not an important aspect of their identity, but 
rather that mobilization does not occur in the same way around issues of Srebrenica 
remembrance for Bosniaks and Bosnians in Germany, as it does in other countries, 
such as the Netherlands.397 “The legacy of the Holocaust in Germany makes denial 
difficult. Germans are sensitive about this,” one interviewee noted. 398  Instead, 
mobilization is focused more on the importance of building the community in 
Germany, integrating the community into German debates or, if provided the 
opportunity, collaboration with homeland organizations such as Prvi Mart, as 
evidenced in this section. 
 Overall, Bosniak diaspora organizations in Germany demonstrate their 
potential for involved diaspora mobilization, but they indicate more of an 
involvement in the hostland politics and maintaining a religiously minded 
community. The German incorporation regime has increasingly provided them 
opportunities to be represented on the subnational levels in their communities, to 
also further conversations about the importance of Islam in Germany. Throughout 
interviews, they maintained their lack of political engagement in the homeland and 
rather noted their role in spiritual matters of its members. Mobilization around 
diaspora voter registration and outreach was limited to supporting the Prvi Mart 
initiative during the 2014 elections, which has not been sustained for the local 
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elections in 2016. The translocal community does not seem to play a role in Bosniak 
organizations, in large part as religion plays a greater role for those who become 
involved. Thus, when there are collective claims from other groups that identity 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have the potential to mobilize, but generally 
focus more on their hostland community than on mobilizing around transitional 
justice or peacebuilding claims in the homeland. 
6.2.2 Avangarda 
 
The Munich-based group Avangarda and its leadership places no emphasis on the 
perceived ethnic belonging of its members. While their claims are not framed in 
transitional justice specifically, they further a vision of their homeland that is 
democratizing faster and has less contention among its local political actors in 
regards to war-time claims.  The group demonstrates the diversity within involved 
diaspora mobilization in that they partner with the host country government as well 
as with local actors in the homeland, to help organize around particular events or 
issues related to peacebuilding. In particular, a high level of translocality is also 
evident.  
Formed in 2005, Avangarda has been mobilizing both in Germany, as well 
as, increasingly, with other diaspora groups, in Sweden most notably. While the 
group is small, they have a clear agenda about the peacebuilding and transitional 
justice goals they have for BiH and are interested in furthering these through their 
mobilization, in collaboration with German and European institutions. Unlike other 
diaspora groups examined throughout this thesis, Avangarda’s members are all 
younger, having few or no memories or direct experience of wartime BiH.  
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Avangarda’s activism is informed by their mission for a ‘united, sovereign, 
and democratic’ BiH. 399  They consider a large number of citizens in BiH as 
disenfranchised by the political elites in the country and are frustrated that their 
homeland has not yet achieved candidate status to the European Union. Those who 
have grown up in BiH have left the country for lack of economic opportunities and 
have chosen to educate themselves or work in Germany, learn to speak German, 
and try to build a future. They maintain an interest in their homeland and collaborate 
with diaspora members who have been in Munich longer, such as guest workers. 
They attempt to lobby host country actors in helping to forward their vision 
of the homeland. While their claims are not necessarily transitional justice related 
in the sense of focusing on victims’ claims, they are nonetheless focused on helping 
to implement a more politically and economically sustainable future in their 
homeland, from their position in the host country. Avangarda was also part of voter 
registration efforts during the 2014 elections in BiH, stressing the importance of the 
diaspora vote in the democratic process and long-term peacebuilding in the country, 
especially in returnee communities. In 2014, they worked with the members of the 
Foreign Ministries in the United Kingdom as well as Germany on recommendations 
which ultimately were included in the the British-German initiative for BiH. Thus, 
they have helped to influence foreign policy initiatives of the hostland.400  
The group’s members consider this as their citizenship duty as they feel 
many diaspora members are not up-to-date with the latest political developments in 
the homeland, particularly those eligible to vote in the RS.401  The strength of 
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translocal ties within the Avangarda collective inform its engagement. Its 
leadership has consistently been from the Prijedor area and has had strong translocal 
connection to the Prijedor region. Additionally, an individual from Prijedor owns a 
café in Munich, fostering this translocal community and serving as a diaspora 
meeting place.402  
In 2013, the group promoted and participated in the Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian Diaspora Investment Forum (BHDiaFor) in Prijedor.403 Members 
recognized this as an opportunity to showcase the potential of their homeland 
transnationally through economic development by fellow diaspora members. 
Avangarda engaged potential diaspora investors in the Munich area to consider 
building transnational business ties between Germany and BiH.404 At the same 
time, Avangarda has utilized its translocal ties to connect with the APU network in 
Sweden. The two diaspora organizations leadership noted they are usually reluctant 
to collaborate with local actors they do not know in the country of origin. However, 
amongst the diaspora, they expressed how they utilize translocal connections to 
build collaboration with local actors across the homeland.405 
  Unlike the Bosniak organizations mentioned in the previous section, 
Avangarda utilizes commemoration around the Srebrenica Genocide as a collective 
claim to engage more diaspora members to mobilize in the host country. They are 
not interested in engaging with the homeland government in regards to this. Rather, 
they are interested in engaging around issues of discrimination and remembrance 
                                                
402 For example, the author met with the organizers of the Avangarda group in said café as it was 
well-known and suggested by the individuals.  
403 Respondent DE28 (2014) Interview in October, Munich, Germany. Respondent BH17 (2014) 
Interview in June, Sarajevo, BiH. 
404 Participant Observation, August 2013, Sarajevo, BiH. This was the second annual BhDiaFor 
event.  
405 Respondent DE22 (2014) Interview in September, Munich, Germany.; Respondent SWE14 
(2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden. 
 		188 
in Germany. They organized broadcasts that were shown in twenty different cities 
in Germany during several years that informed citizens and spark debate, rather 
than one event which attracted only diaspora members. The group’s leaders thus 
aim to show how migrants in Germany want to be part of discussions about 
multiculturalism and integration and thus also strengthen German society, rather 
than be a nuisance and cause of concern. Amidst increasingly populist discourses 
in German media as well as reflected in German local elections with the rise of the 
AfD, a right-wing populist party, they see this as their particular contribution as 
well as duty, particularly reflecting on political discourses in the homeland.406    
 Avangarda provides an example of involved diaspora mobilization in 
Germany, which aims to develop a translocal community among its members to 
ensure their mobilization can be sustained, both in collaboration with German 
institutions, but also transnationally, through working with other diaspora groups, 
such as in Sweden. While the transnational efforts are still nascent, Avangarda 
continues to establish itself as a group of young Bosnians in Germany who are 
willing to lobby for a more productive future in their homeland. The members’ 
energy and youth ensures that second-generation and younger Bosnians in Germany 
have a platform for mobilization should they choose to make collective claims in 
regards to transitional justice and peace in their homeland. At the time of writing 
however, these were rather limited. 
6.2.3 From Involved to Inactive: The SüdOst Center 
The SüdOst Center in Berlin is one of the few institutions that has remained constant 
since the late 1980s focusing on gathering and helping those from all of former 
Yugoslavia living in Germany. During the breakup of Yugoslavia and the 
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subsequent wars, this institution served as a space for diaspora to meet and gather, 
as well as develop their new community in Germany and seek support from those 
who were already in Germany, the Gastarbeiter.  
The Center’s activities, depending on the time period, thus fall into both 
types of theorized diaspora mobilization. Initially and throughout the war in former 
Yugoslavia, while the strength of the translocal community was limited, there were 
collective claims about incoming refugees which led to involved diaspora 
mobilization around issues of return migration and refugee integration as well as 
raising awareness of the ongoing atrocities during the war. Later on, without a 
lasting translocal community, as refugees returned to BiH or moved to third 
countries such as the United States, mobilization organized with the help of the 
Center is representative of the inactive mobilization type as there are no collective 
claims being made on behalf of the diaspora population in regards to transitional 
justice or peacebuilding in the homeland.  
Established as meeting point for guest workers and refugees from not just 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the whole region of former Yugoslavia, the SüdOst 
Center, or “südost Europa Kultur e.V.” was established by Bosiljka Schedlich, a 
Croatian born, naturalized German who considers herself a Yugoslav.407 Having 
arrived in Germany in the late 1960s during the first wave of guest worker 
exchanges between the former Yugoslavia and Germany, Schedlich settled in 
Berlin where she married and had children. By the time Yugoslavia started 
dissolving, she had established a vibrant community around her of individuals who 
had connections to the region, yet felt frustrated at the dissolution of their home 
country before their eyes.  
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They resolved to maintain normalcy “rather than giving in to nationalist 
rhetoric” during the conflict, mainly by organizing cultural events and peace in the 
region.408 The Center quickly became a central meeting point for refugees, mostly 
from the Bosnian conflict, who were urban and educated, predominately from Banja 
Luka and Sarajevo. On weekends, artists, writers, actors, activists, and intellectuals 
met here to discuss the political climate in their homeland and built a community 
amongst each other. They often organized small donation drives amongst each other 
to send to humanitarian organizations helping in the conflict in their homeland. The 
SüdOst Center provided a sanctuary away from the reality of their situation and 
served as a place where refugees came together, networked, learned German, and 
supported one another.409  
During this period, the conflict-generated diaspora and the Gastarbeiter 
community can be classified as involved in the sense that they organized around 
collective claims about ending the war in their homelands. Many were supportive 
of maintaining Yugoslavia as it existed, and did not support ethnic cleansing by any 
of the groups involved in the conflict. This multi-ethnic group fostered ties amongst 
each other very quickly. While many of the individuals were meeting one another 
for the first time under the circumstances of their living in Berlin, there was 
nonetheless a strong sense of translocal community since many of the refugees 
knew each other from their social circles in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. Thus, they 
quickly found common ground and connected with one another in Berlin.  
The main two groups within this community were the former Gastarbeiters 
who, like Schedlich, wanted to maintain a sense of ‘Yugo’ within Germany, of 
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belonging to a greater idea, and for most of these individuals, the war was not a 
lived experience. The second group was composed of refugees who had escaped as 
a result of the war. Many were traumatized as a result.410 In this sense, the Center 
offered a refuge from the war and a community of people with shared cultural 
norms, appreciation for art and literature, film and music.  
However, this community was in many ways not permanent, as the changing 
political solution in BiH as well as the legal status of a large part of the refugee 
community in Germany was always in question. The refugee community knew that 
their legal status in Germany was precarious. While the center helped with 
advocacy for the refugees in Berlin and wider Germany, there were limited paths to 
settlement and citizenship for many of the refugees who arrived in Germany during 
the war. Unlike in Sweden, they received temporary protection status with the 
understanding by the German government that at the end of the conflict, most, if 
not all, would be repatriated. While German law different in each of the sixteen 
Länder in Germany, mandatory repatriation started in some of the regions as early 
as 1996, continuing into 1997 and on.411 The activism in the Center focused on 
helping these conflict-generated individuals maintain residency in Germany rather 
than having to return to war-torn communities back home.  
Today, the size of the Bosnian population in Berlin is less than a third of 
what it was during the war, an estimated 320,000 in 1996.412 During this immediate 
post-war period, SüdOst was instrumental in helping refugees prepare ‘Atteste,’ 
documents that detailed the trauma they had experienced, enabling a way for them 
                                                
410 Respondents DE4 and DE8 (2014) Interviews in September, Berlin, Germany. 
411 Bagshaw, S. 1997. “Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the 
Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina.” International Journal of Refugee Law 9 (4): 
566–92.  
412 Ibid.  
 		192 
to remain in Germany by arguing they were unable to return to their homeland. 
Many individuals who were successful were from the Srebrenica area as well as 
other rural areas in BiH. This population differed from the diaspora members who 
were organizing during the war, many of who left, either to return to BiH, or to third 
countries. The individuals who were traumatized were less likely to mobilize and 
continue to be inactive in regards to the politics of their homeland. Therapy sessions 
for trauma victims, including men, were set up within the Center and continue to 
this day.413  
As the diaspora population has changed, so has the diaspora mobilization. 
Today, narratives of victimhood remain dominant among the population that uses 
the Center and political mobilization is limited to symbolic acts within the 
community. Schedlich believes that the trauma therapy groups the SüdOst Center 
provides as well as the women’s groups within the sphere of this should not be long-
lasting, but acknowledges that the process of healing continues for many within the 
greater Berlin community.414 Unlike the diaspora community that was dominant at 
the Center during the war and the immediate post-war period, this community is 
still managing its trauma and finding ways to integrate within the German 
citizenship regime. There are limited collective claims being made and the Center 
exists mainly to maintain a sense of community among them. The following section 
goes into more detail about inactive diaspora mobilization in Germany. 
6.3 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in Germany  
Hypothesis 6 predicts that in the absence of a collective claim in any citizenship 
regime, there will be inactive diaspora mobilization. This can be expressed as 
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follows: (H6: Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal 
community + no collective claim made à Inactive Diaspora Mobilization.) 
However, it is interesting to note whether the presence of a translocal community 
makes a difference in how diaspora mobilize overall, rather than simply around 
issues of transitional justice and peace.  
 The following sections demonstrate several examples of inactive diaspora 
mobilization in Germany captured during fieldwork. As noted in the previous 
chapter, inactive diaspora mobilization can take different forms and the initiatives 
explored here are intended to highlight rather than capture the plethora of activities 
that might fall within the purview of inactive diaspora mobilization.   
6.3.1 Supplementary Bosnian Schools 
 
Interviewees throughout fieldwork always emphasized the importance of education 
for their children and the opportunities that education provides their children in host 
countries. When it comes to the diaspora community, often, the importance of 
Bosnian language comprehension is stressed among diaspora members. Before the 
war in former Yugoslavia, supplementary Yugoslav schools operated throughout 
Germany, which then dissipated into some schools, corresponding to each republic 
within the federation, which taught the respective curriculum of each country.  
This trend has continued and remains one of the main ways that diaspora 
members in Germany mobilize. While this involves some cooperation with 
homeland institutions, this mobilization does not organize around transitional 
justice related issues in the homeland, but rather around the maintenance of the 
diaspora community. In this sense, the theorized inactive diaspora mobilization type 
prevails due to the lack of a particular collective claim related to the homeland. 
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The students in the German Bosnian supplementary schools, while mostly 
Bosniak, are not exclusively so, with some parents rejecting the Bosniak label and 
instead identifying as Bosnian.415 These schools are not organized based on the 
presence of a translocal community, but rather on a joint belief that the second 
generation should retain the language as well as the established continuation of 
supplementary schools in Germany over time. This reflects the overall belief of 
maintaining the Bosnian heritage while integrating into German society echoed 
throughout interviews.  
 Supplementary schools in Germany have a somewhat contested history, 
depending on their implementation across the Länder. In Bavaria, a model prevailed 
which provided education in the native language of the students and did not seek to 
integrate them with German pupils. German language in these schools was limited. 
In other regions, for example in Berlin, integration was considered the main goal of 
supplementary schools, hence instruction focusing on transitional classes with 
intensive German language education which aimed to integrate students into the 
German education system as quickly as possible.416 While different, both systems 
limited the amount of interaction of guest worker students with German students. 
“Neither approach nurtures the educational needs of children who are, in fact, 
growing up at ‘Turkish-Germans,’ ‘Greek-Germans,’ or ‘Yugoslav-Germans.’ The 
policies and programs in each work to negate one side of the hyphen and thus work 
against what are in fact the beginnings of an ethnically pluralistic society.”417 
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During the Yugoslav period, children of guest workers attended these 
schools, with the curriculum approved by the Yugoslav state to ensure that children 
would be able to return without difficulty to the education system of Yugoslavia 
once the parents returned. Rist notes that in the 1974 – 1975 school year, 510 of the 
1,600 Yugoslav students attended supplementary schools organized by the 
Yugoslav government, with the others presumably choosing to forgo it and remain 
in German public schools only.418  Children of guest workers as well as guest 
workers in Munich, the capital of Bavaria, noted during interviews that they spent 
one to two years in these schools before returning ‘home’ and continuing their 
education. These schools often measured up to the educational standard of 
Yugoslavia as children could seamlessly transfer between Germany and Yugoslavia 
during their education, in a way staying within the Yugoslav education system 
regardless of where they grew up.419  
 After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, these schools ceased. Instead 
supplementary schools for the incoming refugee populations in Germany from the 
region were established. Teachers who were refugees themselves organized and 
taught at these schools. Between 1994 and 1997, approximately 140 students 
attended Bosnian supplementary schools in Berlin at the high school level. The BiH 
government considered them as equivalent to schools in BiH proper, issued 
curricula for them, and paid teachers small stipends. 420  The schools enabled 
collaboration and exchange of vital information about their residential statuses in 
Germany, as well as the changing political landscape in their homeland. By 1997 
however, these supplementary schools, funded by the Bosnian state, had minimal 
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enrollment due to the number of refugees who returned to their homeland or 
immigrated to third countries such as the United States.  
Ultimately, the program was reduced to language and cultural education at 
lower levels rather than full-time operating schools, hoping to ensure that younger 
Bosnian children maintain a relationship with their mother-tongue.421 At present, 
these supplementary schools continue to operate throughout Germany even as all 
the children that attend them attend German schools, almost all having been born 
in Germany as well.422  
In Germany, the schools form a union, headed by a former Bosnian consul 
to Germany, Haris Halilović. Its main objective for the 25 schools in Germany 
organized throughout the country, including those that operate within Bosniak 
Islamic Centers, is to provide language instruction. This helps to ‘preserve the 
Bosnian language and culture among the citizens of BiH living in Germany, as well 
as support their better integration into society and the fight against assimilation.’423 
This updated mission statement reflects that the Bosnian diaspora schoolchildren 
today will likely be staying in Germany and not ‘returning to the homeland.’ 
The administration of these Bosnian schools today falls under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, though there is little oversight into the programs. 
The most recent approved syllabi date from 2008. 424  Neither the Ministry of 
Education, fragmented into separate ministries in each canton as well as the RS, nor 
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the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees which is responsible for diaspora 
homeland relations, liaises regularly with diaspora groups in these schools.425  
Moreover, these schools today face problems of enrollment, regardless of 
the importance of retaining Bosnian language is stressed in interviews. One of the 
main organizers of the Bosnian schools in Germany echoed this during an 
interview, noting that there was an additional challenge in maintaining enrollment 
as well. 426  In fact, according to Eurostat’s results from 2011, close to 2000 
individuals who are Bosnian born in Germany are under 15 years old.427 In other 
words, this is only close to 1% of the whole population. While this does not account 
for children born to one or two Bosnian parents in Germany, who under new 
citizenship laws are accounted for as Germans with migrant backgrounds, it 
nonetheless reflects a much smaller number of second-generation Bosnian diaspora 
who would potentially be able to mobilize in their parents’ homeland. At the same 
time, this also reflects the parents’ desire to ensure their children are fully integrated 
and given opportunities in the German system, thus only maintaining cultural ties 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than citizenship rights or the grievances of their 
parents.428 
Without establishing ties to the homeland through these language schools, 
translocal communities, or collective claims, the second generation of Bosnians in 
Germany has little potential of mobilizing as a diaspora around issues in their 
homeland effectively. The supplementary schools, without support from the 
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homeland, and with low enrollment rates in the hostland, will likely not create 
future opportunities for diaspora mobilization. In this sense, these schools represent 
one of the paths of inactive diaspora mobilization, but show little promise of 
evolving into more. 
6.3.2 Women’s Groups 
 
As noted previously, inactive mobilization is empirically difficult to ascertain and 
locate as inactive mobilization and thus is often unaccounted for in research. 
However, throughout the research period in Germany, interviewees mentioned they 
were part of diaspora women’s groups, usually in informal settings.429 This differed 
from Sweden, where women have two different women’s diaspora associations and 
where some have run for political office in Sweden.430 Usually, these informal 
groups included activities such as gardening together, helping each other fill out 
forms, or offering a safe space to discuss trauma. The groups, established towards 
the end of the conflict in BiH, have not stopped meeting over the last two decades.431 
Interviewees stressed the importance of developing trust and relationships among 
the women themselves rather than building networks targeted towards political 
mobilization.432  
 Inactive diaspora mobilization in women’s groups can potentially be 
explained by the high levels of refugees with trauma who ended up staying in 
Germany at the end of the conflict. Often, these are associated with trauma-related 
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guilt and feelings of shame, which affect the further emotional development of 
individuals.433 In a comparative study of refugees from former Yugoslav countries, 
with the largest number thereof from BiH, around 60% in Germany, the UK, and 
Italy, those interviewed in Germany were found to have experienced the most 
trauma. "Refugees in Germany reported experiencing the highest number of 
traumatic events; particularly higher rates were evident for interpersonal assaults 
such as sexual and nonsexual assaults and torture. They also reported experiencing 
the highest number of post-migration stressors.”434 This can potentially further 
impede individuals’ willingness to participate in political mobilization. One 
interviewee cited that she does not attend commemoration activities or diaspora 
events because it 'brings back too many memories.'435 
One woman’s group organizer in Germany noted that most of the women’s 
group participants were employed while their husbands were unemployed. She 
mentioned this was in large part as women were more open to working, regardless 
of what the work entailed, while many of the husbands considered more remedial 
jobs as unsatisfactory. 436  In Germany, Bosnian diaspora women use women’s 
groups among themselves as a social way of interacting with one another as well as 
reflecting on their new lives in Germany. For many, it offers an escape from their 
everyday life and empowerment amongst one another. Research in Sweden echoes 
                                                
433 Stotz, Sabrina J., Thomas Elbert, Veronika Müller, and Maggie Schauer. 2015. “The 
Relationship between Trauma, Shame, and Guilt: Findings from a Community-Based Study of 
Refugee Minors in Germany.” European Journal of Psychotraumatology 6 (0). 
434 Bogic, Marija, Dean Ajdukovic, Stephen Bremner, Tanja Franciskovic, Gian Maria Galeazzi, 
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UK.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 200 (3): 218. 
435 Respondent DE7 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany. 
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that diaspora women are often the ones, regardless of trauma, who are more resilient 
and have higher levels of employment, regardless of their level of education.437 
The women’s groups of Bosnian diaspora members who meet in different 
cities in Germany are notable for their emphasis on building relationships among 
Bosnian diaspora women. Their activities do not translate to shared initiatives or 
diaspora mobilization beyond their women’s groups, as they do not made collective 
claims in the name of the diaspora as a whole. Instead, they discuss the importance 
of overcoming trauma. Interviewees were uninterested in questions about the 
political situation in the homeland. Rather, they preferred to discuss migration 
challenges they had been through in Germany, and the process of settling in 
Germany after the conflict in BiH ended in 1995.438    
These groups, though representative of inactive diaspora mobilization, offer 
a form of release for diaspora who are traumatized and who have few other outlets. 
While they may not mobilize towards issues of transitional justice or peace, these 
women’s groups nonetheless form a community of survivors who can comfort each 
other and serve as resources for one another. There is some potential for them to be 
engaged around issues of transitional justice or peace activism once they are able 
to move beyond the trauma they have experienced. One interviewee reflected on 
this possibility as follows, “When my paperwork here is complete, I will dedicate 
more time to BiH.”439 She was reflecting on the importance of the citizenship 
regime and stressing she needed to feel safe in Germany first before becoming more 
involved. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
Today, few of the former refugees from Bosnia or guest workers from Yugoslavia, 
even those who have secured German citizenship, would consider themselves or 
their children, in the words of one of the interviewees, to be ‘Bio-Deutsche,’ organic 
Germans. They are largely absent from German migration debates today despite 
their migrant backgrounds, similarly to the guest workers during the Yugoslav 
period, blending into Germany society. This provides them an opportunity to 
participate in the debate and offer their own perspectives on refugees, Islam, 
multiculturalism, and integration. Considering more recent migrants and refugees 
arriving in Germany from Syria and the Middle East, Bosniaks in particular 
consider it a duty to participate within German institutional dialogues in order to 
ensure that Islamophobia does not flourish and that an understanding between the 
belonging of Islam within modern Germany society develops.440  
Diaspora mobilization takes different forms in Germany. In many instances, 
it has grown out of previous efforts established before that have simply continued 
after BiH gained sovereignty, and have since adjusted for the new context. Involved 
diaspora mobilization is evident among Bosniak diaspora members to mobilize 
their religious identities within the German context to contribute to host land 
debates. They have taken advantage of the opportunity to present themselves as 
Muslims in Germany and to highlight their contribution to German debates around 
citizenship, religion, and minority rights. 
Mobilization in Germany happens with specific goals in mind, usually 
geared towards integration in Germany. As expected, the diaspora is not as engaged 
in homeland politics as they are in Sweden. Many of the activities, due to a lack of 
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collective claims made, and in part due to a higher level of trauma than in countries 
such as Sweden, have led to higher levels of inactive diaspora mobilization. It will 
be interesting to explore whether the second generation of Bosnians, with dual 
citizenship, will mobilize in more involved ways over time by voicing collective 
claims and finding new opportunities to engage with their homeland.   
The following chapter will explore the French Bosnian case study in more 
detail as well as the initiatives within this community. The French case study 
offers a different co-occurrence of the independent variables and the typology thus 
hypothesizes different kinds of diaspora mobilization in France as a result. The 
chapter will provide an overview of an often neglected diaspora community due to 
its small size, but it will also point out the different kinds of fragmentation within 
this community that are less evident in the Swedish and German cases. 
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Chapter 7 Bosnian Diaspora in France – Small and Fragmented 
The previous chapter noted the variety of involved and inactive diaspora 
mobilization in Germany, as a result of different population waves, first from 
Yugoslavia and later from BiH, arriving and settling in Germany, returning to BiH, 
or resettling in third countries such as the United States. This chapter will examine 
diaspora mobilization in France, providing particular insight into this small, 
understudied community. This chapter addresses two issues. It provides a brief 
overview of the French Bosnian community, with a particular focus on the Bosniak 
community, split into Bosniaks from BiH and Bosniaks from Sandžak, a region of 
Serbia and Montenegro. Through this dynamic, the translocal community variable 
is analyzed further. Secondly, the chapter examines the community with a view 
towards the typology developed to provide a comparative perspective empirically 
which highlight different pathways to diaspora mobilization. Fieldwork revealed a 
quite fragmented community not rallied around a particular organization, group, or 
collective claim. Thus, it is unlike diaspora mobilization examined in the two 
previous chapters. Firstly, an overview of migration trends between former 
Yugoslavia and BiH and France are necessary to contextualize and situate the 
community.  
7.1 Migration Trends to France between the 20th century and at Present 
According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, there were 3787 Bosnian citizens living in 
France. This is roughly comparable to 4271 in Sweden. 441  However, unlike 
Sweden, which took on Bosnian refugees during the war in large numbers, as 
                                                
441 The number of Bosnian citizens living in Germany as of the 1991 Yugoslav census is 113,306.; 
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evidenced by the previous chapter on Sweden, France did not do the same and 
consequently has a lower number of Bosnians living there today. This section will 
explore the historical migration trends between the region and France in more 
detail.  
Unlike the Yugoslavs in Germany, often compared to the Turks in Germany, 
Yugoslavs in France were relatively negligible. To put this into perspective, less 
than 2% of the immigrant population in France was from former Yugoslavia 
according to the French census of 1982. Other migrant groups were dominant in 
France, in part due to its colonial past. Thus, dominant migrant groups in France in 
the post-WWII period were from former French colonies in the Maghreb such as 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. 442  Further, social science research in France, 
focused rather on French integration models rather than on migration, nonetheless 
neglected systematic academic inquiry, thus helping to also explain some of the 
relative dearth of publications on migrants in France in comparison to Germany and 
Sweden.443 
Between the two World Wars, there was a steady flow of Yugoslavs who 
moved to France to work in agricultural, industrial, or other jobs, to improve their 
socio-economic standing in the homeland. They usually settled in similar regions 
as their co-patriots, so that there was a greater contingent of Slovenes in Moselle 
working in the mining industry. 444  This speaks to the potential of translocal 
connections being established by host state policies. The particular worker’s 
                                                
442 For further reading see: Hargreaves, Alec G., and Mark McKinney, eds. 1997. Post-Colonial 
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programs encouraged chain migration from the same region as this established a 
regular flow of seasonal workers. They were politically inactive and did not 
consider France a settlement country. In fact, the the number of Yugoslavs returning 
from France was at a higher level than those leaving for France in the years leading 
up to WWII.445 Most of the guest workers in France were from Slovenia rather than 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or the other republics within the Yugoslav federation. This 
general trend continued until the mid-60s when Yugoslavia renewed its relationship 
with France for workers to emigrate in an organized way once again. 
The Yugoslav migration wave to France from 1965 on was composed of 
guest workers in metals, construction, and agriculture industries. The number of 
Yugoslavs in France surged to a high of 70,280, according to the French census in 
the early 1970s. Due to the impending oil crisis and new restrictive French 
immigration policies from the mid-1970s, this number decreased to 64,420, as 
evidenced in the 1982 census.446 By 1984, most of the Yugoslav in France lived in 
the Paris area (close to 62%). Comparing the population from each of the republics, 
it is notable that the largest portion of the population was from Serbia, amounting 
to a little over 70%. The number of Bosnians only amounted to 9.8% according to 
the 1981 census, or 4,834 individuals.447 The number of Bosnians in the 1991 was 
below this number, 3,787. While there were some individuals who remained in 
France leading up the eventual war and breakup of Yugoslavia, close to 25% of the 
Bosnian population in France returned to its homeland or left France between 1981 
                                                
445 Ibid., 290. 
446 French Population Census. (2008). Tableau CD-MF3 - Etrangers selon le sexe, la catégorie de 
population et la nationalité détaillée. Retrieved from: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=pop-immigree-pop-etrangere-2008. 
[Accessed January 2016]. 
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and 1991. This goes largely in line with French citizenship policy, limited to 
temporary stays by guest workers throughout this period.  
While the French citizenship regime is considered to be historically liberal, 
French domestic politics nonetheless played a role in culling the number of refugees 
and asylum seekers admitted. Thus, between the 1980 – 1990 period in which the 
number of Yugoslav guest workers in France overall declined, the number of 
refugees admitted overall also decreased. An exception were Cambodian refugees 
who resettled in France in larger numbers, mainly in Lyon and Paris, starting in 
1975. This was due to their ‘invisibility’ through assimilation within French society, 
and an established relationship between France and Cambodia including 
educational exchanges.448 More broadly, in 1981, 80% of the 20,000 individuals 
who sought asylum in France were recognized as refugees. The number declined to 
20% by 1999 for the roughly 30,000, according to the French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless People.449  Thus, the number of Bosnians 
admitted to France as refugees was also much lower than in other European 
countries. Valenta and Ramet estimate the population today to be around 5,000 
individuals, slightly higher than the population was in the early 1990s.450 
 As the 2013 Bosnian census results do not account for the diaspora, there is 
not an up-to-date number of Bosnians living in France today from Bosnian sources. 
However, the French Census data from 2008 seems to point to a somewhat higher 
number, albeit still lower than most European countries, at 9,135. By comparison, 
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the number of Croatian citizens in France according to the same data source is lower 
at 3,533, while the number of Serbs is much higher at 43,112.451  Taking into 
consideration historical migration flows discussed in previous paragraphs, this 
seems to be in accordance. It accounts for a small number of refugees who were 
granted asylum and thus a clear path to citizenship.  
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note, according to Eurostat, that 13,958 
individuals living in France today had Bosnia and Herzegovina as their country at 
birth.452 Some of the discrepancies between these numbers surely accounts for 
births between the years of data collection (Eurostat was published in 2011, whereas 
the French Census in 2008), it is also quite likely that there are Bosnians living in 
France that have dual citizenship. This means they do not appear in the French 
census as Bosnian citizens. 
Recent French census data seems to confirms this. It lists 12,923 individuals 
living in France who were born in BiH.453 Accounting for the number of people in 
France with Bosnian citizenship above (9,135), this highlights a discrepancy of 
close to 3,000 individuals born in BiH living in France today who do not have 
Bosnian citizenship. There are potentially two reasons for this. They could have 
renounced their Bosnian citizenship for French citizenship, or for a Croatian or 
Serbian citizenship respectively, if they are Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Serbs. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no detailed data about these numbers 
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available by any of the data gathering agencies of the countries mentioned before. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that the Bosnian community in France is closer to 9,000 
individuals rather than 5,000, as estimated by the previous research, in line with the 
French census numbers. 
The following sections will analyze the community’s mobilization patterns 
in more detail, particularly how these align with the typology developed and 
examined in Swedish and German hostlands in previous chapters. It is worthwhile 
to remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization for the 
French citizenship regime, represented as ‘Historically Liberal’ according to 
Howard’s framework.  
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7.2 Engaged Diaspora Mobilization in France 
Hypothesis 1, explored in Chapter 5, theorizes how the co-occurrence of the three 
independent variables leads to engaged diaspora mobilization. In short, it can be 
expressed as follows – H1: Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal 
community + collective claim made à Engaged Diaspora Mobilization. While the 
typology hypothesizes the probability of engaged diaspora mobilization, fieldwork 
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in France did not reveal this to be the case. Rather, fieldwork revealed that 
individuals in France collaborate transnationally with Bosnian diaspora in 
Switzerland in an engaged way, a different kind of translocality. The French 
citizenship regime and understanding of integration provides little opportunity for 
collective claims to be at the forefront, thus rendering most immigrant groups, like 
the Cambodians in France mentioned previously, effectively invisible from French 
public debate. Finally, the Bosnian Embassy in France has also rarely been a place 
around which diaspora members might meet and organize.  
Two examples stand out in France as exhibiting some of the same features 
of engaged diaspora mobilization as hypothesized, and they will be explored in the 
following two sections. The first one is an instance of a transnational engaged 
diaspora mobilization. Due to the lack of translocal community in France and 
without much space for collective claims, Bosnians in France collaborate 
transnationally with Swiss Bosnian organizations. The second is a humanitarian 
organization made up of former guest workers and conflict-generated diaspora 
members who organize around issues of education in the homeland as well as youth 
more generally using collective claims focused on transitional justice and 
peacebuilding. 
 7.2.1 Transnational Diaspora Collaboration in Switzerland 
 
Unlike France, Switzerland has traditionally attracted labor migration of Bosnians 
from the Podrinje region in eastern Bosnia around Srebrenica and Bratunac. During 
the 1990s, Switzerland also accepted Bosnian refugees fleeing the war, from the 
same area. Most of the 24,500 refugees454 registered in Switzerland between 1992 
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and 1995 came from either the Prijedor area in the northwest of the country or from 
around Bratunac. Older individuals and a few young families repatriated to their 
villages in the post-war period while retaining some family members in Switzerland 
who help to support extended networks back at home. Further, due to translocal 
connections with a small group of Srebrenica refugees living in France, near Lyon 
during the post-war period, the communities in Switzerland and France established 
transnational ties between France and Switzerland.455  
This dynamic has sustained itself around the Annual Peace March in the 
Srebrenica region. This innovative remembrance and, ultimately, driver for 
economic development, was started by Srebrenica survivors who had resettled in 
Switzerland in 1996 as a way to help them deal with the trauma of surviving the 
Srebrenica genocide.456 Along with Swiss individuals who were active in helping 
the Bosnian refugee community in Switzerland, a little over fifty people organized 
a walk in Bern to symbolically represent the route they had traversed to escape the 
Srebrenica Genocide and to draw attention about what they had survived the year 
before.  
By 2004, members of the Solidarite Bosnie (Solidarity Bosnia) organization 
which includes Swiss people without a Bosnian background, as well as diaspora 
members in Switzerland and France, organized the Peace March in BiH. They 
wanted to bring awareness of the returnee community and to introduce individuals 
from Switzerland and France, including student groups, to the area. Collective 
claims around ensuring that the Srebrenica genocide is not negated but rather 
remembered and commemorated drive all these activities. In particular, the 
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organizers and participants stress the importance of highlighting the returnee 
community in the Srebrenica region and their perseverance, as well as the need to 
help them rebuild their community after genocide. Ultimately, after conversations 
and meetings with both local politicians as well as the Potočari Memorial Center, 
the first March happened between Nezuk, where the Bosnian front line was in 1995, 
and Srebrenica, in July 2005.457 
Over a decade later, the Peace March endures. Every summer, for the three 
days leading up to the burial ceremony each July 11th, close to 5,000 individuals 
walk from Nezuk (near Tuzla) and Potočari, tracing the route which survivors 
undertook to escape in July 1995.458 Many participants are under 30 years old, and 
might only have little connection to Srebrenica, or even live abroad.459 Through 
participant observations for two years, I encountered individuals from the United 
States, Germany, France, Switzerland, Australia, Austria, Italy, as well as from 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through informal conversations, participants 
echoed they felt they were paying homage to the victims of Srebrenica by 
symbolically marching back to the land from which approximately 10,000 Bosnian 
Muslims fled in July 1995. They interact with the returnee community as they walk 
the route and learn about the locations of several mass graves sites along the path. 
Moreover, some stay within returnee homes for around 30 Bosnian marks per night, 
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providing an economic boost for the community where many households receive 
little or no income whatsoever.460  
 This small number of French Bosnian diaspora members are active in 
promoting this Annual Peace March in the Srebrenica region not only by 
participating but also by raising awareness about it in France, albeit this happens on 
a smaller scale than in Switzerland. The author was present at one such event in 
Paris which attracted an audience of around 50 individuals who were eager to learn 
about Srebrenica and participate in the March.461 The event included a Srebrenica 
genocide survivor who had lived in Switzerland but had since returned to BiH. He 
presented his story and discussed the Peace March and its significance to him and 
the community in BiH, highlighting the importance of economic development for 
the region. He also emphasized that the trail was open throughout the year and that 
returnee families were eager to provide accommodation.462 While events like this 
are relatively rare in France, they nonetheless demonstrate that the community can, 
through transnational cooperation with a diaspora and activist community in 
Switzerland to help make an impact in the homeland. Their engaged mobilization 
around organizing the Peace March and helping to sustain the returnee community 
is based on peacebuilding and transitional justice principles utilizing collective 
claims about supporting returnee communities and raising awareness of the 
Srebrenica Genocide. 
                                                
460 Participant observation revealed that the returnees who hosted Marchers usually hosted 
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Building off the idea of the Peace March concurrently, the Bosnian diaspora 
community in Lyon has worked to provide returnees in eastern Bosnia economic 
development opportunities through microfinance of returnee projects and 
endeavors. They were in part financially supported by the French government to 
aid returnees to the region. This collaboration started in 2007, the organization, Mir 
Sada (Peace Now), hired a Tuzla based project manager to coordinate their efforts 
in 2009.463 Tuzla has the highest number of internally displaced in the country, with 
many individuals from the Srebrenica region.464 The non-profit’s members believe 
that humanitarian actions do not amount to lasting peace and that helping returnees 
develop economic development opportunities provides the communities which they 
return to an opportunity to recover and work towards building a common future.465 
Through these goals, collective claims focused on peacebuilding and goals of 
achieving transitional justice are evident. Interviewees emphasized local 
approaches to helping these communities rather than international approaches. 
They acknowledge the importance of these initiatives in addition to judicial 
approaches such as verdicts made in The Hague by the ICTY. “These communities 
need to rebuild. They need to have a future. They need to trust each other.”466 Since 
2007, they have helped to fund 100 different projects to ease the daily lives of 
returnees in an aim for reconciliation.  
 Ultimately, this example of transnationalism offers a cross-sectional 
perspective of the engagement of Bosnians in France and Switzerland between 2007 
and 2014. Due to common goals and proximity with one another in the diaspora, 
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they have started to collaborate to bring awareness of BiH as well as improve the 
lives of returnees. In a sense, the importance of translocal connections between the 
returnee community and Switzerland as well as the returnee community and France 
are highly important. Considering the Bosnian diaspora in France represents the 
smallest population of the three case studies examined, this innovativeness of 
coupling with diaspora groups in Switzerland emphasizes the resourcefulness of 
diaspora members. Thus, the engaged diaspora mobilization transnationally 
between France and Switzerland occurs on a smaller scale than the engaged 
diaspora mobilization examined in Sweden, yet it nonetheless is proven in part.  
7.2.2 Aide a l’education en Bosnie-Herzegovine 
 
There are few diaspora organizations that have been operating in France over the 
last few decades. One of the most enduring, Aide a l’education en Bosnie-
Herzegovine (Help Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina), focuses on creating 
spaces of interaction for BiH youth, including shared computer labs and joint 
French language lessons. While they do not consider themselves as political, their 
actions nonetheless have political implications due to the mobilization they 
encourage. They do not organize around collective claims focused on genocide 
remembrance, but rather aim to create an impact on the homeland communities 
through education, discouraging divided schools. This claim is based on the 
importance of peacebuilding, mainly trust among those communities ravaged by 
war, ensuring that conflict is not carried over into the next generation. Their level 
of translocalism is relatively high, both in the connections they feel towards their 
communities in the homeland, but also amongst each other, with over half of the 
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members having come to France prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia as guest 
workers, or as refugees from the same regions.467  
The Association of Bosnians in France, established in 1991, has around 500 
members. Its members mostly arrived in France as Yugoslavs within five to ten 
years before the war of 1992 to 1995 to work. Others came as refugees towards the 
beginning of the war. Nearly all have since become citizens of France.468 They were 
instrumental in establishing the Bosnian Embassy in France by taking over the 
space that was previously the embassy of Yugoslavia towards the very beginning 
of the war in early 1992.469 The association maintains a policy of support for BiH 
as a state with a vision that embraces all of its citizens, regardless of their ethnic, 
national, or religious backgrounds. Some members identified as Bosnian, others as 
Bosniak, although they refer to Yugoslavia during interviews often.  
The association’s logo is a play on the Bosnian flag and highlights its 
sentiments. Instead of having stars as the flag does, there are a variety of symbols 
signifying the different peoples who make up BiH to reflect the association’s 
inclusivity, such as the Star of David, the Crescent Moon, the Bosnian Lily, a star 
(for Yugoslavs), and a cross instead.470 When asked about the logo, the president 
noted the importance of diversity within former Yugoslavia, comparing it to the 
French fraternite and Yugoslav ideals of ‘Brotherhood and Unity.’471  
Their claims are presented as an important issue which concerns the society 
in the homeland as a whole. The translocal community connections become 
important in the homeland context as they help members select where their 
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469 Respondent FR1 (2014) Interview in February, Paris, France. 
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471 Ramet, Sabrina P. 2002. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
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donations can both make an impact but also be relatively easy for them to place and 
feel they have given back something to the community. Thus, even though the 
community is composed of both guest workers and conflict-generated individuals, 
and they have different collective claims than the diaspora examined in Germany 
or Sweden, there is still engaged diaspora mobilization as hypothesized. This 
stresses the importance of the host land context and the citizenship regime of 
France. They collaborate with French institutions to a degree as well as with 
institutions in BiH. 
Utilizing their knowledge of and contacts from their previous communities 
in Bosnia, the associations’ members build relationships with particular schools and 
coordinate computer donations through them. Association members enjoy making 
local news in their former localities for their contribution, which they consider as 
further strengthening to their position in the local community.472 This helps to 
explain why the initial activities of the association were in the Trebinje region rather 
than in other parts of the country, as its president is from this community and 
maintains translocal ties with it.473  
For those who emigrated to France as guest workers or arrived as refugees, 
their understanding of identity often remains tied to being Yugoslav. They do not 
identify with new political realities of the region and demonstrated a disengagement 
from the ethnonational politics in BiH, including politicians. In fact, in interviews, 
members of the diaspora voiced frustrations with the Dayton Peace Treaty and the 
political system that it has created and often spoke about the fact that they do not 
vote in Bosnian elections as a result.474 Their main contention is the focus on 
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ethnicity over individual citizenship and belonging. Several expressed frustration 
about the existence of Republika Srpska, though this was not the case for all of their 
members, who, pragmatically, considered it legitimate as the result of a peace 
agreement.475 Still, this does not impede their activism in their homeland. In fact, 
the organization collaborates with different institutions in BiH, including in the RS, 
to channel their activism. One interviewee noted there is in fact little to no hostility, 
even though there is initial caution, because the officials in diaspora’s old localities 
in the homeland are different from the individuals they knew before.476  
During the war between 1992 and 1995, they organized convoys from 
within their community as well as from French citizens with food, clothes, a form 
of humanitarian aid, and regularly sent it to a variety of locations in BiH. Thus, they 
developed a relationship with the Red Cross organization in both France and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. They recognized this as a particular need during the war as well 
as a way to remain connected to their homeland localities.477Since the war, their 
mission has been focused on improving education to help the next generation in 
BiH. 478  Although their aims are not rooted in traditional transitional justice 
language, the approach is focused on peacebuilding in these local communities as 
a whole, seeking to mitigate the divisive education system and create more 
opportunities for students in divided schools or among returnee populations. 
One of the main initiatives the Association has been focused on have been 
computer donations to schools in divided communities. The initial donations were 
in places where members of the association had local connections, whether from 
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before the war or built in France thereafter. 479 Its members were adamant that their 
donations were to be used by all students, regardless of their background, and 
regardless of the schools’ parallel curriculums. In their negotiations with different 
schools, they stressed that the computer labs were for the use of all the students 
throughout the school day.480 This reversed the separation of students and placed 
them back into a united school, even if for a short period of the school day.481  
Since 2002, the association has donated computer equipment to over forty 
schools in BiH. They joined a French umbrella organization, La Voix de L’Enfant 
(The Voice of the Child), to further their mission in BiH. Most of the schools, as 
mentioned previously, are selected on the basis of the diaspora members knowing 
someone locally, whether within the school system or within that community, who 
in turn helps the organization get in touch with logistics. They work with the Red 
Cross in BiH to coordinate transport between France and BiH. Drljević repeatedly 
noted the importance of this collaboration in helping to legitimize them in both 
France as well as make their work in BiH easier.482  
Since 2004, they have lobbied for French language education in their 
translocal communities in collaboration with the French Embassy in BiH. They 
have identified this as a way to integrate children of different backgrounds in the 
classroom to increase learning and to move beyond the ‘one roof, two schools’ 
system. As its president of the association argued, if the children are all speaking 
French with one another, they might build relationships which they otherwise 
cannot do in segregated and politicized language courses of Bosnian, Croatian, or 
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481 Respondents FR1 and FR6 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France. 
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Serbian respectively.483 While it is difficult to measure the impact of these initiative 
in the long-term due to remaining difficulties in the structure and provision of 
education in BiH, the Association of Bosnians in France mobilizes as theorized to 
a certain degree. While its members are both former guest workers and conflict-
generated individuals, it is nonetheless interesting to note that they mobilize in 
similar patterns.  
7.3 Reactive Diaspora Mobilization in France 
 
Hypothesis 5 theorizes how the co-occurrence of the three independent variables 
leads to one of the pathways which represent reactive diaspora mobilization. It can 
also be expressed as H5: More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime 
+ absence of translocal community + collective claim made à Reactive Diaspora 
Mobilization.  
 Reactive diaspora mobilization has the potential to dissuade from its goals, 
as noted in Chapter 4. It can vilify the diaspora, or overemphasize their role rather 
than their actions. Due to the lack of translocal community, individual agency thus 
becomes relevant. On the other hand, it can also glorify those who mobilize and 
thus overemphasize the diaspora’s role. This section notes several diaspora 
members’ activities in France in an effort to examine the hypothesis’ relevance.  
The first example is a Bosnian with French citizenship who regularly returns 
to her hometown, Banja Luka and has strong translocal connection to her hometown 
context, but does not in France. Like individuals from Banja Luka who live in 
Sweden, she believes in maintaining a multi-ethnic presence in her hometown rather 
than a dominant Serb one. She remained involved in the lives of her friends in Banja 
Luka as well as those who left the city throughout the 1990s, and retained a strong 
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connection to her hometown despite changes both demographically as well as 
politically.  
After realizing that one of her Banja Lukan friends who owns a traditional 
Bosnian house in Banja Luka in the city center, but lives in the diaspora, was 
interested in selling, she convinced her to delay the sale and instead use the home 
as gathering space for cultural events and preserve it as representative of historic 
architecture in Banja Luka. This home, owned by one of Banja Luka’s most famous 
families, Čejvan, is one of the few traditional Bosnian homes left in the city. Others 
were destroyed during an earthquake in the 1960s, and those that remain have 
largely been sold, demolished, or are not inhabitable as their owners have left the 
city. The house had previously been used for humanitarian purposes (Merhamet) 
during the war, and was to some degree known in the city already. Ultimately, in 
collaboration with local activists who are committed to restoring the home, and by 
agreement with the owners, this individual coordinated the opening of the BASOC 
(Banjalučki Socijalni Centar or Banjalukan Social Center). The center is the only 
one in Banja Luka that focuses both on maintaining Banja Luka’s heritage as well 
as hosting events on post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina with aims to raise 
awareness and activism around active citizenship, feminism, and equality in BiH.484  
In this example, diaspora mobilization relied on the importance of 
translocality in the hometown with a group of local activists and a shared belief 
about preserving cultural heritage which operated as a collective claim. While this 
claim is not explicitly framed as a transitional justice goal, this individual’s 
mobilization around the particular goal is nonetheless evident. As such, it is perhaps 
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also reflective that beyond anything else, personal effort and engagement can result 
in incremental results, even if a larger diaspora group is not mobilized. 
Another example of reactive diaspora mobilization is demonstrated by an 
interviewee from Gradiška who spends summers there and is involved in helping to 
organize events on a regular basis. While seemingly inactive, when asked about her 
perspectives on transitional justice in the region, she emphasized that for her this 
was best achieved by remaining engaged in her hometown community and helping 
to rebuild trust. She leads a transnational life, splitting her time between Paris and 
Gradiška. She highlighted how suživot is only possible if there are more returnees 
and if the diaspora remain engaged in their hometowns in the post-conflict 
period. 485  “With suživot, we can have peace again.” 486  This amounts to very 
individual action, rather than diaspora mobilization on a group level. However, her 
claims in regards to transitional justice are very much rooted in very localized action 
within a post-conflict community. By spending more time in her hometown and 
remaining active within it, she believes she can help foster more community in the 
post-conflict space. A seemingly small action, nonetheless underlined by a clear 
agenda related to peacebuilding.  
The concept of suživot is multi-layered and, as previous research shows, 
understood in a variety of ways, both in the diaspora and in the homeland. Roughly 
translated as co-life, or living together, it stresses the importance of multi-ethnic 
community. Previous research demonstrates this relates to an identification of life 
in Yugoslavia pre-conflict, and an understanding that it is the only way to move 
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towards reconciliation in the post-conflict phase. “The former diversity is more 
memory than current reality, although memory constitutes to poignantly condition 
perceptions of reality.”487  
A third example is Jasna Samić, a prominent Bosnian and French author, 
who, while not necessarily fitting the hypothesized reactive type, nonetheless 
exhibits some similar features through her engagement with the homeland. She also 
leads a transnational life between Paris and Sarajevo and feels at home in both 
cities.488 As a dual citizen since the war and novelist, she does not consider herself 
a ‘dijasporac,’ or a diaspora member, similar to the two previous examples. On the 
contrary, her writing often pokes fun at the guest worker mentality as well as war 
refugee memories of the homeland as naïve. “They are longing for something that 
does not exist.”489  
She has published several books that focused on how the diaspora looks 
back at the homeland, being out of touch with the realities of the homeland, its 
political corruption, and longing for something that is impossible to hold on to.490 
When asked about transitional justice and diaspora mobilization, both in France as 
well as in other countries, Šamić responded with a bitter laugh of resignation, not 
believing either as having the potential to succeed in today’s BiH.491 For her, the 
post-conflict political environment rewards corruption. She notes that it encourages 
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a turn towards Islamized political societies which she considers to ultimately hold 
the country’s democratic development and justice back.492 Media outlets in Bosnia 
often quote her criticisms of the current political regime, particularly of the Bosniak 
leadership in Sarajevo. 
These three individuals, in part due to a lack of a larger Bosnian community 
in their host country, France, their dual citizenships, and the frequency of their trips 
to the homeland, do not mobilize in the host country, France. Instead, they feel they 
can channel their activities at homeland institutions and collaborate with local 
actors. The French state does not help them to organize as migrants and rather 
encourages them to embrace French values and integrate. They do not feel there is 
space for collective claims that focus on BiH in the French public sphere and 
express similar sentiments to Cambodian communities in France who only organize 
amongst themselves.493 Interviewees have repeated they do not feel that they are 
‘real’ diaspora in this sense.494  
While these examples are based on individual incentives, these actions do 
partially confirm reactive diaspora mobilization as hypothesized. However, neither 
of them are reactive in a combative way in which it was hypothesized they might 
be. Instead, these three examples demonstrate some activism on their behalf in line 
with the transnational lives they lead and peacebuilding incentives they support on 
an individual basis. Their locally based actions inherently encourage peacebuilding 
from below, even though they do not necessarily frame them as such. However, 
these mobilizations are more focused on the individual incentives of the individuals 
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who maintain strong translocal ties in their homeland community. In this sense, the 
hypothesized reactive diaspora mobilization type could be amended. Hence, when 
there is an element of translocality available in the homeland, diaspora demonstrate 
more of an individualistic mobilization.  
7.4 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in France 
Inactive Diaspora Mobilization is hypothesized as a potential type of diaspora 
mobilization in each of the citizenship regimes. It is also expressed by hypothesis 6 
which indicates that in the absence of a collective claim there will be inactive 
diaspora mobilization and be expressed as follows: (H6: Any citizenship regime + 
presence or absence of translocal community no collective claim made à Inactive 
Diaspora Mobilization.) Here the translocal community variable is valuable to 
consider as it can result in different pathways, depending on its presence or absence, 
of diaspora mobilization, and the ways in which it also is fragmented. 
When asked about the Bosnian French community, a representative from 
the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees did not find that it is one of the 
communities that are active, nor is the French Bosnian community considered as 
relevant by the Ministry.495 In a two-volume collection listing prominent Bosnians 
living in the diaspora in 2009 and 2010, only five out of the nearly 400 individuals 
listed live in France. 496  They vary in age and profession and live dispersed 
throughout France. However, there is no network of Bosnia professional 
associations or organizations in France as there is Sweden through the APU 
                                                
495 Respondent BH4 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH. 
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network, or in the United States with the Bosnian American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences for example.497  
During interviews in France, inquiring about both connections with other 
Bosnians as well as with Bosnian institutions among those in France, interviewees 
repeated there was a sense of disengagement. While this echoes to some degree 
interviewees’ responses in Germany, in France they added that this was reinforced 
by the Bosnian Embassy in Paris. The ambassador at the time of fieldwork, Nina 
Sajić, was, according to interviewees, uninterested in engaging non-Serb Bosnians 
in the French community.498 They cited that there were no events organized by the 
Embassy for Bosnian national holidays. 499  Moreover, they noted that the 
Ambassador attended events organized by the Serbian Embassy and behaved as a 
representative of RS, rather than the country as a whole.500 Considering that the 
contact with diplomatic staff is often the only contact diaspora members have with 
officials from the homeland, sour relations, echoed by the interviewees, did not 
engender them to collaboration with official homeland actors.501  
Bosniak associations, organized within mosques, or džemat, in France, 
provided no examples of diaspora mobilization. Rather, they serve as religious 
gathering places its attendees. When asked about political mobilization, including 
voting, interviewees cited that they didn’t feel there was any emphasis on Bosnian 
politics within their communities. They noted that Sandžaklije, individuals from 
Sandžak, a predominately Muslim region in Serbia, are in the leadership of their 
                                                
497 Their website can be accessed at http://bhaaas.org/. 
498 Unlike in Sweden and Germany, I was unsuccessful in establishing contact with the Bosnian 
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Geneva, Switzerland. 
501 Ultimately, in 2014, a new Ambassador arrived, Ivan Orlić, who improved relations by inviting 
Bosnians living in France to the Embassy for several events and meetings.  
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mosques and that political discussions around mobilization were thus limited as this 
is not their homeland.  
 Not having a translocal community in the hostland was echoed throughout 
interviews, and often given as a reason for diaspora members remaining uninvolved 
in the homeland. Interviewees noted they do not feel they belong to a greater 
Bosnian community in France and thus prefer to spend time in BiH on an annual 
basis and participate in their local communities in the homeland.502 When asked 
about post-war BiH vs. pre-war BiH and the relationships within their local 
communities, interviewees repeatedly noted they had little problems with 
individuals they knew ‘before.’ Instead, they expressed most frustration with how 
‘provincial’ their former localities had become since the war, referring to internally 
displaced individuals within BiH, or Bosniaks from Sandžak who have moved to 
Sarajevo and the region over the last two decades.503 In BiH, they retain the social 
circles they know from ‘before,’ in this way further building translocal relationships 
between themselves and their homeland community, but not expanding this in the 
hostland due to the lack of other Bosnian diaspora members from these same 
localities.  
While similar sentiments, to a degree even prejudice about Bosniaks from 
Sandžak were shared by diaspora members in Sweden and Germany tangentially, 
they were more strongly voiced in France. This is likely because of the most 
common space for Bosniaks to meet one another, or potentially even mobilize, as 
demonstrated in the German chapter, are Islamic communities. In France, 
particularly at the fieldwork sites in Paris and Lyon, Bosniaks from Sandžak are 
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more dominant than Bosniaks from BiH. As a result, there is little to no mobilization 
in regards to transitional justice with a view towards BiH. The following section 
explores this dynamic further.  
7.4.1 Lack of Mobilization in BiH due to Sandžaklije  
The lack of a translocal community among the Bosniak community in France in 
BiH, as well as the lack of a collective claim is representative of the fragmented 
community. During a focus group with a dozen participants in a Bosniak mosque 
in Paris, there were only a few individuals from BiH proper. Politically, they all 
supported the SDA, the majority Bosniak party in both BiH as well as Serbia, which 
has advocated for Sandžak to be autonomous within Serbia.  
These divisions within the Bosniak diaspora in France were more prominent 
than in the other two case studies examined. In part, this is because the number of 
Sandžaklije who had moved to France in the pre-conflict period was greater than 
Bosnians, who identified with their Yugoslav identity over their religious identity, 
and the number of Bosnian refugees during the 1990s on the whole smaller than in 
the other two cases.  
To remind the reader, the three recognized constituent peoples of BiH today 
are Bosniaks, the Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. One of the main contentions 
among those who advocate for constitutional change in the political structure of 
BiH is that this discounts ordinary Bosnians who do not consider themselves as 
‘constituent,’ as well as other minorities such as Roma and Jews. Further, the two 
neighboring countries, Croatia and Serbia, maintain political linkages with the 
respective ‘constituent’ peoples in BiH, whether through rhetoric or through 
political parties. In turn, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb nationalist politicians 
consider themselves as belonging to one of these countries, with BiH as a 
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secondary, geographic, home. For example, the Bosnian Croat President Dragan 
Čović votes in Croatian elections as he holds a dual citizenship with Croatia.504 In 
contrast, Bosnian Muslims have no other country to which a large percentage have 
allegiance or hold dual citizenship with in comparison to Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats. Thus, they are perceived as propagating BiH and its sovereignty 
most vigorously. 
However, this standard narrative neglects a Serb minority in the Sandžak 
region who are predominately Bosnian Muslim and might consider BiH as their 
homeland. Bosniaks are understood to constitute Muslims from BiH and Sandžak. 
In certain countries, membership in Islamic organizations is in part determined by 
national belonging, particularly when there are large numbers of individuals who 
live there. In France, while there are several Bosniak mosques, there has not been a 
proliferation of these mosques, in part because of the lower number of refugees 
during the 1990s, unlike Switzerland which accommodated a higher number of 
refugees.505 Most of them are led and dominated by individuals from the Sandžak 
rather than BiH. This has led to some resentment from the Bosnian Bosniak 
population, who consider the Sandžaklije to propagate mobilization for their own 
region as well as to generally be more conservative in their beliefs. “The 
Sandžaklije have taken over the mosque, I barely go there anymore. We used to 
have cultural events, now women are barely welcome” one respondent noted.506  
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Prior research on Bosniak communities in Switzerland has found 
differences between those who have been in Switzerland for several generations 
and those who arrived more recently in the country. In some communities, this has 
lead to a split and establishment of separate mosques in certain communities such 
as St. Gallen.507 Rather than this split happening, respondents in France noted that 
in the case of individuals from Sandžak increasingly taking on leadership positions 
in their community mosques, they stopped going regularly.508  
Thus, the Bosniak diaspora community’s mobilization in France is limited 
to helping raise funds for mosques or smaller development projects in Srebrenica, 
as the symbol of Bosniak victimhood, or for mosques in communities where other 
individuals from Sandžak have settled. In essence, they mobilize around religious 
collective claims connected to translocal communities that are most often not based 
in BiH, but rather in their respective homelands in Serbia or Montenegro for 
example. When asked about politicians they support, while some noted SDA 
politician and Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegović, more 
interviewees noted religious leaders such as Mustafa Cerić, the former head of the 
Islamic Society, as being more influential in their lives.509 More in-depth research 
on this community could potentially shed light on their motivations and this 
particular religiously oriented mobilization should be considered for future 
research.   
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7.5 Conclusion 
While diaspora groups are not homogenous as has been explored in previous 
chapters, this chapter demonstrated some of these dynamics using the Bosnian and 
Bosniak diaspora in France. In a smaller population such as in France, this 
heterogeneity is magnified and ultimately stifles the mobilization process. This 
chapter also provided a test case for the hypotheses of the typology related to 
historically more liberal citizenship regimes such as in France. The chapter 
demonstrated that the engaged diaspora mobilization does not quite fit the French 
case completely, there is nonetheless mobilization that happens along the lines of 
peacebuilding and transitional justice, lending credence to the typology. This 
chapter also highlighted different pathways to inactive diaspora mobilization, and 
expanded on reactive mobilization by noting the importance of the strength of 
translocality in the homeland. 
There is not as much Bosnian diaspora activism in France generally in 
comparison with Sweden and Germany. However, diaspora have partnered with a 
Swiss and French organization and organize an annual Peace March in Srebrenica 
and raising awareness about the Srebrenica genocide. In another instance, there has 
been mobilization with a Paris based group which is involved in improving 
education in the homeland as they consider this within larger frames of rebuilding 
their post-war communities. Overall though, the French Bosnian diaspora 
community is fragmented in two different ways. Firstly, individuals from the 
Sandžak region dominate the Islamic Societies which have traditionally afforded 
space for Bosniaks from Bosnia to organize on a political level. The Sandžaklije 
mobilize around issues related to Sandžak, and while they see Srebrenica 
remembrance as important, this is not the basis of collective claims with Bosniaks 
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from Bosnia. Secondly, there is little overlap between the different waves of 
migration to France from Bosnia, negating the potential for a translocal community 
to develop among them to share a common platform. The lack of collective claims 
that unify the community and the lack of translocality among diaspora due to 
fragmentation among both their origins as well as the times in which they arrived 
in France leads mostly to individual mobilization or passivity. 
The Džemat Paris (Bosniak organization in Paris) individuals and 
leadership were unaware of events organized by Solidarite Bosnie, noting they did 
not know much about the Peace March and the organizers themselves.510 This 
indicates there is limited communication and overlap of activities. It demonstrates 
the insular nature of the different communities within the population. For the 
Bosnians in the Lyon community and particularly those who had translocal ties in 
Srebrenica, the activities around the Peace March were more familiar, indicating 
the importance of translocal connections in mobilization, and transnationally 
between France and Switzerland due to the translocal relationship to Srebrenica.  
 The same dynamic was evident in the summer of 2015 when Bosnian Swiss 
diaspora members organized a commemorative public art performance in Geneva. 
The nomadic monument entitled ‘Što te Nema?’511 attracted a number of families 
from the region who live in France. When asked about their attendance, they echoed 
the importance of commemorating Srebrenica as they were from the region or had 
ties to it through their knowledge of the Swiss Bosnian diaspora organization, and 
the fact that there was a lack of similar activities in France.512  
                                                
510 Focus Group FG1 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France. 
511 Karabegović, D., 2014. “Što Te Nema?”: Transnational Cultural Production in the Diaspora in 
Response to the Srebrenica Genocide. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 20(4), pp.455–475. 
512 Participant Observation, July 2015, Geneva, Switzerland. This was at a Sto Te Nema? event 
organized in Geneva with over 100 diaspora members attending and volunteering throughout the 
day.  
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Individuals who arrived in France before the war in comparison to those 
who arrived during and after the war feel distinctly more Yugoslav than Bosnian. 
They have retained their homes in Bosnia where they return on a regular basis 
during the summers, but have French citizenship and identify with it primarily. 
There is a distinct lack of identification with being victims among these individuals, 
with some even voicing this themselves.513 This is in part as they identify the 
homeland to be Yugoslavia and thus the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 does 
not hold much significance for them as they do not have first hand experience with 
it. In essence, they have no traumatic past to overcome, unlike conflict-generated 
diaspora members; their experience of the homeland is separate from war.  
The following chapter will summarize the findings of this dissertation and 
reflect on the typology, as well as potential avenues for future research. It will also 
explore the generalizability of this typology for other conflict-generated diaspora 
within Europe, and reflect on how the project can also expand further into other 
Bosnian diaspora communities in other countries.  
  
                                                
513 Respondent FR2 (2014) Interview in February, Lyon, France. Respondent FR6 and FR7 (2014) 
Interview in February, Paris, France. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions – Bosnians Abroad as Transitional Justice Actors?  
This thesis was informed through an interest in diaspora, contested sovereignty, 
post-conflict society, and transitional justice. The study’s aim was to provide 
theoretical grounding with rigorous comparative empirical research to these topics. 
At the center of the empirical analysis was the homeland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
a country that continues to be in transition with internally contested sovereignty 
after more than two decades. Along with the region, it has been the focus of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding research as an important case, as well as some 
diaspora research due to the number of refugees as a result of conflicts of the 1990s. 
These research agendas have largely been conducted in parallel, rarely intersecting 
or speaking to one another. Although there is well-established research and 
scholarly interest in these fields, studies are rarely comparative, usually focusing on 
one case or a diaspora within one host country for example. While these studies 
help to enlighten the understanding of diaspora relations in particular integration 
regimes, they do not provide explanations about how conditions in these integration 
regimes impact and influence diaspora mobilization. The research on the 
intersection of diasporas and transitional justice is a developing field, both 
theoretically as well as empirically, as noted in the previous chapters.  
Hence, this thesis set out with a question: How do diaspora utilize the 
political environments in their hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of 
transitional justice and peace? In what ways and why? This final chapter will briefly 
discuss the empirical findings and analyze the typology set out in previous chapters, 
and amend the typology as a result of the empirical testing as well as elaborate on 
potential other ways to improve it. Subsequent sections will discuss the implications 
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of this study for theory, for policy, and practice. The chapter ends with suggestions 
for future research on this topic.  
8.1 Main Findings 
Based on the intersection of three different independent variables – the citizenship 
regime, the translocal community, and collective claims – I developed a typology 
of diaspora mobilization with a view towards transitional justice and peacebuilding, 
understood from a broader perspective and focused on diaspora initiatives from 
below. In this vein, the thesis has aimed for mid-range generalizations through 
comparative work. The four types of diaspora mobilization that were theorized in 
the typology are engaged, involved, inactive, and reactive.  
Engaged diaspora mobilization is evidenced through particular collective 
claims made, the presence of a translocal community, and occurs in historically 
liberal or open citizenship regimes. It utilizes both host and home country 
institutions in order to address particular claims and is often sustained. Involved 
diaspora mobilization offers the most diversity when it comes to diaspora 
mobilization, as different interplays between independent variables lead to similar 
diaspora mobilization. It was hypothesized in all three different citizenship regimes. 
In involved diaspora mobilization, diaspora actors utilize either host land or 
homeland influences, rather than both. Often times, diaspora mobilization is 
particularly concerned with issues of transition and their own migration to the host 
country, evidenced by their practices, leading to diaspora mobilization in the 
hostland around issues of peacebuilding rather than transitional justice in the 
homeland. Reactive diaspora mobilization relies more on the strength of existing 
collective claims and responds to them without the presence of a translocal 
community, but usually to a smaller degree as a result. It can also seem more 
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combative than productive. Finally, inactive diaspora mobilization is marked by a 
lack of collective claims made to mobilize the diaspora, rendering this kind of 
mobilization culturally based or focused on other non-political activities.  
This typology was in turn tested in three different countries (France, 
Germany, and Sweden) in Europe with Bosnian-born individuals. The typology was 
largely confirmed in Sweden. In Germany, a number of different pathways that led 
to involved diaspora mobilization were examined. In the French case, fieldwork 
provided new insights into the typology and expanded on the idea of reactive 
mobilization. In this case, the hypotheses generated by the typology were partially 
confirmed. 
In each of the cases, the citizenship regime in which the diaspora was 
embedded played a vital role in their mobilization as well as their outlook towards 
the homeland. Collective claims focused on transitional justice understood from a 
broader perspective or focused on issues of peacebuilding, were also explored. 
These usually were concerned with issues of memorialization or focused on helping 
communities on the translocal level. Very similar collective claims, in particular 
those based on grievances around issues such as genocide remembrance, produced 
different kinds of mobilization depending on the citizenship regimes in which they 
were made. Finally, the importance of the translocal community came to the 
forefront throughout fieldwork. It is through these translocal connections that 
diaspora members often find initial inspiration and motivation to mobilize, and 
further, to sustain the mobilization. Translocality helps them to remain tethered to 
their homeland localities despite the fact that their homeland has contested 
sovereignty. The strength of these translocal communities among diaspora and local 
populations often helps to determine the levels of diaspora mobilization, rather than 
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simply the translocal community in the host country. This is particularly the case 
with localities where there are contentions between the diaspora actors and the local 
governments.  
The six hypotheses which were generated by the typology were as follows:  
H1: Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + collective 
claim made à Engaged Diaspora Mobilization 
H2: Open citizenship regimes + absence of translocal community + collective 
claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization 
H3: Partially liberal citizenship regimes + collective claim made à Involved 
Diaspora Mobilization 
H4: Restrictive Citizenship Regimes + presence of translocal community + 
collective claim made à Involved Diaspora Mobilization 
H5: More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime + absence of 
translocal community + collective claim made à Reactive Diaspora Mobilization 
H6: Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + 
collective claim absent à Inactive Diaspora Mobilization 
 
Empirical evidence supported H1, with a wealth of diaspora mobilization, for 
transitional justice and peacebuilding and beyond, which was a result of Bosnian 
diaspora in Sweden collaborating with one another and forming an umbrella 
network which acts on their behalf in Sweden and BiH. Utilizing translocal 
relationships between its members in the homeland as well as in the hostland, the 
organization has been instrumental in helping to bolster the image of Bosnians in 
Sweden as well integrated individuals who are interested in helping their homeland 
move forward. Through their sustained engagement on several different fronts, 
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evidenced throughout Chapter 5, their activities are focused on implementing 
change in BiH as well as retaining a connection between Sweden and BiH.514  
H1 was further supported in France, though with less evidence, in large part 
due to the small community and the fact that integration in France limits diaspora 
engagement with host country institutions. However, transnational collaboration 
between French and Swiss diaspora organizations has led to engaged diaspora 
mobilization in the Srebrenica region, in part due to the translocal communities 
present in both France and Switzerland. Further, conflict-generated diaspora in 
collaboration with former guest workers have organized a non-profit that aims to 
influence education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, developed through translocal 
connections.  
 H2 was also supported by empirical evidence. By establishing a diaspora 
political party in BiH with headquarters in Sweden, there has been a high level of 
involved diaspora mobilization. Many of the claims this group has is echoed in BiH, 
focusing on the importance of citizens’ voices to be heard amidst the ethnonational 
political debates which continue to dominate in the homeland and often discourage 
transitional justice implementation on the local level. In particular, their lack of 
overarching success can be attributed to the lack of translocal society, as 
hypothesized, which limits the group’s ability to be more relevant in local 
communities in the homeland as well as their sister communities in the diaspora, 
whether in one country or transnationally.  
 Involved diaspora mobilization is also predicted by H3, and it is largely 
supported by evidence from Germany within Bosniak associations in particular as 
                                                
514 This can also be taken quite literally as the organization has been instrumental in trying to 
establish regular SAS flights between Sweden and BiH most recently. 
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well as Bosnian organizations more generally. Here, it is interesting to note how in 
a partially liberal citizenship regime, when there are collective claims, there is some 
mobilization, regardless of the presence of translocal community or not. However, 
when there is translocal community, it seems that the mobilization is a bit more 
sustained. Further, while claims are not always aimed at transitional justice in the 
homeland, involved diaspora mobilization is also evident in the hostland around 
issues that are relevant here, such as Islamophobia, evidenced through the 
engagement of Bosniaks in Germany, who do not really mobilize on account of the 
homeland.  
The only hypothesis that was not tested in this thesis was H4. The typology 
introduced included restrictive citizenship regimes, but neither of the three case 
studies examined fit. Future research could also incorporate a case study that has a 
more restrictive citizenship regime according to Howard’s framework, such as 
Austria. Considering that the type, hypothesized here, is involved diaspora 
mobilization, this would provide yet more comparable examples of involved 
diaspora mobilization across a spectrum of cases with different citizenship regimes 
as well as translocal community. It would further also be able to tease out potential 
other variables to include in the typology as well as how translocality impacts it.  
H5 predicted reactive diaspora mobilization in both restrictive citizenship 
regimes as well as those that are historically more liberal. In the French case, the 
evidence supports the hypothesis partially, as translocal community seems to play 
a role in mobilization, particularly through diaspora members’ explanations of their 
continued engagement with the homeland communities in transition. However, in 
one example, a prominent French Bosnian author engages with the homeland in a 
reactive way through her resignation and questioning of the homeland politics about 
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ideas of citizenship and political society. The initiatives discussed in France do not 
engage in French society about issues in their homeland, sometimes even 
emphasizing their belonging in France. 515  Their incentives, largely difficult to 
measure, can be understood to be individualized incentives for transitional justice 
from below.  
Hypothesis 6 is largely supported by the evidence provided by fieldwork in 
Germany, France, and Sweden. In all three cases, there are examples of inactive 
diaspora mobilization. However, in some cases, in the presence of a translocal 
community, the potential for greater diaspora mobilization is possible due to the 
strength of the translocal connections. However, this diaspora mobilization might 
be more overarching rather than focused on transitional justice or peacebuilding 
goals. This is evidenced by the Banja Lukans of Sweden who sustain their translocal 
communities in the diaspora but do not mobilize based on collective claims to a 
large extent.  
In Germany, H6 was supported by evidence from supplementary Bosnian 
schools as well as women’s groups. While there are collective claims that could be 
made around the importance of unified historical narratives in BiH, which is linked 
to education and transitional justice, they are not made in an effort to mobilize the 
diaspora in this regard. Instead, the emphasis has been teaching on Bosnian to the 
communities in Germany. The same was evident in women’s groups in Germany 
that focused on building community and overcoming trauma together. In France, 
the fragmentation within the community between Bosniaks from Bosnia and 
Bosniaks from Sandžak came to the forefront more than in the other two cases. 
                                                
515 For example, she writer her novels in French rather than Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian.  
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Without a collective claim being made explicitly within the community, 
inactive diaspora mobilization is best evidenced through attempts to maintain the 
heritage and culture of the diaspora, and to ensure that the second generation 
maintains some connection to it. In a sense, this mobilization is more alike to 
diaspora maintenance.  
In light of the findings discussed, the typology developed can be amended 
as follows in order to account for the hypotheses that were tested during fieldwork. 
Here, the inactive mobilization has been reinforced with the idea of diaspora 
maintenance, as discussed in the section about inactive diaspora mobilization in 
Sweden among Banja Lukans, the supplementary schools and women’s groups in 
Germany, and the fragmentation within the diaspora group between Bosniaks from 
BiH and Bosniaks from elsewhere. Also, due to the lack of hypothesis testing in a 
‘Restrictive Continuity’ citizenship regime during the fieldwork, the typology has 
been amended to reflect the hypotheses that have been tested.  
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In short, these hypotheses presented a variety of different pathways which led to 
four types of diaspora mobilization. Among the three variables which were tested, 
the translocal community variable played a particular role in the involved diaspora 
mobilization type in each of the three citizenship regimes. While it was originally 
anticipated that there was a presence or absence of translocal community, empirical 
research demonstrated that it matters whether there are translocal ties that remain 
the homeland as well as in the hostland for mobilization under different 
cirucmstances. For conflict-generated diaspora, the levels of translocality play a 
particular role and were in turn teased out in each of the three country cases, in 
particular utilizing translocal connections based on cities such as Banja Luka, 
Prijedor, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo.  
8.2 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
By developing a typology of diaspora mobilization, this study aimed to minimize 
some of the inherent challenges of multi-sited fieldwork by identifying and tracing 
three independent variables that influence diaspora mobilization, with a particular 
focus on transitional justice and peacebuilding. This thesis thus further builds on 
the role of diaspora in transitional justice approaches in post-conflict homelands, a 
topic gaining prominence in both academic and policy perspectives. It contributes 
to a more thorough understanding of Bosnian diaspora mobilization on a 
comparative level.  
Moreover, it has implications for ongoing research on the relationship 
between the global, the national, and the local in transitional justice, the role of 
diaspora and other external actors in these processes, and the ways in which these 
in mobilize in turn. This thesis brings to the forefront translocality, combining the 
transnational and the local by noting the importance of local knowledge and 
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understanding as well as grounding in the wider world. In many ways, this echoes 
the development of transitional justice research which has increasingly focused on 
local dimensions (see chapter 3). Moreover, it integrates translocality in political 
science research.  
In light of the ongoing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe as well as 
beyond, this research is particularly relevant for policy and practice, as countries 
such as Syria will undoubtedly undergo transition in the future as well. How their 
diaspora will mobilize around issues of transitional justice in Syria could be 
informed by this work, and there is some comparative work which has begun to 
undertake this already.516 Understanding how diaspora mobilize can help policy 
makers interested in supporting transitional justice processes. For host countries, it 
is particularly relevant as they navigate their own policies towards countries in 
transition. For example, Germany has accepted an unprecedented number of Syrian 
refugees and migrants, just as it did during the 1990s. A better understanding of 
how the citizenship regime influences diaspora can contribute to better policy 
decisions, whether around questions of integration, questions about hostland 
policies towards homelands, or overall support for transitional justice and peace 
activism.   
 A further implication of this research is for the policies of homelands 
towards their diasporas. While several countries have Ministries for Diaspora that 
are active and continue to foster relationships with their diaspora populations, 
Kosovo and India being most noteworthy perhaps, this is not a norm for most post-
conflict countries with diaspora populations. This research provides some insight 
                                                
516 Stokke, Espen, and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm. 2017. “Competition and Collaboration in the 
Syrian Diaspora’s Pursuit of Transitional Justice1.” Paper presented at ERC Workshop, 
“Diasporas and Transitional Justice: Local, National, and Global Dimensions,” at University of 
Warwick, Coventry, UK. 
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into the ways in which diaspora mobilize around relevant issues in their homelands 
and thus can help guide homeland policies in order to gain support from diaspora 
members as well, beyond including them in post-conflict peacebuilding processes 
for example. These can be by way of transitional justice measures, such as in Libya, 
economic development measures, or political participation.  
 This research provides insight into diaspora activism and outlines the 
resourceful ways in which diaspora mobilize from their host countries around 
collective transitional justice and peace based claims. The institutions with which 
diaspora members choose to collaborate often reflect their levels of integration and 
reflect back on the citizenship regimes they find themselves in. In turn, this affects 
the potential they have in influencing these post-conflict processes in their 
homelands. Further, international organizations and institutions that are heavily 
invested in peace processes in post-conflict homelands can learn from diaspora 
strategies, particularly on the local level using their translocal connections. Thus, 
this research helps to inform and can be an integral party of determining policy 
decisions in both homelands and host countries as well as for international 
organizations lobbying for transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts.  
8.3 Future Research 
 
Further scholarly work could take on aspects of the research explored in this thesis 
to address gaps in knowledge, policy, and understanding. In short, this could be in 
the form of theoretical work on diasporas and transitional justice, empirical work, 
or policy-oriented work. These will be explored in this section. 
 The first natural continuation of this research would be to increase the 
number of case studies or the number of diaspora populations. This would help to 
draw further conclusions about the generalizability of the typological model as well 
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as to expand on it. For example, further examining the US Bosnian population, or 
the Bosnian diaspora population in other countries in more detail, such as 
Switzerland or Austria, would help to build further on the Bosnian diaspora case 
study, as well as provide a case study of restrictive citizenship regimes through 
Austria. Considering that a hypothesis remained untested based on the original 
typology created, this seems a natural continuation of this research. 
On the other hand, there are sizeable other diaspora populations in Europe 
that would be worthwhile to study to examine the causal paths their mobilization 
takes vis-à-vis the typology developed in this thesis. This broader set of diaspora 
cases could be analyzed within one particular citizenship regime, or across different 
citizenship regimes, depending on whether there was interest in a particular country 
and its different diaspora populations, or diaspora populations across different 
countries. In this way, there could be more focus on process tracing and unpacking 
particular variables presented in the typology further, expanding, or finding new 
ways of increased generalizability for the typology.   
 Future research can also take on a multi-methodological approach, 
combining both quantitative as well as qualitative methods. Through survey 
research, the reasons for involved mobilization could be explored further to gather 
more variables for this distinct type of mobilization across different countries.517 
This would require more resources and collaboration with several institutions in 
helping to find diaspora individuals to contact but would further unpack an 
interesting area of research. At the same time, reactive as well as engaged 
mobilization could be further elaborated on, exploring additional causal 
                                                
517 The ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ will conduct survey research focused 
on diaspora mobilization comparatively in 2017. 
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mechanisms that influence diaspora mobilization, that are harder to extrapolate with 
qualitative research.  
 There are several further questions and that could be featured in future 
research apart from the methodological innovations mentioned above. As noted 
from the introductory chapter, diaspora collective claims are considered a key 
variable in diaspora mobilization. Future research could explore diaspora 
perceptions and participation regarding particular mechanisms of transitional 
justice – whether courts, truth and justice commissions, or particular local efforts 
exclusively. As more case based research emerges, more potential for comparative 
work on several diasporas will be possible, potentially collaboratively. For 
example, diaspora mobilization around truth and justice commissions could be 
compared with local and civil society partnerships diaspora forge to forward 
transitional justice and peacebuilding agendas in post-conflict homelands. Are 
certain claims more prone to a particular kind of diaspora mobilization and how to 
these pathways differ? The intersection of diaspora and transitional justice research 
is interesting to consider as this is a fledgling field with potential to expand the way 
we think about transitional justice and peacebuilding actors in post-conflict 
countries that have diaspora populations, but also how we implement these 
processes and find inclusive means to do so from a policy perspective. 
Moreover, research on translocalism can help to shed light on how 
transnationalism is evoked in the everyday and sustained over time. Understanding 
how attachment to formative places and relationships can translate into political 
action and activism in a globalized world is becoming increasingly relevant. 
People’s perception of shared experience in creating communities, building 
movements, and sustaining activism, whether transitional justice related or not, 
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beyond their places of origin is especially interesting to consider. For example, 
Black Lives Matter has chapters in the United Kingdom as well as across different 
states in the U.S. Translocal connections enhance our understandings of 
transnationalism and global politics and the activism that happens as a result. Local 
communities in which individuals first build their lives and which they share despite 
national and international environments impact the ways in which these individuals 
mobilize.  
 More thought could be given on the relationship between homelands and 
hostlands and how diaspora influence this relationship. Whether through lobbying, 
as understood in the US context, or through civil society actions, diaspora 
populations help to shape public perceptions about their homelands, in both positive 
and negative ways. For example, there is already interesting being developed in 
relation to statebuilding and diaspora.518 Further, the influence of political parties 
in the homeland has been touched on in this thesis and can further be elaborated 
on.519 It is generally understood  that diaspora vote for more nationalist parties, 
leading to extrapolation that diaspora are also more nationalist. More recent 
research including this thesis seems to point in the direction that diaspora can also 
act as moderating actors in the political discourses of their homelands, particularly 
in transitional situations. For example, an overwhelming number of interviewees 
disagreed with the political elite of their homeland, echoing allegations of 
                                                
518 Kadhum, Oula. 2016. “Diasporic Interventions: State-Building in Iraq Following the 2003 Iraq 
War.” PhD Dissertation, University of Warwick. 
519 Two papers during a recent workshop explored this in more detail: Burgess, Katrina. 2016. 
“States or Parties? Political Regimes and Patterns of Emigrant Outreach” Paper presented at 
Unpacking the Sending State: Regimes, Institutions, and non-state Actors in Diaspora and 
Emigration Politics, ISA ERC Warwick Workshop, University of Warwick, 12-13 September, 
2016.; 2016.; Koinova, Maria. 2016. “Government vs. Party Engagement of Diasporas Abroad:  
Kosovo as a Case of Contested Sovereignty.” Paper presented at Unpacking the Sending State: 
Regimes, Institutions, and non-state Actors in Diaspora and Emigration Politics, ISA ERC Warwick 
Workshop, University of Warwick, 12-13 September, 2016. 
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corruption, and displaying their frustrations openly. As one interviewee noted, “I 
have nobody to vote for, nobody I respect, so I don’t vote at all!”520 Research on 
diaspora attitudes and perceptions as well as sustained diaspora action towards 
transitional justice can take into account more than diaspora voting trends.   
 This study has developed a typology of diaspora mobilization for 
transitional justice and peacebuilding based claims in different citizenship regimes 
across Europe. It has established the importance of the interplay between translocal 
communities among the diaspora as well as collective claims as mobilizing factors 
for diaspora groups in addition to the host land environments which channel 
diaspora mobilization in different ways through citizenship regimes. The research 
conducted has gathered new empirical evidence which has been informed by 
several different strands of academic literatures. While it has explored the 
intersection of diaspora, transitional justice and peacebuilding through diaspora 
mobilization, more research is necessary in order to improve the typology 
developed and to expand on the ways in which post-conflict homelands can 
continue in their peacebuilding and transitional justice processes. If this chapter 
serves to place into context this study and indicate the potential of the scope of 
future research, there is little doubt left these vibrant academic fields will continue 
to flourish for many years to come.  
 
 
  
                                                
520 Respondent DE27 (2014) Interview in September, Stuttgart, Germany. 
 		248 
Appendix I 
Due to the nature of the ERC ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ stipulations, 
interviews were anonymized for confidentiality. In order to encourage 
transparency, the two sections of this appendix offer some further insight into the 
research methods. The methodology used for this study is further discussed within 
the thesis, and thus there is no need to repeat this information here. The first 
appendix provides some of the initial guiding questions and topics inquired about 
during interviews, as well as the informed consent letter which was presented, 
explained, and discussed with participants before interviews took place. While all 
interviewees were comfortable being interviewed or taking part in a focus group, 
some were not comfortable signings forms, citing concerns about bureaucratic 
measures, not being comfortable signing English forms, and general distrust with 
‘foreign’ institutions. In these cases, they provided verbal consent. The second 
appendix provides an overview of the interviews and focus groups conducted, the 
capacity in which individuals were interviewed, and the locations of the interviews.  
On a final note, nearly all of the interviews were conducted in Bosnian, or a 
combination of Bosnian and English, Bosnian and Swedish, Bosnian and German. 
I let interviewees choose their preferred language of communication, and obliged if 
they felt the need to switch between languages for particular questions. If 
individuals did not speak Bosnian or felt uncomfortable speaking Bosnian, we did 
not stray away from English or German. Considering that the overwhelming 
majority of interviews were conducted in Bosnian, the following section will outline 
the themes which I asked about rather than providing verbatim translations of the 
questions. 
 
Interview Structure Overview  
The interviews conducted for this study followed a similar structure based on a list 
of prepared questions that were derived from the interests and questions of the thesis 
as well as informed by the literature consulted. Some interviews were more 
informational in nature, particularly at the beginning of fieldwork. Not all the same 
questions were asked each time, depending on the interviewees, but the priority 
remained the same – to establish how diaspora mobilize politically, both within the 
homeland as well as the hostland, particularly around issues of transitional justice. 
Some interviewees served in official governmental or institutional roles, in either 
the homeland or the host country. I asked them about diaspora involvement in their 
work as well as potential collaborations or contentions they might have with 
diaspora.  
 All interviews started with me introducing myself and explaining what the 
larger ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ was focused on, before 
discussing in a bit more detail my own PhD research. Often, I also provided further 
information about myself, such as my place of birth (Banja Luka), the fact that I 
have also lived ‘in diaspora’ (particularly during interviews in Sweden and 
Germany as I have lived in these countries), or a shared acquaintance (if the 
individual was referred by another diaspora member).  
 The interviews started with me asking interviewees to provide a general 
introduction. If they were representatives of a diaspora organization, I further asked 
about their role there as well as the organization’s mission had changed over the 
years. I also asked about informal ties they might have to diaspora organizations or 
similar immigrant networks in both their country of residence as well as 
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transnationally. In order to open up the conversation, I asked interviewees what they 
considered the ideal diaspora engagement towards the homeland to look like in, 
both generally, as well as more specifically around issues of peacebuilding, 
reconciliation, and transitional justice. This was followed by questions about 
whether the organization they are part of has organized any initiatives that would 
help to move towards that ‘ideal’ version, or if the individual has been part of any.  
 In the following section of the interview, I asked interviewees about the 
main challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina today as well as the main issues 
they felt were relevant for the country. These were open-ended on purpose as I did 
not want to lead interviewees towards questions in regards to grievance claims, 
though I did ask them to specify in more detail once they began discussing.  
 As the interview moved on, I asked interviewees to discuss in more detail 
their engagement, or the most relevant three initiatives they could think of with 
diaspora involvement in relation to their homeland. Then I inquired about their 
reflections about these initiatives as well as their sustainability and whether there 
were any local actors in the homeland, transnational diaspora partners, or host 
country institutions and organizations that were relevant for diaspora engagement. 
I asked about the diaspora’s potential in changing the trajectory of the homeland. 
Here I also elaborated with questions about homeland politics and interviewees’ 
reflections on the same. In particular, I asked them to reflect on and give particular 
examples of collaboration with homeland institutions or individuals, and how this 
might reflect diaspora influence in the homeland.  
 In the following set of questions, I inquired about translocality and the 
interviewees’ relationship to their homeland city and region. Here I also asked if 
they could speak more generally or in more detail, depending on where the answers 
were leading. I also asked if they could think of diaspora members that were 
particularly more active, or less active, and why this was the case, both in the 
homeland as well as in the host land, as well as how this had changed over the years. 
This included also reflections about the Federation as well as Republika Srpska 
politics and diaspora standing in both.  
 Further, I asked interviewees about host country politics and their 
perceptions about the diaspora as well as the homeland in general. I inquired about 
what they viewed as their role within the host country society and questions of 
belonging. Here, I also asked about the issues they felt resonated in relation to their 
homeland in the host country, regardless of whether it was positive or negative. I 
also inquired about informal and formal ties with host land institutions the diaspora 
organization might have, or that might exist directly between the host and 
homelands.  
 Before finishing the interview, I asked if there was anything else they would 
like to add and if they felt I had overlooked anything during my questions, as well 
as whether they could provide me with further potential contacts.  
 As part of the ERC project, we conducted several coding exercises in which 
we coded some of our own and each other’s interviews in an effort to find mutual 
issues that were important comparatively across our cases as well as elucidate our 
own work further. This coding helped to inform the comprehensive survey for the 
larger ERC project. Further, it also served as the foundation for my own interview 
analysis.  
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Informed Consent Letter      
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
My name is Dženeta Karabegović and I am a PhD Research Fellow at the 
Politics and International Studies Department at Warwick University. I would like 
to express my gratitude to you for your interest to be included as an interviewee in 
this large academic project, which aims to better understand how diasporas in 
Europe mobilize transnationally to affect political change in their countries of origin 
in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The project is conducted on 
behalf of Warwick’s Politics and International Studies Department and is sponsored 
by the European Research Council. My specific sub-project is a comparative study 
of the transnational mobilization of the Bosnian diaspora in Europe with regard to 
the post-conflict reconstruction processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The study 
is embedded in scholarship on conflict and post-conflict processes, transitional 
justice, genocide remembrance, and state-building.  
Today I would like to talk to you about your experiences as an active member 
of your community, and about your connections to your country of origin, country 
of settlement, third countries with which you maintain active connections, and the 
European Union and other international organizations. I also would like learn what 
ideas and processes concerning your ethno-religious community are most important 
to you. I hope you do not mind that I record this interview to ensure quality 
transcription and publication. If you mind, or if you want to stop the recording or 
note-taking at a certain point, please let me know. Your participation is voluntary. 
If you want to say something relevant to this research that is not included in the 
interview questions, please feel free to do so. 
The results of this interview will be included in academic articles, an edited 
volume, a book [for the PI and Post-doc], and thesiss [for the Ph.D. students] that 
will be turned into books in the future. Since we also want to make a real-life 
impact, we will also communicate results to the media and the policy-making 
community. In order to protect the privacy of participants, we anonymize the 
interviews, unless you explicitly say that you want to go on record with your 
statements.  
If you have any further questions about this project, your participation in it, or 
about me, please feel free to ask me now or at any time in the future. Thank you for 
your cooperation in advance. 
Yes, I understand the nature of this research project and agree to participate: 
 
[name and signature of participant, place, date] 
 
I agree to maintain the anonymity of the above signed: 
 
[name and signature of researcher, place, date] 
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Appendix II – List of Interviews  
 
Interview 
Code 
Capacity Location Month and 
Year 
BH1 Returnee from Prijedor, Omarska 
Survivor, Activist, collaborates 
with Diaspora 
Prijedor, BiH July-13 
BH2 Returnee Activist from Prijedor, 
collaborates with Diaspora  
Prijedor, BiH July-13 
BH3 Staff, Council of Europe Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH4 BiH Ministry of Human Rights 
and Refugees 
Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH5 BiH Ministry of Human Rights 
and Refugees 
Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH6 Returnee, from Sarajevo, Non-
profit Sector 
Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH7 Activist, Returnee from 
Srebrenica, collaborates with 
Diaspora 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
BH8 Senior Staff MFS Emmaus 
Organization, Returnee from 
Tuzla 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
BH9 Former President of Preporod, 
worked with Diaspora and 
Returnees during the 1990s 
Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH10 Returnee from Zenica, not 
involved in diaspora activisty 
Sarajevo, BiH July-13 
BH11 Diaspora Activist in Sweden, 
more involved around Bosniak 
issues 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
BH12 Diaspora Returnee and Activist 
from Srebrenica 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
BH13 Diaspora Returnee from Banja 
Luka 
Banja Luka, BiH July-13 
BH14 Returnee from Srebrenica Area, 
Organizer around Peace March 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
BH15 Communications Director for 
Prvi Mart 
Sarajevo, BiH August-13 
BH16 Youth Organizer working with 
Diaspora  
Sarajevo, BiH August-13 
BH17 BiH Diaspora Forum Founder, 
Returnee Activist from Prijedor 
Sarajevo, BiH June-14 
BH18 Returnee Activist, works with 
APU Network  
Sarajevo, BiH July-15 
BH19 Returnee and Activist from Banja 
Luka 
Banja Luka, BiH July-15 
DE1 BiH Embassy Senior Leadership, 
Berlin 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
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DE2 Diaspora Activist, Former 
Supplementary School Attendee, 
Active with Bosnian Islamic 
Cultural Center 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE3 Diaspora Activist, Former 
Supplementary School Attendee, 
Active with Bosnian Islamic 
Cultural Center 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE4 Senior Staff at SudOst 
Organization 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE5 Leadership at Bosnian Islamic 
Cultural Center, Supplementary 
Schools 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE6 Diaspora Member, Bosnian 
Women's Group, SudOst 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE7 Diaspora Member, Bosnian 
Women's Group, Supplementary 
School Teacher 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE8 Diaspora Member, SudOst  Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE9 Bh Initiative Leadership, Activist 
in Germany 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE10 Diaspora Member and Organizer, 
does not participate in Diaspora 
Organizations 
Freiburg, Germany September-14 
DE11 2nd Generation Diaspora in 
Germany, works in Stuttgart city 
institutions on diversity and 
integration 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE12 Diaspora Member, Bosnian Club 
Stuttgart 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE13 Representative of Hrvatske 
katoličke zajednice Bl. Alojzije 
Stepinac i Sv. Martin 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE14 Senior Staff at BiH Embassy, 
Stuttgart 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE15 Senior Staff at BiH Embassy, 
Berlin 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE16 Diaspora Activist, Former 
Supplementary School Attendee, 
Active with Bosnian Islamic 
Cultural Center 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE17 Former Supplementary School 
Leadership in Berlin 
Berlin, Germany September-14 
DE18 Gastarbeiter, Diaspora Member, 
SDA supporter 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE19 Former BiH Consul in Germany, 
Diaspora Member, 
Supplementary Schools 
Leadership 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
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DE20 IZBN President, 2nd Generation 
Diaspora Member 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE21 Leadership Avangarda BiH Munich, Germany October-14 
DE22 Leadership Avangarda BiH Munich, Germany October-14 
DE23 Former Senior Staff at BiH 
Embassy in Munich, Diaspora 
Member 
Munich, Germany October-14 
DE24 Diaspora Activist during the 
1990s, arrived in Munich as a 
Refugee 
Munich, Germany October-14 
DE25 Diaspora Activist, 2nd 
Generation Diaspora 
Munich, Germany September-14 
DE26 Diaspora Member, Bosnian Club 
Stuttgart 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE27 Diaspora Member, Concentration 
Camp Survivor 
Stuttgart, Germany September-14 
DE28 Former Avangarda Leadership Munich, Germany October-15 
FG1 Bosnian French Dzemat 
Members, Focus Group (11 
Participants) Organized after 
Friday Prayers 
Paris, France February-14 
FG2 Srebrenica Area Returnees and 
Diaspora Members, Focus Group 
(5 participants) Organized during 
the Peace March 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
FG3 Srebrenica Area Returnees, Focus 
Group (6 Participants) Organized 
during the Peace March 
Srebrenica, BiH July-13 
FG4 Srebrenica Area Returnees, Focus 
Group (5 participants) Organized 
during the Peace March 
Srebrenica, BiH July-14 
FG5 Srebrenica Area Returnees and 
Diaspora Members (8 
participants) Focus Group 
Organized during the Peace 
March 
Sarajevo, BiH July-14 
FG6 Konjevic Polje Parent Protestors, 
Focus Group (9 Participants) 
Organized during Sarajevo 
Protests 
Sarajevo, BiH September-13 
FR1 Bosnian Diaspora Member in 
France since 1970s, not very 
active in diaspora organizations 
Paris, France February-14 
FR2 Bosnian Diaspora Member, 
MirSada 
Lyon, France February-14 
FR3 Bosnian Diaspora Member, does 
not participate in diaspora 
organizations 
Lyon, France February-14 
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FR4 MirSada, Solidarite Bosnie, Peace 
March Activist 
Geneva, 
Switzerland 
February-14 
FR5 Solidarite Bosnie, Peace March 
Activist, Organizes Bosnia 
related events in Geneva and Paris 
Geneva, 
Switzerland 
February-14 
FR6 Diaspora Organizer and 
Leadership of Aide a l’education 
en Bosnie-Herzegovine  
Paris, France February-14 
FR7 Has lived in France since 1970s, 
does not participate in Diaspora 
Associations 
Paris, France February-14 
FR8 World Bosniak Congress, Džemat 
Paris Leadership 
Paris, France February-14 
SWE1 Bosnian Diaspora Member, 
Sweden, Banja Luka Association 
Sarajevo, BiH August-13 
SWE2 Diaspora Member, Sweden, 
Former BiH Embassy Staff in 
Stockholm, Women's 
Organization 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
March-14 
SWE3 President, Banja Luka Diaspora 
Association 
Motala, Sweden March-14 
SWE4 President, Ljiljan Motala 
Association, APU Network 
Motala, Sweden March-14 
SWE5 APU Network Leadership Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE6 Swedish Parliament Member Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE7 President of Bosnian Women's 
Organization, Sweden 
Varnamo, Sweden June-14 
SWE8 President of Bosnian Women's 
Organization, Sweden, APU 
Network 
Malmö, Sweden June-14 
SWE9 Leadership SDBiH, Peace March 
Participant 
Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE10 Former Leadership SDBiH, 
Women's Organization Member 
Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE11 Former Leadership SDBiH Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE12 SEEBA Founder, APU Network 
Member 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE13 Former APU Network 
Leadership, Diaspora Activist 
who also lived in Germany 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE14 APU Network Leadership Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE15 Founder of Vara Barn, APU 
Network  
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-14 
SWE16 Diaspora Member, Women's 
Group, Banja Luka Association 
Motala, Sweden March-16 
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SWE17 Diaspora Member, APU Network Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-16 
SWE18 Diaspora Member, APU Network Stockholm, 
Sweden 
June-16 
SWE19  Diaspora Member, Banja Luka 
Association Member  
Motala, Sweden June-16 
UK1 Diaspora Activist from Prijedor 
Area, Omarska Survivor 
Oxford, UK March-13 
UK2 Leadership Svjetski Savez 
Dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine 
(SSDBiH), SDBiH Member 
Birmingham, UK May-14 
US1 US Based Diaspora Activist from 
Prijedor 
New York City, 
USA 
April-13 
US2 Diaspora Member, Former 
Teacher in Supplementary School 
in Berlin 
Phone Interview June-16 
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